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INTRODUCTION
There is a contradiction in the prevailing understanding of law-
yer dispute bargaining role, between what might be thought of as
bargaining's practical norms and its ethical norms. The practical
norms provide rules for maximizing long range client and lawyer
returns. They tell lawyer bargainers to distribute resources effi-
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ciently, preserve bargaining relationships, and satisfy party interests
in the aggregate. The ethical norms provide rules for representing
clients competently and diligently. They tell lawyers to get the most
they can for present clients, when so instructed, irrespective of the
effects on resource distribution and future bargaining. Trying scru-
pulously to comply with both sets of norms, each for different rea-
sons, lawyers frequently find themselves under contradictory
commands, without meta norms to sort out the contradictions or
rank order the commands, and thus, "in the dark" with respect to
the central question of how they should act. This contradictory set
of role commands has several effects, but one of the least salutary is
that it seems to encourage the stylized adversarial maneuvering
commonly associated with lawyers and dispute bargaining (e.g., ex-
aggerated argument, insulting tone, routinized trading, circumspect
and deceptive disclosure), which is now widely thought to make
such bargaining inefficient, unpleasant, and unfair. If these effects
are to be avoided, and bargaining role to be made more coherent, it
is necessary that bargaining's ethical and practical norms be recon-
ciled, or if that is too ambitious, at least their contradictions de-
scribed in sufficient detail so that others may work on the problem.
These are the purposes of this Article.
The discussion has five parts. Part I describes the nature of
legal dispute bargaining, emphasizing the distinctive combination of
adjudicative and legislative properties that make it both legal and
bargaining, and explains the analytical dilemma of lawyer role, the
so-called bargainer's dilemma, through which the pull of bargain-
ing's practical norms is most readily seen. Part II describes two sets
of practical norms that presently compete for allegiance. The first,
an older and perhaps weakening "lawyer-as-adversary" view, sees
bargaining as an essentially competitive enterprise in which one
party's gains are the other's losses, bargaining conversation as the
advancement and rebuttal of position and demand, and "looking
out for number one" as the overriding objective. The second, a
newer "lawyer-as-colleague" view, sees bargaining as a cordial,
principled, and problem-solving undertaking in which party inter-
ests are complementary rather than antagonistic, and in which
reaching the best outcome for all concerned is more important to
each participant than achieving the most favorable outcome for its
particular side. The lawyer-as-colleague view seems to have carried
the day in the academic literature, and perhaps in parts of practice
as well, and Part II summarizes and evaluates the arguments
through which this was done.
Part III describes bargaining's ethical norms, as articulated in
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the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct and the statutes and doctrines of the various jurisdictions,
which lawyer bargainers are bound to obey at the peril of being
sued, disciplined, or thought unethical by themselves and others.
Contrary to practical norms, ethical norms make loyalty and dili-
gence in the pursuit of individual client goals the overriding rule. A
lawyer is obligated to do for a client what the client wants done, as
the client sees it, as long as it is legal, to the detriment of whoever
and whatever stands in the way. These individually oriented, adver-
sarial, and maximizing norms often command action contrary to
that required by bargaining's community-focused and cooperation-
oriented practical norms, and it is in particular instances of conflict
between the two sets of norms that the contradiction in lawyer bar-
gaining role most clearly appears.
Part IV describes the frequent impossibility of being both ethi-
cal and practical, and examines lawyer efforts to avoid and adapt to
this difficulty. Certain stylized types of deceptive, contentious, and
unmannerly lawyer bargaining behavior, long the object of criticism
by opponents of the lawyer-as-adversary view, are reinterpreted in
light of this role contradiction, and explained as a natural if not al-
ways felicitous adaptation to role confusion. In Part V proposals to
eliminate the confusion are described and evaluated, and a prefer-
ence is indicated.
I. BARGAINING AS STRATEGIC INTERACTION
For simplicity's sake, let us make the familiar assumption that
legal bargaining takes two principal forms, dispute settlement and
deal making.' Dispute settlement is the resolution of disagreements
in which different conceptions of law play a central role, both in de-
1. The distinction is Eisenberg's, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976), and
others have followed it. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 758 n.6 (1984). Like
most dichotomous categorizing, it is often problematic, see DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 39-40 (1989) (discussing the problematic
character of Eisenberg's dichotomy, using the terms "dispute resolution" and "transac-
tional negotiation"); Franco Ferrarotti, The Destiny of Reason and the Paradox of the Sacred,
46 Soc. RES. 650-54 (1979) (discussing the inadequacies of dualistic thinking); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties,
33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 188 (1981) ("these two categories ... would collapse into a single
type were it not for the availability of a court to which parties could resort upon failure
of negotiations"), but those difficulties do not come up in this discussion. For other
bargaining typologies, see HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL 118-27 (1991);
GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 2-5 (1983).
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fining the problem and determining its outcome, and in which the
parties may pursue, have pursued, or are about to pursue the con-
flict in court.2 Deal making, on the other hand, is the definition of,
and agreement to, voluntarily undertaken rules and relationships
for governing future behavior. Deals create rights that did not pre-
viously exist and that may serve as the basis for defining and resolv-
ing future disputes. Individual lawyers do both, but often the two
types of bargaining are conducted by different parts of the bar, in
accordance with different conventions and practices, and through
the use of different maneuvers and techniques.3 While outwardly
different, therefore, the two types of bargaining are also structurally
alike, particularly with respect to the manner in which offers and
proposals are advantageously presented and exchanged in what may
be thought of as the trading dimension of each. Because in one
sense this Article is about advantageous trading, its analysis often
will apply equally well to both types of bargaining. Nevertheless,
discussion will be limited to dispute settlement. Working with just
one scenario should make the discussion easier to follow, and dis-
pute settlement is the harder case for the Article's claims. If the
analysis can be made to work in that context, the reader will have
little difficulty in extrapolating its principles to deal making, or de-
ducing its equivalent arguments.4
Dispute settlement is a complex, often contradictory process,
which resists attempts at explanation in terms of some single all-
encompassing metaphor. It is characterized by its own distinctive
set of participant objectives and expectations, structural incentives
and constraints, prudential behavior patterns, and interactional con-
2. The civil lawsuit is the paradigm example. "Court" in this context includes all
formally created adjudicative bodies with their own rules of procedure, no matter how
minimal, and specifically defined jurisdictional authority. In addition to institutions
called courts, this includes all types of administrative agencies, most arbitrators and ar-
bitration panels, and many mediators and mediation panels. For a discussion of the
many meanings and functions of "court" in the American judicial system, see Marc Ga-
lanterJustice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19J. LEGAL PLU-
RALISM 1, 1-3 (1981).
3. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 193. For other discussions of the ways in which law
practice is stratified, seeJOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); FRANCES K. ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM,
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981).
4. Extrapolating to deal making would involve the use of additional conceptual
tools. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE LJ. 239, 305 (1984) ("[F]inance and transaction cost economics now provide
tools necessary for serious inquiry into a theory of private ordering and for bringing the
theory to bear . .. on understanding how people order their relationships in the ab-
sence of regulatory interference.").
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ventions and norms. It is a hybrid of the ordinary social experience
of disagreeing with a friend or acquaintance on the one hand, and
the unusual and highly stylized work experience of arguing to a
court on the other. It asks one to be adversarial but not antagonis-
tic, personal but not intimate, truthful but not candid, and informal
but not relaxed. It is a study in tensions, located between the worlds
of self and other, friendship and work, law and morality, formality
and informality, efficiency and justice, and it carries with it a corre-
spondingly complex set of obligations for those who participate.
For example, dispute settlement sits prominently astride the
well-known public-private distinction.5 It is, at one and the same
time, both a part of the state's formal system for redressing legal
injury and a partial escape from it. It is nonlegal and private in that
it is unmonitored and party run, so that when bargainers agree (an
important and less common occurrence than is typically thought) to
be arbitrary, collusive, extra-legal, or even lawless, there is little the
formal adjudicatory system will be able to do or want to do about it. 6
Yet, law also largely defines dispute settlement's form and content.
5. The literature on this topic is quite extensive. See, e.g., Symposium, The Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
6. "Agree" means agree in fact, not just behave in a manner that will later be
treated by a court of law as evidence sufficient to support the finding of an agreement
(e.g., signing a consent decree). Parties often sign agreements based on inaccurate un-
derstandings of their rights, see Robert J. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides ': Patterns of Argu-
ment in Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 131-32 (1985), or because they were
coerced by features of the settlement process, see HOWARD S. ERLANGER ET AL., COOPERA-
TION OR COERCION? INFORMAL SETrLEMENT IN THE DIVORCE CONTEXT 7-21 (Institute for
Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 7, Mar. 1986). Such agreements cannot be said to
be voluntary in any noncasuistical sense of the term. See also MARYGOLD S. MELLI ET AL.,
THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION IN THE DIVORCE CON-
TEXT 26 (Institute for Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 7, Dec. 1985) (maintaining
that "true agreement between the parties is much less common than the frequency of
settlement might indicate"). Nevertheless, courts often enforce such agreements, see Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1136 (1991) (upholding rational, but
seemingly bad union settlement), notwithstanding that their "ability to provide mean-
ingful review of [the] settlement's adequacy is questionable." Janet C. Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499 n.5
(1991). For a discussion of the point that parties may agree to "extra-legal" settlements,
see Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitu-
tional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV.
203, 208-09 (1987) ("[Wlhere one of the parties to a consent decree cedes more than
the utmost a court could have exacted on its own authority, there are grounds to suspect
that the decree reflects collusion between the parties or some element of distortion or
misrepresentation by one of the parties[;]" however, " 'a federal court is not necessarily
barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader re-
lief than the court could have awarded after trial . . . to the extent that the consent
decree is not otherwise shown to be unlawful.' " (quoting Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525-26 (1986))). As to why we should
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Legal rules create rights and obligations that make tactical and stra-
tegic moves available and serve as bargaining chips; shadow ver-
dicts7 act as standards against which to judge the desirability of
different outcomes; and the possibilities of deadlock and removal to
court serve as leverage for parties whose rights are not adequately
recognized or protected by informal processes. Even the compro-
mise of rights for practical considerations, the quintessential non-
legal maneuver, is to a considerable extent grounded on and
influenced by a legal analysis of the strength of the rights
compromised.
Dispute bargaining is also a complex social process consisting
of distinctive political, moral, and strategic dimensions. It is polit-
ical in the sense that it resolves questions of legal entitlement as an
adjunct to formal adjudication by making binding determinations
about the identification and compensation of legal wrongs. It is
moral in the sense that it proceeds through a series of truth claims
made by individuals in face-to-face interactions, which are grounded
in determinations about the limits of deception, the proper use of
power, and the obligations of personal fair dealing. And it is strate-
gic in the sense that it involves the bilateral presentation, evaluation,
and selection of conflicting claims to real world goods and opportu-
care about settlements unconnected to the merits of parties' legal claims, see Alexander,
supra, at 568-70.
For a discussion of the special kind of lawlessness in which lawyers are inevitably
engaged, see Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass,
75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 381-86 (1987).
7. For perhaps the most sophisticated discussion of the relationship among and the
interpenetration of formal norms, courts, and informal processes, see Galanter, supra
note 2, at 4-17, 27-34. For a discussion of shadow verdicts, and how legal claims operate
as bargaining chips, see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-77 (1979). See also HERBERT
M. KRrrZER, THE FORM OF NEGOTIATION IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 10 (Institute for Legal
Studies, Working Papers Series 7, Dec. 1985) [hereinafter KRrrZER, FORM OF NEGOTIA-
TION]; HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR: WORKING IN THE SHADOWS
passim (Institute for Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 7, Jan. 1986) [hereinafter
KRITZER, LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR]; DAVID LUBAN, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE 11-31 (Insti-
tute for Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 8,June 1988); Galanter, supra note 2, at 8-
9 (tracing the origins of the shadow metaphor). But see MELLI et al., supra note 6, at 8-12,
20-21, 30-37 (arguing that while background substantive law and availability of formal
adjudication influence negotiation outcome, a wide range of nonsubstantive factors also
play a large role); Alexander, supra note 6, at 567 ("[I]n a world where all cases settle, it
may not ... be possible to base settlements on the merits because lawyers may not be
able to make reliable estimates of expected trial outcomes .... In short, there [may be]
nothing to cast a shadow in which the parties can bargain."); Avery Katz, The Strategic
Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 215, 227 (1990) (summarizing and discussing economic perspectives on the effect
of substantive entitlements on strategic behavior).
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nities, shaped by a strategic plan for advancing such claims
successfully.
In fact, it is this strategic dimension that gives dispute bargain-
ing its distinctive nature and form. Dispute bargaining is almost
created by strategy, undertaken in the first instance not because it is
intrinsically worthwhile, aesthetically pleasing, important to per-
sonal development, or the naturally best way for people to interact,
but because it is an instrumentally effective method for settling con-
flicting claims to limited resources, opportunities, and the like. It is
not an essential human activity, and it probably would not exist, at
least not pervasively, in a world without scarcity. Instead, it is a so-
cially constructed process in which participants manipulate a com-
plex web of interpretive, advocative, and trading practices in order
to put individual objectives in their best possible light and increase
the likelihood that they will be realized. It takes its form in the first
instance from a process of reasoning backwards instrumentally from
such objectives. Strategy is not all of bargaining, of course, but it is
an inescapable, irreducible part, the core out of which the process's
moral, political, and social issues emerge, and from which they take
their own special character and shape. A bargainer has no choice
but to be strategic, other than the choice not to bargain at all, and
this reality acts as a backdrop to all understanding of lawyer bar-
gaining behavior and role.8
8. See Oran R. Young, Introduction to Manipulative Models of Bargaining, in BARGAINING:
FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 303-07 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975) ("[Ijt is the com-
bination of opportunities for communication with the presence of strategic interaction
which paves the way for the manipulative activities that constitute the core of bargain-
ing." Id. at 303.). There is a body of feminist political theory, grounded in the work of
Carol Gilligan and others, see, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REV. 829, 871 n. 174 (1990); Paul T. Wangerin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative
Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1292-96
(1988), that may view this emphasis on strategy as a particularly male way of seeing
things. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 763-64 n.28. Nevertheless, being stra-
tegic in this context means only being purposive, that is, having a conception of the
appropriate ends of the bargaining relationship and a method of proceeding for realiz-
ing those ends. A feminist view of appropriate ends and means might (almost assuredly
will) be different from a nonfeminist view, but it still will be purposive. For example, an
ethic of "nurturing and care" (or even "sympathy," see Robin L. West, Taking Preferences
Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 679-88 (1990)), if it is appropriate to characterize this as a
feminist ethic (and there is controversy about whether it is, see Douglas MacLean & Clau-
dia Mills, Love and Justice, 9 QQ-REORT, INST. FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y 12, 13 (Fall
1989); Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1049-50 (1991) ("Worthy and precious as it is,
the ethic of care as we know it may also be a cultural complex of traits useful to a group
existing under oppression . . . [and not] essential or peculiar to women."); Deborah L.
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 624-25 (1990); Helen Vendler,
Feminism and Literature, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, May 31, 1990, 19, 21-23), can be seen as a
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In this world of strategic interaction, uncertainty, thought of as
incomplete and imperfect information about the factors a rational
actor should take into account in deciding how to proceed, is dis-
pute settlement's most salient attribute. Parties come to bargaining
with diverse and not always compatible expectations about out-
come, and often incommensurable beliefs about the legitimacy of
their respective positions. While they know in advance that such in-
compatibility and incommensurability are possible, they do not
know in any particular case to what extent they are present. When
they enter a negotiation, therefore, bargainers do not know for cer-
tain whether they will be friends or enemies, focused on questions
of efficiency or fairness, able to work together or locked intractably
in combat. As a result, they must approach the negotiation pre-
pared for all of the above.
Uncertainty results in part from the fact that in law, and in life
generally, there are competing conceptions of the good,9 and thus
no necessary consensus on how a dispute ought to be resolved, or
even on the principles on which a resolution could be grounded.
Not everyone believes, for example, that property rights count for
as much as personal rights (or even that rights discourse is the best
framework for resolving questions of resource distribution), that all
values can be expressed in terms of some common denominator
such as money, that proceeding forward efficiently is more impor-
tant than determining responsibility for present states of affairs, that
properly promulgated laws are necessarily valid, or that procedural
justice is the same as justice simpliciter. Parties starting from such
diverse premises often reach different conclusions about what result
a bargaining interaction ought to produce, and with good reason.
The effect is that bargainers usually cannot say with precision at the
beginning of a negotiation what their counterparts will accept to set-
strategic (in the sense of purposive) response to the bargaining problem based on a
specific conception of the appropriate ends of bargaining and its related means.
Whether an ethic of care is an appropriate response, or whether there is such a thing as
an ethic of care, are complicated subjects on which there is room for doubt, but there is
no doubt of feminism's purposivism.
9. This, again, is a topic on which many volumes have been written, both making
this point and articulating differing conceptions of the good. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 79 (1983); Duncan Ken-
nedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE LJ. 705,
743-44 (discussing a similar point under the rubric of ideology); Howard Lesnick, The
Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413,
420-39 (discussing conservative, liberal, and radical "world views"); Rhode, supra note
8, at 635-38.
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tie the dispute."° They can make predictions, and these often will
come close, particularly if their past dealings involved similar dis-
putes or were long standing. But they cannot be exact in these pre-
dictions or do more than specify a range of possible outcomes. If it
were otherwise, there would be no need to bargain. Each would
offer the minimum the other would take, because to offer more
would be to make a gift and not a bargain.
Uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that bargainers must
make statements and describe intentions in their clients' best light,
and therefore, in the strongest credible terms that the most gener-
ous or compliant (hypothetical) adversary might accept. Conse-
quently, what is said in bargaining is usually an exaggerated version
of what is meant, and known to be so. Yet, bargainers need to know
whether particular adversaries are the most generous, or of what
generosity consists in a given case. Therefore, they must learn dur-
ing the course of the bargaining interaction what their counterparts
truly believe and would be willing to do, and to do this they must
interpret actions and statements of the other side as much for what
they reveal as for what they say." In such a world, communication
itself is another source of uncertainty. Every disclosure is viewed as
(and is) potentially a concession, every argument potentially a prov-
ocation, and every proposal potentially a gift. In speaking at all,
then, bargainers understandably will be cautious and circumspect,
revealing as little and defending as much as possible until the
other's intentions are known. While this is only prudent-one does
not bare the throat until it is clear that it will not be cut-the effect is
to make communication more difficult. Suspicion increases, candor
diminishes, and indirect and self-protective methods of expression
replace open and straightforward ones.
Uncertainty is also increased by the recursiveness of the bar-
gaining dynamic. In the process of trying to dope out, influence,
and trade favorably with one another, the state of mind each bar-
gainer tries to understand has as one of its properties the fact that it
is also trying to understand the other. Bargaining is thus a process
of mutually assessed mutual assessment, in which each party makes
moves that carry fateful implications and that must be chosen in
10. See Katz, supra note 7, at 239 n.62 ("In reality, it is difficult for one party to know
the other's valuation of relevant outcomes with precision, especially if one allows the
possibility of nonmonetary or psychic aspects of value.").
11. For a discussion of this process, described as "assessment," see Condlin, supra
note 6, at 67-68. See also Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA
L. REV. 1219, 1239-41 (1990) (describing "best lights" discourse).
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light of one's thoughts about the other's thoughts about oneself,
and so on. Such information is unknowable in any final sense, of
course, because it changes at the moment it becomes known, by vir-
tue of the fact that it is known. Bargainers can make assumptions
about what their counterparts believe, about what they (the bargain-
ers) believe, about what the others believe, and so on, but to the
extent that they try to understand these beliefs finally, they will inev-
itably be trapped in an outguessing regress.' 2
In short, the lack of perfect information about adversary wants
and needs, the possibility of competing conceptions of the good, the
practice of a "best lights" discourse, recursiveness, and ordinary
prudence combine to cause dispute bargainers to approach a bar-
gaining relationship cautiously and to communicate strategically.
Dispute bargainers must and do learn to trust, of course, for without
trust bargainers could not settle disputes. But this is an instrumen-
tal understanding of trust, as predictability, or the capacity to know
when others will honor their commitments,13 and trust as predict-
ability does not do much to soften the cautiousness and suspicion
that is built into the structure of the bargaining conversation or to
change bargaining's distinctive and identifying character as strategic
interaction.
Galling dispute settlement strategic does not diminish the im-
portance of the moral and political dimensions of choosing a bar-
gaining approach. It is often more important to be candid or fair
than to be instrumentally successful. Nor does it resolve the ques-
tion of how to behave when settling disputes. There are different
and often contradictory strategies for achieving bargaining objec-
tives, ranging from the most cooperative and mutual on the one
end, to the most competitive and individualistic on the other, and
similarly different ways of defining the hierarchy of bargaining goals
so that anything from obtaining the maximum share of the bargain-
ing pot to preserving working relationships with other bargainers
and principals could be at the top. To see dispute settlement as
12. For a discussion of the recursiveness problem and the "outguessing regress," see
Erving Goffman, Strategic Interaction, in STRATEGIC INTERACTION 99-101 (1969).
13. For a recent discussion of methods to ensure that bargainers carry out their com-
mitments, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcON. &
ORGANIZATION 5, 9-25 (1985). The classic discussions that Professor Kronman updates
are those of THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), and Goffman, supra
note 12. See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 182 (1984)
("Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than
whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation with
each other."); Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1990).
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strategic, however, is to see it as bargainers see it, to recognize what
drives it, and to understand the way in which questions about it,
even moral and political questions, must be framed. We now turn
to one of those questions.
II. THE PRACTICAL NEED TO COOPERATE
If dispute settlement i's primarily strategic, its central strategic
choice is whether to cooperate or compete, both in deciding how to
make each of the hundreds of individual tactical maneuvers and
moves that make up a single negotiation, and in selecting an overall
bargaining strategy. These decisions include whether to share in-
formation or conceal it, exploit leverage or seek a fair return, brow-
beat an adversary or discuss and analyze views evenhandedly, and
describe wants accurately or inflate and state them as demands.
With respect to the selection of an overall strategy, these decisions
also include whether to give the opponent the benefit of the doubt
and cooperate until betrayed, or to assume the worst and try for a
pre-emptive or decisive first strike. Successful bargainers are those
who blend cooperative and competitive choices into a unified ap-
proach so that they are able to share private information without
making themselves disproportionately vulnerable, test differing
legal views without weakening their support for nonrelated issues,
and invent and make multiple proposals for settlement without com-
mitting themselves to the worst of the possibilities. They cooperate
with an eye toward protecting their competitive positions and com-
pete so as not to preclude the development of mutual trust and bi-
partisan effort, even though competitive strategies make
cooperation more difficult and cooperative moves make parties dis-
proportionately vulnerable to competitive responses.' 4
14. See Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOP-
ERATIVE RELATIONS 213, 214-15 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (discussing the interrela-
tion of cooperation and competition in society). Not everyone likes the terms
"cooperative" and "competitive," but it is the language of rational choice theory, where
most of the research on bargaining has been done. See KRrrZER, supra note 1, at 76-80
(discussing cooperation and competition in bargaining); Katz, supra note 7, at 234. For
another use of the cooperative-competitive dichotomy, in the context of a discussion of
Dean G. Pruitt's "strategic choice model," see GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 22-24. See also
DEAN G. PRUrITr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 15-16 (1981). Gifford defines "competitive"
and "cooperative" differently than I, and in ways that are not always helpful. For exam-
ple, he sees the universe of bargaining behavior as falling into three tactical categories:
competitive, cooperative, and problem solving. Competitive tactics are those "designed
to undermine the other negotiator's confidence in his bargaining position," cooperative
tactics are those "based on what is fair and just," and problem-solving tactics are those
that "identify and exploit opportunities for joint gain." GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 8. He
also defines the categories in terms of their views about appropriate bargaining ends. Id.
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As David A. Lax and James K. Sebennius have shown,' 5 these
properties cause the bargaining process to have much in common
with game theory's famous prisoner's dilemma.' 6 When both bar-
gainers cooperate they receive the benefits of joint action and pro-
duce an outcome that is favorable for both. When one cooperates
and the other competes, the competitor usually exploits the cooper-
ator and does better. When both compete, they waste resources in
ego battles, leave money on the table out of exhaustion and polari-
zation,.and frequently end up with a mediocre outcome.' 7 In any
single negotiation, choosing presents a dilemma because the ra-
tional choice for each individual bargainer often leads to a mutually
undesirable outcome.' 8 There are ways out of this dilemma in re-
peat bargaining that, while simple, are not always obvious, and these
are discussed later.'9 But in any single negotiation, where there is
no prospect of future dealing, it is usually irrational for individual
bargainers to act cooperatively, and that is the bargainer's
dilemma.20
at 14-15. The rest of his book explicates this tripartite division, and it is one of the
work's principal analytical contributions. Yet, these definitions do not seem to sort out
hard cases. For example, if I have a fair and just claim to a certain resource, which the
bargainer on the other side does not accept, because of some error, willful or otherwise,
in her assessment of the bargaining problem, may I browbeat, intimidate, or in some
other way coerce her into recognizing and agreeing with my view? It will not always be
the case that when bargainers disagree one is right and the other wrong, but it will
sometimes be so, and that is the situation on which I want to focus. If I do coerce the
other side, through the use of some extra-substantive leverage, have I bargained com-
petitively or cooperatively in Gifford's terms? I have certainly tried to "undermine the
other negotiator's confidence" in her bargaining position, yet I have done so on behalf
of a claim that is "fair and just." If the response is that I have been both competitive and
cooperative, is this not always the case in bargaining, because all bargaining behavior
"based on what is fair and just" tries as one of its goals to "undermine the other negoti-
ator's confidence in [her] bargaining position" (for the reason that what she is asking is
not fair and just)? At this point, Gifford's categories no longer separate one type of
bargaining behavior from another and are not helpful.
15. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENNIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BAR-
GAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 38-41 (1986). This is surely the best
book to come out of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and one of the best books (if not
the best) on bargaining theory in the last decade.
16. The prisoner's dilemma and its application to legal dispute bargaining are dis-
cussed in detail, infra notes 138-183 and accompanying text. For an introduction to
game theory and the prisoner's dilemma, see J. KEITH MURNIGHAN, THE DYNAMICS OF
BARGAINING GAMES (1991); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO GAME THEORY (1990).
17. See infra notes 141-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of this payoff
structure.
18. See infra text accompanying note 142.
19. See infra notes 146-165 and accompanying text.
20. For an explanation of why this is so, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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The bargainer's dilemma is a practical problem, concerned with
the question of how to behave in order to obtain the largest share of
whatever is bargained over, both in individual negotiations and over
the course of a bargaining career. According to traditional wisdom,
lawyers resolve the dilemma by always choosing the competitive op-
tion. They reportedly disclose information selectively and mislead-
ingly, overstate substantive views and discuss them contentiously,
inflate needs and state them as demands, clean out opponents when
given a chance, and do all of these on principle or out of habit, not
just when provoked by the other side.2 ' This is the popular lawyer-
as-adversary view, and while there is reason to doubt much of its
accuracy,22 for the moment let us suppose that it is true-that law-
21. This is the premise of the vast amount of literature critical of lawyer "positional"
or "adversarial" bargaining methodologies. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY,
GETrING TO YES 3-8 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 764-94; David Schuman,
Beyond the Waste Land: Law Practice in the 1990s, 42 HAST. L.J. 1 (1990).
22. Many have found that lawyers often bargain cooperatively, processing cases as
much as fighting over them, and colluding with one another more than competing. See,
e.g., H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 151-62 (1970) (describing the "game" of negotiation); Alexander,
supra note 6, at 505-23 (sampling securities class actions settled at a "going rate," which
did not correspond to probable trial outcome, but could be predicted from the dollar
amount of the market loss); James B. Atleson, The Legal Community and the Transformation
of Disputes: The Settlement of Injunction Actions, 23 Lw & Soc'v REV. 41, 56-60 (1989)
("community" of labor and management negotiators resolve disputes according to their
own definitions of appropriate picket line behavior, which are more restrictive than the
legal definitions); Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA Briefcase 106, 108 (1977) [hereinafter Bellow, Solutions] (discussing routine
processing as "slotting"); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 28-30 (1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Landscapes] (describing routine
processing); Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process,
34J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 272-73 (1984) [hereinafter Galanter, Deals] (describing "bargain-
ing arenas"); KRrrZER, FORM OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 7, at 12-16 (describing negotia-
tion as routinized process); Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet. Observations of
Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV.
177, 195-96, 202-28, 239-41 (1986) ("The high degree of similarity in the financial
profiles of many clients coupled with large client volume is likely to influence lawyers
toward a stereotyped conception of the categories of client situations and toward rou-
tine procedures for and solutions to categories of cases." Id. at 240.); Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc'v REV.
93, 109-13 (1986) (describing ways in which lawyers "transform ... disputes from a
battle over ... legality and morality ... to a negotiation over ... more narrow and
tangible issues," id. at 112, reaching standardized outcomes); Memorandum from Pro-
fessor Gary Bellow to the Dean of Harvard Law School 27-30 (May 15, 1975) (proposing
research project for spring semesters, 1976-77) [hereinafter Bellow, Memorandum] (dis-
cussing routine processing as "slotting"); see also Gilson, supra note 4, at 306-13 (discuss-
ing Japanese system of contracting, where parties do not behave opportunistically vis-a-
vis each other). Herbert Kritzer's excellent discussion of "ordinary litigation" explains,
in part, why this cooperation occurs. See KRITZER, supra note 1, at 41-55, 66-71.
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yers characteristically make the competitive choice and, as a result,
produce the mediocre outcome. The adversarial approach has now
come under heavy fire for its inefficiencies, unpleasantness, and lack
of fairness from legal scholars aligned in one way or another with
the so-called "alternative dispute resolution movement."2 These
In ordinary litigation the potential costs involved in processing the cases are
inevitably going to constitute a substantial fraction of the amount at issue, and
when combined with the uncertainties inherent in litigation, this creates power-
ful incentives to move cases through quickly with as little investment of expen-
sive resources as possible. This is facilitated by costs that are large relative to
stakes, creating wide, greatly overlapping zones of acceptable settlements.
Thus first offers, or, failing that, second offers, are very likely to fall within
those zones of acceptability, usually resulting in settlements after only one or
two exchanges of demands and offers.
Id. at 64-65.
In this view, often described as routine or bureaucratic processing, lawyers fit cases
into categories of worth. These categories are crude approximations of the analytical
categories of jury verdict research, in which dollar amounts are attached to clusters of
stereotypical characteristics of litigants and harms, see, e.g. ,JuRY VERDICT RESEARCH INC.,
How to Use the Personal Injury Valuation Handbooks to Evaluate Personal Injury Cases, 1 PER-
SONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS 5-20 (1991) (applicable categories for completing
a personal injury evaluation), with heavy doses of lawyer and system interest mixed in to
define categorical boundaries. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 547 ("Thus, plaintiffs'
firms may find it more economic to maintain a large portfolio of cases, spending suffi-
cient time and effort on each to manage it through a routinized motion, discovery and
settlement process leading to a uniform settlement for a guaranteed fee than to concen-
trate on intensive preparation of a few cases for trial."); Bellow, Memorandum, supra. In
the routine processing view, bargaining consists of lawyers interacting with nominal ad-
versaries in a manner similar to cobureaucrats in an organization. In this view, lawyers
make decisions in accordance with privately understood conventions and norms, turn
cases over expeditiously with a minimum of expense and formality, and sell the results
to clients with the aid of "cooling-out" techniques developed by the profession over
time. See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 733-34 (1990) (lawyers
exaggerate the level of difficulty or effort needed to achieve settlement to encourage
clients to accept it); LUBAN, supra note 7, at 37-39 (describing practice of "cooling out"-
overstressing risks of litigation to encourage acceptance of a settlement); Sarat & Fel-
stiner, supra, at 115 (giving example of "cooling out"); ERLANGER et al., supra note 6, at
14-15 (citing an extreme example of "cooling out"); JOSEPH S. LOBENTHAL, JR., POWER &
PUT ON 68-69 (1970) (particularly egregious example of "cooling out").
If clients resist, judges help out by staging elaborate ceremonies in which clients are
told that the present deal is the best they can expect, and that they should take it. SeeJ.
Skelley Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141, 145 (1960) ("I tell them: 'This case
is worth $20,000 for the settlement,' and I tell them why; and I tell them further to go
tell their clients that I say so."); Marc Galanter, ". . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:"
Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12J. L. & Soc'Y 1, 4-6 (1985) [hereinafter Galanter,
Settlement Judge] (describing "techniques ofjudicial participation" in the settlement pro-
cess); MELLI et al., supra note 6, at 19-20; Dale A. Oesterle, TrialJudges in Settlement Discus-
sions: Mediators or Hagglers?, 9 CORNELL L.F. 7, 8 (1982); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of
Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 343-48,
351-53 (1986) (describing an extended and particularly complicated judicial interven-
tion). For a critique of judicial intervention, see Oesterle, supra, at 9-11.
23. See SUSAN SILBEY & AUSTIN SARAT, DISPUTE PROCESSING IN LAW AND LEGAL
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commentators argue with considerable force that lawyers ought to
trade in adversarial 24 bargaining practices for more cordial, princi-
pled, and problem-solving approaches, and have identified at least
three distinct bases for and versions of this argument.25 Each ver-
SCHOLARSHIP: FROM INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE TO THE RECONSTITLION OF THE JUDICIAL
SUBJECT 5 (Institute for Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 8, June 1988); Marc Ga-
lanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 Mo. J. DIsP. RESOL. 55, 56. The "alternative dis-
pute resolution movement" is an admittedly ironic name for a group concerned as much
with mainstream as alternative processes. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZ-
ARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 300 (3d ed. 1985) ("fundamentally the American system is one of
compulsory bargaining in response to claims of right"); Galanter, Deals, supra note 22, at
269 ("On the contemporary American legal scene the negotiation of disputes is not an
alternative to litigation[;] ... it is the central core."); MELLI et al., supra note 6, at 7-8.
The movement also has little to say about genuine disputes, and its proposals for reform
suppress conflict as often as they resolve it, see infra notes 129-137 and accompanying
text.
24. Some cooperative bargaining theory uses the term "positional" to describe the
objectionable bargaining practices it seeks to replace, see FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at
3-8, but because position taking is involved in all types of bargaining, including coopera-
tive bargaining, "positional" does not seem to be the right term. My view of what
bothers cooperative bargaining theorists, though no doubt some of them will disagree,
is the competitive manner in which legal bargaining defines ends, and the overly conten-
tious manner in which it advances them. These qualities seem better captured in the
term "adversarial," and I will use it interchangeably with "positional." See Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 1, at 756 n.3.
25. See Gambetta, supra note 14, at 213-14 n.2, for a definition of cooperation elastic
enough to encompass all of these variations on the argument. For a recent comprehen-
sive treatment of the idea of cooperation, see BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING
COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS (1989). In its own small way, the debate
between cooperative and adversarial bargaining theories may be a "for instance" of a
larger debate in legal scholarship. This larger debate is between civic republican and
pluralist views of legal theory, between those who think that deliberation and reasoned
exchange can settle legal differences and those who think that accommodation and com-
promise are often all that is possible. For a defense of deliberation, see generally Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republi-
canism--Or The Flight From Substance, 97 YALE LJ. 1633 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, The
Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1673 (1988). For a defense of com-
promise, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713
(1988). For a discussion of the "paradox of compromise," see David Luban, Bargaining
and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and InformalJustice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397,
414-16 (1985).
The debate on cooperative versus adversarial bargaining should not be confused
with the debate about the comparative advantages of formal versus informal dispute
settlement processes generally. The latter is a struggle over the role and importance of
law in society, see generally SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 2-25; Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For
Reconciliation, 94 YALE LJ. 1660 (1985), and has provoked widespread discussion. See,
e.g., ROBERT BARUCH BUSH, DEFINING QUALITY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TAXONOMIES
AND ANTI-TAXONOMIES OF QUALITY ARGUMENTS 7-14, 21-70 (Institute for Legal Studies,
Working Papers Series 8, June 1988); ERLANGER et al., supra note 6, at 6-2 1; 1 THE POLI-
TICS OF INFORMALJUSTICE (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); TOM R. TYLER, THE QUALITY OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES: MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS AND POS-
SIBILITIES 9-28 (Institute for Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 8, June 1988); Albert
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sion emphasizes a different aspect of dispute bargaining and is
based on different and important insights into the nature of the pro-
cess. Taken together, they complement and support one another as
if separate pieces of a single mosaic. 6 To understand the contradic-
tion in dispute bargaining role, therefore, it is necessary first to ap-
preciate the importance of the practical need to cooperate, and thus
to understand the nature of these arguments for cooperative
bargaining.
A. Cordial Bargaining
The earliest theories of cooperative bargaining emphasized so-
ciability. Being nice, it was thought, would cause other bargainers
to reciprocate, with the net result that bargaining would take the
form of pleasant, non-self-interested, mutual concession-making to
agreement.2 7 While few if any legal commentators adopted this
W. Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a
Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986); Robert Baruch Bush,
Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 15-19 (1989); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Preudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359
(1985); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668 (1986); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative. Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE LJ. 1545 (1991); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 57 (1984); Sally Engle Merry,
The Discourses of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1990);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to "Better Way ": Litigation, Alter-
natives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824. With many of these authors, I believe
that the comparative advantages of informal processes have sometimes been overstated,
often substantially, though in a "sound-bite" culture a certain amount of hyperbole is
probably necessary just to be heard. For purposes of this discussion, however, it does
not matter how the question of formalism versus informalism comes out, as long as
there continues to be some form of informal dispute settlement. That seems a safe bet.
26. One may quarrel with the claim that each of these arguments is distinctive. Ad-
mittedly, none makes a unique point, each mentions most of the points raised by the
others, and the overlap among them is considerable. Yet the proponents of each argu-
ment write as if they believe that each of the others is slightly off the mark. In discussing
the arguments, therefore, I have tried to describe each in terms of what seemed to be its
most distinctive feature or features. The decision to describe arguments for cooperative
bargaining in terms of the views of individual bargaining theorists follows Silbey and
Sarat's telling of the history of alternative dispute resolution in the form of stories about
moral entrepreneurs. See SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 12-38.
27. See, e.g., CHARLES E. OSGOOD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962)
(describing "graduated reciprocation of tension reduction" method of conflict resolu-
tion, in which one of the parties to a negotiation makes unilateral concessions as a
means of inducing the other to reciprocate). These early theories were often based on a
standard of bargaining akin to a paraphrase of the golden rule: that is, cooperate with
others because that is what you want them to do with you. Gifford calls the golden rule
the premise of cooperative bargaining theory. See GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 8. The
problem with unconditional cooperation, however, as Axelrod points out, is that by pro-
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view completely, the equation of niceness with success is a central
theme in the first distinctively legal theory of cooperative bargain-
ing, that of Gerald R. Williams's bargaining as cordiality. 8 Williams
set out to prove that "the most effective [legal] negotiators [are]
characterized by positive social traits and attitudes and by the use of
more open, cooperative, and friendly negotiating strategies."' 29 Ef-
fective bargainers, in other words, are those who are friendly, trust-
worthy, and fair."° Being friendly means avoiding insulting, rude,
threatening, and belligerent behavior; being trustworthy means
sharing information, recognizing the needs of others, and estimat-
ing the value of cases realistically; and being fair means looking at a
problem from both sides' points of view, basing discussion on com-
mon ground, communicating a sense of shared interests, and not
seeking any special advantage. 3 '
In a complicated research program involving questionnaires,
interviews, and videotaped observations, 32 Williams asked one thou-
viding bargainers with an opportunity to exploit others, it "tends to spoil [bargainers],"
placing "a burden on the rest of the community to reform [them]." AXELROD, supra note
13, at 136. He suggests that reciprocity is a better foundation for bargaining than un-
conditional cooperation. See id. For a recent attempt to resuscitate the unconditional
cooperation view, at least with respect to establishing bargaining relationships, see
ROGER FISHER & SCOTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP THAT
GETS TO YES 37-39 (1988).
28. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 14 ("The intensity of emotion and ill-will gener-
ated by litigation is frequently overlooked, particularly as regards the opposing attor-
neys."). The cordiality characterization is mine, and one I expect Williams would be
reluctant to adopt. He uses the more general descriptive term "cooperative" to describe
his view of the preferred bargaining approach. While it is true that his view generally fits
within the mainstream of cooperative theories, he is one of the few to rank good man-
ners highly. See id. at 27 (effective bargainers are "careful to observe the customs and
courtesies of the bar").
Cordiality may be coming back into fashion. Its loss (or the loss of civility or profes-
sionalism, as it is also put) is regularly bemoaned in bar journals, legal newspapers, and
association meetings. Many jurisdictions, including Maryland, Georgia, and Texas (and
probably dozens of other states), along with the Seventh Circuit (and probably most of
the others) are drafting amendments to their codes of professional practice, and man-
dating special courses of instruction, to require and teach lawyers to be more civil. See,
e.g., Catherine T. Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1017-
22 (1991); Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal
Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 643-46 (1990); Jef Feeley, Md. CA Requires New Course On
Professionalism, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), June 24, 1990, at 1, 11; Randall Samborn,
Panel Says Civility Declines, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 29, 1991, at 3, 14, 26; Gary Taylor, Texas Sets its
Sights on Rambo, NAT'L L.J.,July 31, 1989, at 3, 24. Judge Reavley also points out that the
loss of civility is not a uniquely modern problem. See Reavley, supra, at 639-42.
29. Gerald R. Williams et al., Effectiveness in Legal Negotiation, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
LAW 127 (Gordon Bermant et al. eds., 1976).
30. See id. at 42-44.
31. See id.
32. For a description of Williams's methodology, see id. at 15-18. Williams was one
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sand lawyer subjects to rate the last attorneys with whom they had
bargained, on scales of both effectiveness (effective, average, inef-
fective) and approach (cooperative or competitive). He discovered
that nearly half of the bar was seen as effective, and four out of five
effective bargainers were also viewed as cooperative." On the other
hand, he also found that some cooperators were seen as only aver-
age, some ineffective and, more difficult to comprehend, that some
competitive bargainers were seen as effective.3 4 He concluded "that
it is not regard or disregard of the social graces which determines an
attorney's negotiating effectiveness," but legal astuteness, that is,
being "perceptive, analytical, realistic, convincing, rational, exper-
ienced and self-controlled" in the preparation and presentation of
one's bargaining case.35 Legal astuteness was the principal quality
effective competitors had in common with effective cooperators, and
cooperators who were not astute were rated only as nice, not effec-
tive." In Williams's words, bargainers were effective in proportion
to
the quality of the legal work being performed, including
the expertise with which an attorney had investigated the
facts of his case, studied and understood the legal rules ap-
plicable to it, taken a realistic position with respect to the
value of the case, and presented his position in ways that
other attorneys accepted as being rational, fair and persua-
sive (convincing).
Notwithstanding these conclusions, Williams argued for the su-
periority of a cooperative, as in cordial, approach to bargaining. He
considered it significant that four of five effective bargainers also
were cordial, and concluded that this was so because bargainers pre-
ferred the cordial style, recognized it more readily when used by
others, and understood and worked with it more easily than with
other approaches. A bargainer who wants to communicate clearly,
avoid confusing and sometimes antagonizing distortions, make mu-
tually advantageous trades, and avoid needless unpleasantness, will
have a better chance of doing so, in Williams's view, in a cordial
of the first legal commentators, if not the first, to recognize the importance of careful
empirical study of the skill dimension of the bargaining process. His work is important
for that reason, and legal bargaining theory is very much in his debt.
33. See id. at 18-19.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 28, 39, 40.
36. See id. at 28, 35-36.
37. Id. at 40.
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manner."8 When most of the world is cordial, or thought to be so,
one should go along to get along. 9
Apart from the lack of perfect fit between this recommendation
and the results of his research, Williams's analysis has several diffi-
culties that undercut its ability to provide a complete grounding for
the argument for cooperative bargaining. To begin with, it is diffi-
cult to determine precisely what the study shows. The study asked
lawyers to judge bargaining effectiveness, but it does not define ef-
fectiveness. Williams discusses effectiveness at length, and men-
tions factors that could be used in a definition,4" but he never says
what, in his view, identifies a bargaining approach as effective or in-
effective, and does not indicate that he gave any more guidance to
his subjects.4 ' This is an important omission. Like bargaining
power, effectiveness is far from a self-evident notion, and a noncir-
cular definition may not be possible.4 2 When Williams's lawyers
rated their adversaries as effective or ineffective, therefore, we do
38. See id. at 19 ("The higher proportion of cooperative attorneys who were rated
effective does suggest it is more difficult to be an effective competitive negotiator than
an effective cooperative [negotiator]."); id. at 41 (arguing that there are more coopera-
tive effective attorneys than competitive effective attorneys).
39. Williams makes additional arguments for the efficacy of cordiality (e.g., that im-
passe and deadlock are more common when bargainers are not nice, that being unpleas-
ant has long term reputation effects which will play a role in the settlement of future
cases), see id. at 50-52, but these points are not developed.
40. See id. at 7-10. Perhaps the closest Williams comes to defining effectiveness is
when he states that "people have a wide variety of beliefs about what constitutes effec-
tiveness in negotiation." Id. at 8. While he also presents "a set of hypotheses about
effectiveness," id. at 42, he indicates that they are not correct, are biased in favor of
cooperative approaches, and so far as one can tell, were not communicated to his sub-
jects. See id.
41. This is most apparent in the chapter describing Williams's research methodol-
ogy, where he gives no indication of how to determine whether a prior bargainer was
effective or ineffective. See id. at 15-17. While asked to correlate effective and ineffective
negotiation with an extensive list of bipolar adjectives, the initial characterization of ef-
fective or ineffective was left to Williams's subjects to make on their own, based on
whatever criteria they chose to use. See id. at 137-39.
42. For a discussion of the difficulty in avoiding question-begging and circularity in
the attempt to define bargaining power, see P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS
186-90 (1979). The difficulty is in formulating a conception of power that allows one to
make predictions about bargaining outcome. It is often possible to determine retro-
spectively at the close of a negotiation what factors were powerful in shaping the result,
but it is difficult to say at the beginning what those factors will be. No attribute or re-
source is inevitably powerful, including superior understanding of the bargaining prob-
lem or resources to prosecute it. Many commentators seem not to see this as a problem.
See GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 67-69; JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE REso-
LUTION 212-16 (1989); Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM.
BEHAV. ScIENTIST 149, 156-57 (1983); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 833-34. For a
cogent synopsis of and commentary on the bargaining "power" literature, see KRITZER,
supra note 1, at 72-76.
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not know what they thought they were asked, or what they were
saying.43
For example, effectiveness might have meant being pleasant
and personable, legally knowledgeable, verbally facile, on the same
wavelength (appraising the case in the same way), or disproportion-
ately successful. We do not know whether ends or means were im-
portant, or some combination of the two, but we can speculate. It is
unlikely, for example, that effectiveness meant obtaining dispropor-
tionately favorable settlements. Participants did not have the com-
parative data necessary to make these judgments objectively, 44 and
presumably they would not have agreed to settlements they viewed
subjectively as favoring the other side. If effectiveness was not
based on ends, then it must have been based on inferences from
means. Effective negotiators must have been those in command of
the interactional skills associated with good negotiation. Partici-
pants could watch their adversaries, and thus had access to the data
needed to make this judgment, and acknowledging the other as
skillful would enhance rather than undercut perceptions of their
own bargaining performance. But if skill was important, what kinds
of skills did the participants rate the highest?
The most frequently mentioned characteristic of effective bar-
gainers was that they met rather than traversed expectations partici-
pants brought to the negotiations. Effective bargainers were
"realistic," "experienced," and "predictable," rather than "ambi-
tious," "greedy," or "demanding." They settled cases efficiently
and with a minimum of friction; they knew how to make the system
43. The fact that only 12% of the bar was rated as ineffective suggests that Williams's
subjects were generous in their definition of that term. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 20.
44. To know how one does comparatively, one needs to know how other bargainers
would settle the same problem. Such data is usually nonexistent for real life bargaining,
where cases are settled just once. A facsimile exists, however, when simulated bargain-
ing problems are given to multiple sets of bargaining teams. When several sets of bar-
gainers settle the same case, even if only hypothetically, participants know more about
where they fit comparatively because they know how many bargainers got more of the
bargaining pot (however measured) than they did, and how many got less. Williams ran
such a simulation, see WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 6-7, and others have conducted similar
experiments, see, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO's IN CHARGE
202-05 (1974) (multiple evaluations of single case by panel of experts); Alexander, supra
note 6, at 505-23 (Comparative study of "a number of contemporaneous cases involving
virtually identical claims about very similar companies." Id. at 500.). In those situations,
objective determinations of comparative effectiveness were possible. There is no indica-
tion, however, that such data was available to Williams's subjects, and it could not have
been, because participation in the study was based on the evaluation of real life bargain-
ing, not simulations. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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work.4" It is difficult to know what to make of such statements, how-
ever, because they also could describe ineffective bargaining. Bar-
gaining usually involves adjusting adversary expectations as much as
meeting them. Preparing a case from a client's point of view makes
a bargainer's perspective one-sided--client interests seem more
worthy than adversary interests because justifying client interests is
what the bargainer has thought most about4 6 and the adversary
must correct this imbalance in perspective during the course of the
settlement discussion. Arguing for such adjustments can sometimes
appear "ambitious," "greedy," and "demanding" to one who does
not understand how her perspective could be one-sided; but such
arguments must be made nonetheless.
Perhaps Williams's subjects overlooked the importance of ad-
justing adversary expectations because they subscribed to a routine
processing conception of dispute bargaining.47 Routine processing
is usually faster and less contentious than more substantive and in-
dividualized methods of settling disputes, and that may account for
its popularity, but whatever its efficiencies, it is not always a model
of distributive justice. It favors status quo distributions of wealth
and power, gives repeat players an advantage, and encourages stere-
otypical settlements in which bargainers smooth over or ignore the
idiosyncratic features of individual claims. Whether Williams's law-
yers were routine processors or not is hard to know, however, given
the way in which the study's inquiries were framed. As a result, it is
equally difficult to know how much to credit the study's claim about
the close relationship between effectiveness and cooperation.
Another difficulty with Williams's discussion permeates other
work on the topic as well. Williams does not distinguish between
substance and style in categorizing bargainers as cooperative or
45. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 27-28, 37.
46. See Condlin, supra note 6, at 80 n.35. The incentive theory of IrvingJanis sug-
gests how this could happen. See Irving L. Janis, The Influence of Incentive Conditions on the
Success of Role Playing on Modifying Attitudes, 1 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 17, 17-18
(1965) ("[I]mprovising arguments in favor of a point of view at variance with [one's]
own . . . increases the salience of the positive arguments and therefore increases the
chances of acceptance of the new attitude position."); see also LEON FESINGER, A THEORY
OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (suggesting that in attempting to reduce the disso-
nance caused by believing one thing and doing another, a person changes her beliefs so
that they become consistent with her public behavior); LUBAN, supra note 7, at 37-40
(discussing "adaptive preference formation"); DarylJ. Bern & H. Keith McConnell, Test-
ing the Self Perception Explanation of Dissonance Phenomena, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 23, 23 (1970) (arguing that "individuals come to 'know' their attitudes and
other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt
behavior").
47. See supra note 22 for a definition of routine processing.
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competitive, and yet these are distinctively different domains in
which to cooperate or compete. 48 Take competition. One can
threaten, make ad hominem attacks, use a didactic or condescending
tone, or otherwise try to score debater's points irrespective of con-
tent. This is stylistic competitiveness, and its goal is to win the inter-
action at the level of rhetorical (in the vulgar, colloquial sense) skill.
Conversely, one can make strong demands when warranted, refuse
to change views without good reasons, and support positions with
well-developed if complicated and hard-to-follow arguments, albeit
in a friendly and personable manner. This is substantive competi-
tiveness, and its goal is to have one's views about applicable law or
practical concerns adopted by the parties as the basis for settlement,
and thus, to produce the best outcome consistent with the strength
of one's substantive claims.
Stylistic competitiveness is almost always inappropriate and
usually ineffective, but substantive competitiveness is indispensable
to successful bargaining.49 Without making justified demands and
taking stands on principle (while being willing to discuss the
strength of these principles), even when they go beyond what the
other bargainer expects or thinks legitimate, a lawyer has unilater-
ally waived a client's rights and conceded rather than negotiated a
dispute. And when research instruments, including analytical cate-
gories, do not make the distinction between substance and style,
one cannot tell whether descriptions of lawyers as "tough," "force-
ful," and "aggressive," or even as "courteous," "friendly," and
"fair-minded," refer to what was said, or how it was said. Until re-
searchers frame inquiries to take this distinction into account, it will
be difficult to know what the evidence shows about the relationship
between cordiality and bargaining effectiveness.
48. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 27-30. Gifford makes this same point about Wil-
liams's analysis, characterizing the point as the failure to distinguish between strategy
and style. See GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 18-21, 29 n.6. In a sense, Williams himself ac-
knowledges the distinction in his discussion of legal astuteness, see WILLAMS, supra note
1, at 28, where he concludes that being nice is not always enough. Astuteness is a sub-
stantive category, describing what bargainers say to one another, not how they say it,
and to segregate it as an independent variable in assessing effectiveness is to distinguish
between substance and style. See also id. at 25 (describing the gap in attitudes between
cooperative and competitive negotiators: "Cooperatives feel that cases should be evalu-
ated objectively, on their merits," whereas "competitive attorneys view their work as a
game in which they seek to outwit and outperform the other side."). Williams does not
describe the point in these terms, however, or continue to make the distinction through-
out the remainder of his analysis. One cannot tell whether he recognizes the point or
not.
49. See Condlin, supra note 6, at 72-79.
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B. Principled Bargaining
Articulation of the theory of principled bargaining was the next
significant stage in the development of the argument for coopera-
tive bargaining.50 Starting from the premises that "conflict lies not
in objective reality but in people's heads," and that "[t]ruth is sim-
ply one more argument ... for dealing with ... difference,''5 princi-
pled bargaining theory asserts that successful bargainers are those
who "separate the people from the problem," "focus on interests,
not positions," "invent options for mutual gain," and "insist on ob-
jective criteria. ' 52
Separating the people from the problem involves preventing
perceptual and psychological errors in communication and interpre-
tation from skewing analysis of the substantive issues presented by
the bargaining problem. Principled bargainers recognize that
"[n]egotiators are people first," 53 who
get angry, depressed, fearful, hostile, frustrated, and of-
fended. They have egos that are easily threatened. They
see the world from their own personal vantage point, and
they frequently confuse perceptions with reality. Rou-
tinely, they fail to interpret what you say in the way you
intend and do not mean what you understand them to
say. 54
To protect against such potential disasters,55 principled bargainers
are encouraged to "see the situation as the other side sees it," 56 with
the aid of a set of interactive rules of thumb (e.g., do not deduce
their intentions from your fears; recognize, identify, and discuss
emotion explicitly; confirm interpretations before acting on them;
and the like),57 which make overinterpretation difficult and projec-
tion less likely. When bargainers identify communicative incompe-
tence and isolate its effects, proponents of principled bargaining
50. The "originators" of the theory of principled bargaining are Roger Fisher and
William Ury, see FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at vi, xii, though a careful reader will find
much of the theory's content in RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAV-
IORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATION (1965).
51. FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 23.
52. Id. at 11-12.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id. For further development of this point, see FISHER & BROWN, supra note 27, at
25-30.
55. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 19.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Id. at 25-36; see also FISHER & BROWN, supra note 27, at 43-106.
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claim, the bargaining conversation will deal naturally and success-
fully with satisfying the parties' respective interests.
The directive to focus on interests rather than positions is a
more elusive notion. Interests are "the silent movers behind the
hubbub of positions," what causes one to decide on a position, and
the "needs, desires, concerns, and fears" that underlie expressed
statements of what one wants.58 In the principled view, reconciling
interests, not positions, is the basic problem of bargaining, but it is a
more manageable problem because for every interest several posi-
tions usually exist that would satisfy it, and behind opposed posi-
tions lie more shared interests than conflicting ones.5" While
principled bargainers are soft on people, they are hard on interests.
They commit to interests, and make them come alive with all of their
"aggressive energies. '  This is because "[t]wo negotiators, each
pushing hard for their interests, will often stimulate each other's
creativity in thinking up mutually advantageous solutions."61
Inventing options for mutual gain consists of identifying and
mulling over multiple solutions to the bargaining problem, and
comparing, contrasting, and refining such solutions until a mutually
satisfactory outcome is found.62 It includes "brainstorming,"" in
which bargainers hypothesize outcomes but do not evaluate them
until all imaginable possibilities are on the table, and perspective
shifts, where bargainers consider the bargaining problem from the
differing vantage points of description, analysis, diagnosis, and pre-
scription, and through the intellectual frameworks of different disci-
plines and professions.' Principled bargainers alter and re-alter
the scope and strength of potential agreements, expand bargaining
stakes until there is something for everyone, identify and match
shared and dovetailing interests, and treat agreements as tentative
and subject to improvement until made Pareto optimal.6 5 The ob-
ject of this process is to discover a configuration of the (continuingly
redefined) bargaining pot that leaves all parties with those items or
parts of items they value most, and each party with a payoff that is
roughly equivalent (or at least perceived to be) to the other's.
58. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 42.
59. Id. at 42-43.
60. Id. at 52, 55.
61. Id. at 56.
62. Id. at 12, 14, 62.
63. Id. at 62-67. For another description of this process, see GIFFORD, supra note 1,
at 55-60.
64. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 67-71.
65. Id. at 72-79.
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Principled bargaining's distinctive characteristic, however, is its
insistence on the use of objective criteria (the "principle" from
which the theory takes its name), as the basis for settlement. To
proponents of principled bargaining, objective criteria are impor-
tant because they allow parties to arrive at lasting agreements ami-
cably and efficiently.66 Yet, objective criteria also can be seen as a
normative response to what David Luban, following John Roemer,
calls the "informational poverty of bargaining,"67 and concerned
with justifying the outcomes of bargaining as much as its methods.
Objective criteria consist of "fair standards and fair procedures."'68
Standards and procedures are fair when they are "independent of"
each side's will, are "legitimate and practical," and pass the test of
"reciprocal application"-that is, each side would use the same
standards and procedures if bargaining positions were reversed. 69
Examples of fair standards include market value, replacement cost,
depreciated book value, competitive prices, scientific judgment, pre-
cedent, community practice, what a court would decide, tradition,
moral norms, and other consensus standards accepted by the bar-
gaining parties and the community in which they bargain. 70 Exam-
ples of fair procedures include "taking turns, drawing lots, letting
someone else decide, and so on." 7 1
When more than one objective criterion is available as the basis
for settlement, or when parties advance different criteria, as will
usually be the case, bargainers should "look for an objective basis
for deciding between them, such as which standard has been used
by the parties in the past or which standard is more widely ap-
66. Id. at 86-88.
67. See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 19-22, 39-40 ("Bargaining theory relies on informa-
tion that is just too thin and impoverished to capture any pre-analytic notion ofjustice."
Id. at 19.); John Roemer, The Mismarriage of Bargaining Theory and Distributive Justice, 97
ETHICS 88, 90, 97-102 (1986) (arguing that bargaining theory lacks the information nec-
essary to capture the essence of distributive justice).
68. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 88-91.
69. Id. at 88-89.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 90. For another definition of objective criteria, see GIFFORD, supra note 1,
at 69-70. One of my favorite examples of fair procedures is the rule of "one cuts, the
other chooses." Id. at 90. Usually described in terms of two children splitting a single
piece of cake, this division of power technique is supposed to insure that neither child
has an advantage over the other. Anyone who has ever used this stratagem with chil-
dren, however, quickly discovers that it is better to choose than to cut. It is difficult to
divide anything into two perfectly even halves, and the one who chooses is almost always
in the position of being able to select a larger piece. See also MURNIGHAN, supra note 16,
at 103. Rather than solve the bargaining problem, the technique relocates it (and some-
times makes it smaller) to the issue of who will cut and who will choose. Most other "fair
procedures" suffer the same fate.
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plied."7 If there are two (or more) standards that produce different
results, but which seem equally legitimate, the parties should
"split[] the difference or otherwise compromis[e] between the re-
sults" suggested by the standards.7 3 Throughout the bargaining
process, bargainers should "be open to reason" and yield "only to
principle."74 Such a stance has the "power of legitimacy '""' and al-
lows bargainers to prevail on the all-important issue of negotiation
style. It allows them to shift discussion from positional bargaining
to a search for a solution based on merit, and as such, is a dominant
strategy over positional bargaining, giving principled bargainers an
edge. "It is a form of 'right makes might.' "76
The concept of principled bargaining has great analytical power
and appeal. It builds on the idea of "legal astuteness," identified,
but not elaborated upon, in the theory of cordial bargaining, and in
the process adds an important normative dimension to the idea of
cooperation. Being cooperative now means adhering to authorita-
tive substantive norms-legal, moral, and political-which form the
backdrop of dispute settlement and make its outcomes legitimate
and fair. It is no longer enough that bargainers be cordial, predict-
able, and nice; they must do justice as well. This normative addition
transforms bargaining theory from a theory of strategy and manners
to one also of morality and politics, and in so doing, helps justify
bargaining's place in the system of adjudicatory justice.
While a major advance, therefore, principled bargaining is not
without its difficulties, as one of its leading proponents has acknowl-
edged.77 A few representative illustrations will show how this is
so. 78 To begin with, principled bargaining's starting point, that
72. FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 93.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 92-95.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id.
77. See Roger Fisher, Comment to James J. White, Essay Review, The Pros and Cons of
"Getting to YES, " 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 120 (1984) ("I ... see some inadequacies in the
book"); Getting to YES Six Years Later, Disp. RESOL. F. 4-5 (May 1987) (interview with
Roger Fisher and William Ury).
78. There is a good deal of critical commentary on principled bargaining. See, e.g.,
Max H. Bazerman, Getting Beyond YES: Where Negotiation is Now and Where it Should Go,
DIsp. RESOL. F. 3, 8 (May 1987); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 758-59 n.9;JamesJ.
White, Essay Review, The Pros and Cons of "Getting to YES, " 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 115 (1984).
With the possible exception of some points made by Professor White, I do not plan to
retrace ground already covered. I will limit my comments to points not raised else-
where, either explicitly or in the same form. I do not want to show all that is wrong with
principled bargaining theory, but only that it has serious problems.
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"conflict lies not in objective reality, but in people's heads,"79 is
often just wrong.8 0 It is also incongruous with the theory's heavy
reliance on the possibility of principled resolutions.8 Not all beliefs
and values can be measured against each other, or against some
common denominator (or principle).8 2 Bargainers who disagree are
not invariably confused or mistaken about what they believe or
want; sometimes their beliefs and wants are grounded in irreconcila-
ble notions of entitlement, and interpretive or communicative skill
will not make these conflicts go away. If principled bargaining the-
ory claimed only that communication can distort meaning and cre-
ate the appearance of conflict when none is present, that it can
produce "cognitive conflict,"8" and then argued that cognitive con-
flict should be avoided whenever possible, few would disagree.
These points are not news, however, and are hardly worth the fan-
fare with which the theory of principled bargaining has been an-
nounced and advanced. Instead, principled bargaining seems
committed to the stronger claims that substantive differences are
79. FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 23.
80. The belief in and search for a single definition of the good is understandably
attractive to those on the tops of social, economic, and political pyramids, who will feel
better if they can believe that everyone below agrees on the legitimacy of the pyramids.
Like the structural functionalists in anthropology in the 1950s, those on top view disa-
greement as a "matter of failed conformity with unproblematic normative standards."
SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 46; see also Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term-Foreword Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 73-74 (1987) ("The more pow-
erful we are, the less we may be able to see that the world coincides with our view pre-
cisely because we shaped it in accordance with those views."); Lesnick, supra note 9, at
420-39 (discussing ways in which perspective influences patterns of one's thinking).
Nevertheless, the universe of principled belief is usually too messy to reward such a
search. Shared standards sometimes exist, and when they do, they resolve some and
narrow other differences, but even shared standards often run out, to use Charles
Fried's phrase, "twenty feet above the ground." Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the
Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 57 (1981). The level of abstraction that
permits agreement on the standard also often makes its application inconclusive. When
principles fail, or come up short, accommodation and compromise are the paths to set-
tlement, but there are no objective criteria for determining how much to accommodate,
or when to compromise. See Luban, supra note 25, at 414-16.
81. The idea that conflict lies only in people's heads is incongruous with principled
resolutions unless the only principle that principled bargaining recognizes is one which
holds that bargainers are always mistaken when they perceive themselves to be in con-
flict. But if bargainers are always mistaken, and in fact conflicts never exist, it is not
exactly clear what use bargainers can make of other principles.
82. To believe in the inevitability of common denominators with which differing in-
terests may be compared is to treat all statements of value as essentially alike, and in the
process to make a "category mistake." See Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental
Law, 79 MicH. L. REV. 1393, 1402-18 (1981) (discussing category mistake). Category
mistake may be out of date terminology. See Radin & Michelman, supra note 8, at 1029.
83. See John Thibault & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541,
543 (1978) (defining and discussing "cognitive conflict").
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most often illusory, and simultaneously that they can be resolved by
objective criteria. These stronger claims are what make principled
bargaining interesting, but they are also what make it suspect.
Apart from its grounding on a suspect premise, principled bar-
gaining also has weaknesses in each of its core principles. For exam-
ple, in discussing the importance of separating the people from the
problem, the leading proponents of principled bargaining recom-
mend both that bargainers identify with the other side ("see the sit-
uation as the other side sees it"), 4 and that they manipulate the
other side when it is possible to do so. "Manipulate" is my charac-
terization but it seems fair. For example, a principled bargainer is
encouraged to "devot[e] substantial time to working out the practi-
cal arrangements" of concessions so as to provide the other bar-
gainer "with an impressive achievement and a real incentive to
reach agreement on other issues."8 5 Drag out concession-making,
in other words, even when one is ready to concede, so that the other
side will think it has accomplished more than it has and be corre-
spondingly grateful. This may be instrumentally useful advice, but
it encourages bargainers to be strategically inauthentic, and it seems
slightly out of place in a bargaining method based on mutual coop-
eration and empathic identification with the other side. Following
the dictates of principled bargaining is not always easy, in part, be-
cause the theory is not always clear about whether it is a genuine
alternative to discredited positional bargaining, or a set of more so-
phisticated techniques for operating successfully within the posi-
tional mode.8 6
Similarly, the advice to focus on interests rather than positions
is based on an unargued premise, that the two are different in some
significant sense, which is convincing to proponents of principled
bargaining for reasons that ordinary language seems not to explain.
In bargaining, all statements of interest are not very thinly disguised
statements of position (i.e., that the interest must be provided for by
some explicit term in the agreement), and statements of position are
inarticulate but usually discernible statements of interest (i.e., that
the money or whatever else is being discussed is desired for some
84. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 23.
85. Id. at 27.
86. There is even a principled bargaining equivalent to positional bargaining's in-
flated first offer, to wit, "an illustrative suggestion that generously takes care of your
interests." Id. at 55. Sometimes Fisher and Ury's capacity for euphemism is considera-
ble. Also unusual is their distinction between a "threat" (bad, because a tactic of posi-
tional bargaining), and a "warning" (good, because a tactic of principled bargaining).
Id. at 142-43.
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particular reason or reasons-to feel vindicated, be made whole,
take revenge, or the like). It simply is not possible for conversation
of any sophistication to be about just one or the other. Principled
bargaining implicitly admits this impossibility when it acknowledges
that bargaining ultimately must involve the discussion of and agree-
ment on settlement terms (positions), and describes a range of rhe-
torical and psychological techniques designed to help in this
process.8 7 Given this acknowledgment, it is perhaps a bit disingenu-
ous to suggest that "focusing on interests not positions" will make
bargaining more productive.
Presumably, proponents of principled bargaining make the dis-
tinction between interest and position to emphasize the need for
flexibility in defining bargaining objectives, and thus to encourage
bargainers to take different approaches to solving the bargaining
problem when necessary in order to avoid unproductive conflict,
polarization, or deadlock. If flexibility is the goal, however, it is pro-
moted by bargainer offer- and concession-making that is imagina-
tive, contingent, and respectful. It is skill in formulating, discussing,
refining, and discarding settlement terms (whether thought of or ex-
pressed as interests or positions), not skill in labelling them, that is
critical. When the end is avoiding polarization, the means must be
more than terminological.
There is an understanding of the interest-position distinction
that proponents of principled bargaining may recognize, but do not
discuss. In this view, interests are the ultimate ends of bargaining,
the objectives one would pursue if perfectly and finally aware of
what is to one's greatest advantage, judged from the vantage point
of perfect information and the perspective of all of time. Positions
are intermediate or provisional expressions of those ends, based on
imperfect information and incomplete perspective. Ultimate ends
are often different from intermediate ones, in the same manner that
destinations are often different from way stations, because knowing
perfectly what will be in one's ultimate interest is frequently not
possible in any real or trustworthy sense within the time frame of
bargaining.
For example, the lawyer bargainer must determine which of the
client's many selves to consult in determining what to seek from a
bargaining transaction. The pleasure-seeking self will want some-
thing different than the citizen self, the short term self something
different than the long term self, and the public self something dif-
87. See id. at 113-18.
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ferent than the private one. The client may want most not to have
to decide at all, and wish only that the problem had never arisen.
Asked today, she may want one thing, but tomorrow (or yesterday)
another. Even when expressed, the description of interests is often
likely to be a function of how, by whom, and under what circum-
stances the questions were asked. Moreover, statements of interests
even when made are inevitably at the mercy of new information not
taken into account in formulating the statements, and can be shaken
to the core, even to the point of being repudiated, by such informa-
tion. This is a particular concern in dispute negotiation where bar-
gaining interests are partly a function of what outcomes are
available, and where the information and understanding necessary
to make that determination change constantly as bargaining pro-
ceeds. Only after a negotiation has concluded will a client know bet-
ter what she wanted during it, and she may not know best for
months or years to come."8 The problem with bargaining is that it
forces one to articulate objectives that are mixed, contingent, tenta-
tive, fuzzy, and incomplete, as if they were discrete, fixed, tangible,
and exhaustive. But this is true whether one thinks of objectives as
interests or positions, and it is the real problem in understanding
and articulating bargaining goals."
88. More important than time and knowledge, if interests are to be fully and finally
known, is the freedom from ideological and social constraints, sought by constructs like
Habermas's ideal speech situation, seeJURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 17-19
(1973); THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS 306-310
(1978), or Rawls's original position, seeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 17-22 (1971).
89. In one sense, the whole idea of interests is problematic. Are interests everything
one wants? See SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 93 ("[I]nterest based claims say 'I want
it.' "). If so, should bargaining be designed to give participants everything they want?
What if a bargainer wants something to which she has a weak, suspect, or nonexistent
claim, under any or all (including communitarian) theories of entitlement? See Ronald
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 484 (1989) (discussing the distinction
between "volitional well-being," i.e., what one wants, and "critical well-being," i.e., what
one should want); Bernard Williams, Dworkin on Community and Critical Interests, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 515, 515-16 (1989) (arguing for a description of critical interests as "real" inter-
ests). In such circumstances, are there legitimate and illegitimate interests? If so, why
construct a new entitlement system when there is already in place a longstanding and
highly elaborated system of rights performing the same function? See Amy Bartholo-
mew & Alan Hunt, What's Wrong With Rights, 9 LAW & INEQUAIrrY REV. 1, 49-58 (1990),
for a relatively nonpartisan discussion of the adaptability of rights discourse to modern
political debate. See also Radin & Michelman, supra note 8, at 1035-39 (The passion of
"rights-critics . . . should be directed not against the very thought of rights, but rather at
the characteristic failings of nonideal rights practice in our specific cultural context." Id.
at 1038-39.). The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility is
subject to a similar critique:
Instead of conceding or recognizing that the situation confronting the lawyer
may be one of considerable indeterminacy of objectives or deep ambivalence of
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Principled bargaining's third foundational rule, the directive to
invent options for mutual gain by expanding the bargaining pie and
looking for shared and dovetailing interests, is often a helpful guide
in resolving particular disputes, but of more limited use in con-
structing a general theory of bargaining. Bargainers sometimes get
locked into unnecessarily zero-sum conceptions of their situations,
and see conflicts where none exist, and when this happens, it can
help to redefine issues, clarify goals, and expand the pie. Concep-
tually, however, this is not bargaining. Bargaining begins at the
point where differences must be reconciled, accommodated, or
compromised. It is not the same as individual bargainer interest
clarification (i.e., learning), and is not needed when interest clarifi-
cation will suffice. Inventing options for mutual gain is about avoid-
feeling and attitude, the Code simply erects a concept of "interests" with which
the client is inexorably identified. "Interests" is never defined or discussed.
The term is rather like a black box into which the lawyer presumably dumps his
own projections of what the client should desire, intend, feel, or anticipate.
Karen L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 327 (1988).
If interest is used to make the point that not everything one wants is best expressed
in terms of money or goods, then it is not necessary. The point was already widely
understood and regularly made. Interest could be thought to encourage ajoint concep-
tion of the bargaining relationship, because the idea of interest is more bipartisan than
position, making it easier to enlist the efforts of other bargainers in defining it. For a
similar argument, though one not made by principled bargaining theorists, see SILBEY &
SARAT, supra note 23, at 88-96; for a response, see id. at 114. But if this is so, the concep-
tion must still be reconciled with many other parts of principled bargaining theory that
treat others as adversaries, not partners. This is less of an issue for problem-solving
bargaining theory, considered next, though ironically, problem-solving theory uses
"needs" and not "interests" to describe the currency of bargaining. And "need" is a
decidedly less bipartisan concept.
The concept of interest was introduced by legal realism as an outgrowth of its cri-
tique of rights, but the realists recognized that interests were as subjective as rights, and
thus not yet an adequate basis for grounding legal decisions. See SILBEY & SARAT, supra
note 23, at 70-86; David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the
Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1988, 111, 116-17.
On one view, contemporary proponents of principled bargaining seek to overcome this
subjectivity problem by converting interests into economic commodities, and measuring
them with the aid of objective criteria, see SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 94 n.66,
though it is not clear that principled bargaining theorists see their contribution in these
terms, or view their work as part of the critique of rights. In the end this matters little,
however, as interest analysis fails to solve the contradictions of rights talk. See id. at 108-
12. For another extended discussion of the distinction between interests and rights, see
WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETrING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE
COSTS OF CONFLICT 3-19 (1988), where virtually every argument for an interests-based
approach could just as plausibly support a rights-based approach. Like many coopera-
tive bargaining theorists, the authors have a rigid, static, and vulgar understanding of
rights, and a flexible, evolving, and sophisticated understanding of interests, so that in
the end, their discussion is grounded more on faith than on reason.
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ing the need to bargain, an important practical topic, but of limited
significance in the theoretical task of explaining bargaining.
Finally, and most interestingly, there are weaknesses in the
most controversial part of principled bargaining theory: its insis-
tence on the use of "objective criteria" for determining outcome.
"Objective" is an emotionally evocative term, with positive associa-
tions for most, but it is ambiguous in an important sense, which the
theory of principled bargaining trades on, but does not discuss. Ob-
jective can mean neutral or nonpartisan, in the sense of treating
each side's interests equally. Flipping a coin or splitting the differ-
ence is objective in this sense. Or it can mean fair and legitimate, in
the sense of respecting recognized entitlements of the parties, and
reconciling conflicts between them through the use of principles,
procedures, and substantive norms that are accepted as authorita-
tive. Neutrality and fairness are not always the same, however, as it
is possible to be both neutral and unfair, and fair but biased."0 The
theory of principled bargaining does not say so directly, and there
may be some waffling,9 ' but its suggested examples of objective cri-
teria, such as splitting techniques that divide pots into rough
equivalents, consensus community practices, or the parties' past be-
havior, seem based on an understanding of objectivity as neutral-
ity." Like "neutral" mechanisms generally, however, such criteria
have a strong bias in favor of status quo distributions, and the status
quo is not always fair, particularly to those who reasonably reject
existing definitions of worth, received distributions of resources and
power, consensus procedures, or the wisdom of past behavior, their
own included. Principled bargaining cannot simply assume that
neutral principles will be fair, and if it intends to stand on this prop-
osition, then it must argue for it, directly and at length.93
90. See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 19-22; Luban, supra note 25, at 402-03. Anatole
France has given us perhaps the most well-known statement of the not always identical
relationship between fairness and neutrality. See ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE (1894)
("The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, beg in the streets, and steal bread.").
91. For example, the use of "moral standards," "what a court would decide," and
"precedent" as illustrations of objective criteria may be intended to suggest that norms
based on considerations more extensive than neutrality also qualify as "objective crite-
ria." What happens when, for example, "moral standards" conflict with "market value"
is not discussed. FiSHER & URY, supra note 21, at 89.
92. Id. at 88-89.
93. Like Richard Posner after them, Fisher and Ury do not even adopt the minimalist
strategy of "theft over hard work." See Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L;
REV. 1681, 1683-89 (1991) (discussing Richard Posner's "refusal to enter the relevant
jurisprudential and philosophical debates" over the presence or lack of objectivity in
American laws, even to the extent of saying what arguments of others he finds convinc-
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A second problem with objective criteria, as principled bargain-
ing acknowledges, is that often there will be more than one objec-
tive criterion (by whatever definition) available to settle a dispute.
In choosing among them, principled bargainers are told to look for
second level criteria, or meta-criteria, that will tell one which is the
appropriate first level norm.9 4 But principled bargaining does not
explain why it is reasonable to expect the problem of more than one
criterion to go away at the appellate level, or in other words, why it
is reasonable to expect to find only one meta-criterion. Thus, in the
end, principled bargaining falls into the familiar formalist trap of the
infinite rule regress.9 5 Principled bargainers are also encouraged to
discover appropriate criteria by referring to norms they have used in
similar circumstances in the past. 96 If each side comes from a differ-
ent "tradition" and has done different things, however, or if one or
the other now reasonably believes that its past behavior was in er-
ror, the theory of principled bargaining does not help. Suggesting
that bargainers act like judges rather than advocates is also not use-
ful, unless one is willing to suppose, as few are, that in most disputes
there is only one right decision for a judge to make.9 7
ing). Fairness as equal concessions has its defenders. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman et al., A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 663 (1989) (under conditions of perfect information "rational
individuals make equal relative concessions"); John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed
Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964); John E. Coons,
Compromise as Precise Justice, in COMPROMISE IN ETHics, LAW AND POLrrIcs (J. Roland Pen-
nock &John W. Chapman eds., 1979). David Gauthier has even named the principle at
the root of the process, calling it the "Principle of Maximin (maximum-minimum) Rela-
tive Benefit." See DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS By AGREEMENT 154-55 (1986).
94. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 93; supra text accompanying note 21. Perhaps
principled bargaining means to resuscitate H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition," Dwor-
kin's critique notwithstanding. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 39-45
(1977). For an interesting illustration of conflicting objective criteria, both of which are
authoritative, see Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensa-
tion in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'v REV. 651, 682 (1990).
95. See DWORKIN, supra note 94, at 39-45; see also Luban, supra note 25, at 414 n.42
("[O]bjective [criteria] must not [themselves] be... principles about which the parties
are contesting, else agreement is hardly possible. Thus 'principled' bargaining actually
evades principles rather than voicing them."). In the end, the absence of any reasonable
basis to expect agreement at the level of meta-principle makes principled bargaining not
about principle at all.
96. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 88-89.
97. Id. at 93. But see DWORKIN, supra note 94, at 39-45. Principled bargainers are also
encouraged to look forward, not backward, in choosing objective criteria, id. at 53-54,
but often this will rule out fault as a factor in settlement. This might make sense in the
managerial world of business, where getting beyond an immediate problem quickly and
inexpensively may be the only or primary concern, but it does not make sense in the
moral and political world of law, where assigning responsibility and meting out reward
and punishment are also important. See infra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
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In principled bargaining, objective criteria are important be-
cause they enable bargainers to avoid contests of will, those wasteful
and degrading ego spats that cause unnecessary conflict and delay,
and leave parties with the sense that their claims have not been un-
derstood or respected. Like many things in bargaining, however,
avoiding contests of will is good advice to a point, and in principled
bargaining, the point is sometimes missed. Objective criteria, like
any criteria, are open-ended and indeterminate, and parties must
deduce and debate their relevance and meaning on a case-by-case
basis. Even noncontroversial points that eventually are accepted
may take time to be understood, and a bargainer's resolve in dis-
cussing or debating the points is frequently decisive in influencing
the extent to which the points are recognized and accepted. In a
significant sense then, objective criteria do not exist independently
of will, and it is a mistake to think that bargainer resolve plays no
role in principled (or any other kind of) bargaining. Some contests
of will must always be fought, not for their own sake, but because
some points are true and yet some bargainers will be slow or reluc-
tant to accept them.9"
By proposing a kind of bilateral, private adjudication as the
proper understanding of cooperative bargaining, the theory of prin-
cipled bargaining advances the idea of cooperation beyond the
overly simple level of social style and explains the central role of
authoritative substantive norms in determining the outcome of bar-
gaining interactions. But for many who think that the resolution of
differences from the perspective of individual, self-interested points
of view (whether expressed as interests or positions) is destined to
fail, principled bargaining's reluctance to jettison the adjudicatory
model completely, and its incorporation of some features of adver-
sary advocacy, prevent it from being the final word. This view re-
quires a new orientation to bargaining, one that defines the
bargaining task in terms of a mutual effort toward a common goal,
and one that does not get sidetracked, however well-intendedly, into
a destructive quest for correct answers to the question of whose sub-
stantive views are right and whose wrong. That is where the theory
of problem-solving bargaining comes in.
C. Problem-Solving Bargaining
Distancing itself explicitly from cordial bargaining, and appro-
98. See White, supra note 78, at 117 (arguing that Fisher and Ury's suggestion that
one can avoid contests of will "is at best naive and at worst misleading").
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priating the methods of principled bargaining to its own different
purposes, the theory of problem-solving bargaining adds another
dimension to the argument for the efficacy of cooperative bargain-
ing approaches. 99 Problem-solving bargaining is characterized by
99. Carrie Menkel-Meadow's primer on problem-solving bargaining is the leading
discussion of the method. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1. While Professor Menkel-
Meadow has written a good deal more on the topic, see, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Strategies]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settle-
ment: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, For and Against]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transforma-
tion of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J.
Disp. RESOL. 1, 31 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Transformation]; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 50-55 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia], little that is funda-
mental has changed. For that reason, and because her Problem Solving article is still the
best statement of the theory, citations will be made to that work. For a discussion of
problem solving's distancing itself from principled bargaining, see Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 1, at 758-59 n.9. The terms "integrative" and "distributive" are also used to
describe the difference between problem solving and positional bargaining. See GIF-
FORD, supra note 1, at 15.
More so than with principled bargaining, it will come as a surprise to many that
problem solving is a new and distinctive approach. This claim derives much of its plausi-
bility from the exaggerated description of adversarial bargaining with which problem
solving is contrasted. Accord SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 98 n.71. For example, it is
said that a problem-solving bargainer "articulates reasons why a particular solution is
acceptable or unacceptable, rather than simply... [rejects] an offer or [makes] a conces-
sion." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 825. Now, while it undoubtedly happens that
some bargainers only reject or concede, no one claims that this represents a particularly
distinguished, or even typical illustration of adversarial bargaining. Take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining, which is what refusing to discuss reasons amounts to, is generally regarded
as bad technique, adversarial or otherwise. Menkel-Meadow's claim that the approach is
widely used seems to rest principally on the popularity of Herb Cohen's book, HERB
COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING-HOW TO GET WHAT YOU WANT (1980), which
was first serialized in Playboy magazine, and Michael Meltsner and Philip Schrag's unfor-
tunate work on hardball tactics for legal services lawyers, see MICHAEL MELTSNER &
PHILIP SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
ch. 13 (1974) [hereinafter MELTSNER & SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY]. The Co-
hen book is breezy and flip, but hardly mean-spirited, and while the Meltsner and Schrag
work is occasionally nasty, it must be read against the backdrop of the early 1970s, when
it was first published, see Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Negotiating Taticsfor Legal
Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1973) [hereinafter Meltsner & Schrag, Tac-
tics], and the politically charged context in which it was debated and used, which Menkel-
Meadow acknowledges, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 779 n. 107. Neither publica-
tion is a brief for "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining, however, or a bargaining manual for
much of the bar, legal services or otherwise, in the 1970s or now, and to attribute their
occasional excesses to all of bargaining practice is not fair. For more representative
descriptions of conventional bargaining methods, see KRrrZER, FORM OF NEGOTIATION,
supra note 7, at 12-16; Galanter, Settlement Judge, supra note 22. For a more representative
bargaining manual, one that combines cooperative and competitive perspectives into a
thoughtful and nonreductionist view of the bargaining process, see CHARLES B. CRAVER,
EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1986). The practice of comparing ide-
alized manifestations of one bargaining approach with failures of another no doubt
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the attempt to satisfy "real" needs,' 0 the "underlying," "basic," or
"actual" needs parties bring to negotiation, and not legal needs,
which are the parties' real needs expressed in terms of money or
goods.' 0 ' Real needs are more complicated, diverse, and numerous
than legal needs, less likely to be irreconcilably in conflict, and more
likely to provide grounds for agreement.10 2 A client's real needs are
discovered through "searching" and "comprehensive lawyer-client
dialogue" (e.g., "how would you like to see this all turn out?";
"what would you like to accomplish here?"; "why do you want to do
that?").'0 3 An adverse party's real needs are discovered "primarily
helps sharpen the differences between the two approaches, but sharpening differences
does not always advance understanding, or help one to determine which approach is
better. Exaggerated claims of novelty occur in scholarship, however, and they are not a
reason to be distracted from the task of discovering what problem-solving theory has to
offer.
100. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 794 n. 155. Problem-solving theory uses the
language of "needs," but it is not clear what it means by this term. Cf. Frank Michelman,
Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 256, 257 n.8 (1989)
("It is not clear how, if at all, Fiss would differentiate 'beliefs' about what 'should' be
done from 'preferences' and 'wants.' "); see also LUBAN, supra note 7, at 20 n.22 (discuss-
ing differences between "needs," "tastes," and "beliefs"); SiLBEY & SARAT, supra note
23, at 94-100 (describing needs analysis' addition of relational and therapeutic perspec-
tives to interest analysis); Galanter, supra note 23, at 68 (discussing the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing "authentic needs from inappropriate, illegitimate and improper ones").
Problem solvers do not literally need many of the things they are permitted to ask for in
bargaining, in the sense that if they did not get them something drastic, disastrous, or
fatal would happen. In fact, if problem solvers could ask for only those things required
for subsistence, physical or psychological, a negotiation between two problem solvers
would almost always leave items on the table. Yet, problem solvers are not supposed to
do that. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 760 n.15, 784 n.118, 811 n.220, 822.
Problem-solving theory, therefore, must use the term "needs" in some more expansive
sense than the literal one. While it does not capture it completely, the idea of "wants"
seems to come closest to that sense. Cf. SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 93 ("[Ilnterest
based claims say 'I want it.' "). The right to bargain for what one "wants" is more diffi-
cult to justify, however, than the right to bargain for what one "needs." See Galanter,
supra note 23, at 68; SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 113-20. This might be an instance
of "persuasive definition," see CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHicS AND LANGUAGE 81-110
(1944), substituting for argument. See also Brian Barry, Priorities of the Selfgovliset, TIMES
Lrr. Supp., Feb. 5-11, 1988, at 140 ("We tend to think that needs possess a kind of
peremptory status that mere desires lack: if you say you need something you seem to be
presenting a weightier claim than if you say you want it."); Trubek, supra note 89, at 130-
32 (critical legal sociology critique of needs discourse). To avoid confusion in discuss-
ing problem-solving theory, however, I will continue to use the term "needs."
101. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 795.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 801-03. By describing the process of discovering needs solely in terms of
asking clients what they want, problem-solving theory adopts a form of the conservative
legal theory premise that expressed preferences are sacrosanct, and are therefore be-
yond investigation. Because the formation of preferences is influenced by extant social
structures, however, and because social structures do not operate equally in everyone's
interests, expressed preferences are sometimes a poor representation of an individual's
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by asking one's client," but also by making stereotypical assump-
tions, posing direct questions, making principled offers, and disclos-
ing information, all of which encourage or provoke equivalent
action by and thus information about the other side."°
true interests. Thus, this conservative legal theory premise is sometimes just wrong. See
Rhode, supra note 8, at 629; West, supra note 8, at 670-75. Moreover, the view that
preferences are beyond investigation entails the additional view that they are also be-
yond comparison, the famous impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, see
LIONEL C. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
138-54 (3d ed. 1984), and this view is incompatible with problem solving's requirement
that a bargainer understand empathically the bargaining relationship's joint needs. In
effect, problem solving's directive to take a client's preferences at face value but to inves-
tigate those of an adversary, seems to ask a lawyer to behave more empathically with an
adversary than a client, but it cannot mean to say this. Problem-solving theory must
discuss how client needs are probed, interpreted, analyzed, and tested, rather than just
inquired into, if it is to sort out these contradictory messages and escape this uneasy
alliance with conservative legal theory. For a description of a familiar method of doing
this, and the suggestion of a new and different one, see West, supra note 8, at 675-88.
For those who find the approach useful, the most recent discussion of "client-centered
lawyering" also describes a range of techniques for use in the interest-investigation task.
DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 310-13,
322-31, 334-35, 345-46, 351-52, 356-59 (1991).
For a more detailed illustration of the needs investigation process in operation, see
GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 47-48. For Gifford, the term "real needs" (or "interests" in
principled bargaining) appears to be a synonym for "reasons," and the suggestion that
bargainers discover their clients' real needs is seen as advice to understand a client's
reasons for expressing particular positions. This seems a more accurate way to put the
point. Like principled bargaining, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text, problem
solving is more hopeful about the prospect of identifying client needs at the front end of
the bargaining interaction than the nature of such needs would seem to warrant. See
Galanter, supra note 23, at 68 ("We are not told how the problem-solving negotiator is
going to select ...authentic needs from inappropriate, illegitimate, and improper
ones."). Problem solvers must know what they need before beginning to bargain, yet
this is almost impossible to do. What one needs is partly a function of what one can get
(even when one does not want "everything," knowing the most another will give is help-
ful in figuring out what a claim is worth), and what one can get cannot be known fully
before bargaining. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. The identification of
needs must proceed simultaneously and interdependently with bargaining, not sepa-
rately and in sequence, and a theory of bargaining must explain how this is done. Gif-
ford seems to recognize this problem, but does not say how it is overcome. See GIFFORD,
supra note 1, at 6-7. Menkel-Meadow acknowledges that "needs may change over the
long run" but does not say anything more about the point, see Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 1, at 802, and she also states that "[iun order to engage in problem-solving negotia-
tion the lawyer must first ascertain her clients' underlying needs or objectives." Id. at
804 (emphasis added). Proponents of problem solving often charge adversarial bargain-
ing with being overly linear, see id. at 767-71, 793-94, but to assume that needs can be
identified fully at the outset of bargaining is to introduce a different but equally objec-
tionable kind of linearity into the conceptual arena. Menkel-Meadow may acknowledge
this problem when she says that it is possible to meet needs even when they are only
"perceived" or "incomplete," see id. at 821 n.262, but if so, it is not clear how this can be
reconciled with the directive to satisfy "real" needs.
104. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 804, 818-29. Information sharing is not "to-
tally uninhibited" in problem solving, however, as only information that can be received,
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Problem solvers operate "on a multi-dimensional field,""' in
which they generate multiple solutions to the bargaining problem,
consider the solutions simultaneously, and do not get locked into a
pattern of argumentation and concession over single demands.10 6
They "articulat[e] reasons why a particular solution is acceptable or
unacceptable, rather than simply reject[] an offer or make a conces-
sion.""' Giving reasons focuses attention on the process of "solv-
ing the problem.., rather than winning an argument... [and] may
cause negotiators to see still other solutions .... ."'08 Problem solv-
ers sometimes "focus on the legal merits as a justification for a par-
ticular proposal,"' °9 but when the parties "have widely divergent
views," one of the "primary advantages" of problem solving "is that
no judgment need be made about whose argument is right [and
whose] . . . wrong."" °
When party needs are not sufficiently complementary, and the
bargaining pie not naturally divisible, problem solvers manipulate
the material available for distribution by "exploring shared inter-
ests .... exploiting value differences .... looking to third parties, ....
sharing,. . . aggregating or disaggregating [resources].... seeking
substitute goods, [and] . . . exploring long- and short-term val-
understood, and related concretely to the problem is sought or provided, id. at 822-23,
though it is not clear who makes these judgments, or on the basis of what evidence or
standards. While also not discussed, perhaps so as not to undercut the claim that prob-
lem solving does not require bargainers to be "nice," id. at 827, it would seem that a
cordial and respectful interactional style, of the type rated highly by Williams, see supra
note 39 and accompanying text, would help encourage disclosure and exchange of infor-
mation about needs, and thus be an important part of the problem-solving approach.
A program for identifying adverse bargainer needs must also deal with the problem
of deception. Even in problem-solving bargaining it can be to a bargainer's advantage
to fool the other side, see Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1226-30. As a consequence, prob-
lem solvers must know how to separate the genuine from the manufactured in proffers
of information about the other bargainer's needs. Menkel-Meadow makes a brief ac-
knowledgement of this problem at the end of her discussion, see Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 1, at 833 n.306, but she does not discuss it, and seems to agree that problem-
solving theory does not provide much help in this regard. In fact, problem-solving the-
ory's assumption that bargainers will be candid because it is in their interest to be so, id.
at 837 n.326, makes the question of how to recognize and deal with deception largely
irrelevant. There is nothing incoherent about circumspect or suspicious problem solv-
ing, however, and though analytically less distinctive, it is just such a variation of the
theory that is needed to explain how one determines when an unwilling bargainer has
provided the accurate information needed to make problem solving work.
105. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 822.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 825.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 825.
110. Id. at 826.
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ues,"' so that the final agreement can include something for
everyone. Resources are distributed between the parties rather than
left on the table or wasted in needless wrangling, and distributions
are improved until the most efficient solution is achieved." l2 Prob-
lem solving is said to be faster and more efficient than adversarial
(or positional) bargaining, to reach more satisfying and thus more
lasting solutions, and to be more straightforward and pleasant.
When real needs are known, a comprehensive set of solutions iden-
tified, and battles for competitive advantage avoided, bargaining be-
comes a process of matching means with ends. This can be
complicated, but when bargainers work diligently and in their joint
interests (and even when they do not),"' they ultimately can make
such matches.
At first glance, it might appear that problem solving is a not so
very different variation on the theme of principled bargaining, with
real needs playing the part of interests and legal needs the part of
positions. The two theories share the same faith in the absence of
genuine conflict in the world and believe that adversarial position-
taking is the root of all bargaining evil. Both theories also assume
that interests underlying positions are invariably compatible, at least
in some of their manifestations, and that sufficiently clever bargain-
ers can always define the bargaining problem to provide for a distri-
bution that will leave everyone contented and compensated; that
skillful bargaining is just a matter of breaking analytical, emotional,
and intellectual log-jams through acts of the imagination. This is a
lot for the two to hold in common, and perhaps it is enough to es-
tablish identity rather than overlap. But there are also differences
between the two that in the end may turn out to be as important, if
not more important, than their similarities.
The key to the differences lies in the contrasting metaphors the
two theories use to identify the essential character of bargaining.
Principled bargaining is grounded in the belief that determinative
principle can ultimately identify the right solution to any dispute. In
other words, that there is always a background belief structure of
regulatory norms-legal, ethical, and moral-which participating
111. Id. at 813.
112. Id. at 822. Problem-solving theory also uses the concept of Pareto optimality.
See id. at 760 n.15, 789 n.128, 811 n.220.
113. See id. at 822 ("Even a single problem solver can propose alternative ways of
measuring liability that may eventually be successful, if she has accurately determined
the other party's needs."); id. at 838 ("A problem-solving conception need not be aban-
doned simply because both parties don't use the same negotiation behaviors."); id. at
838 n.328 ("It doesn't take 'two to tango.' ").
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bargainers accept as authoritative, and from which correct answers
to bargaining problems can be deduced. Finding the right norms
("objective criteria") and deducing correct answers can be compli-
cated and difficult tasks, in the performance of which reasonable
persons can disagree, and working through these disagreements can
require considerable skill. But principles come first, and they, not
bargainers, are the most important variable in the determination of
bargaining outcome.
For problem-solving bargaining, on the other hand, the bar-
gainer is most important. Norms can be useful tools for finding so-
lutions, but only as an adjunct to bargainer maneuvering; norms in
themselves are not dispositive. The bargainers' willingness to treat
the bargaining task as a joint venture, in which both sides' shared
interest in reaching an agreed-upon solution outweighs each partic-
ular side's individual interest in a most favorable solution, is the
principal determinant of outcome. Parties working together, cre-
atively, and in their mutual interest, on a problem that vexes them
both, literally "solving a problem," makes settlement possible and
defines its contours. Bargainer open-mindedness, inventiveness,
flexibility, and evenhandedness are the important influences on this
process, and while principle can play a role, it is not inevitable that it
do so. Principled bargaining also emphasizes the importance of
joint action," 4 but it is the raison d'etre of problem solving, an end in
itself, and not just a felicitous means for discovering correct
principles.
Problem solving ultimately is based on a managerial view of the
bargaining world. Unlike principled bargaining, which is essentially
adjudicatory," it asks parties to treat bargaining as a process of
looking into the future to determine how best to use resources effi-
ciently. It asks "where do we go from here?," or "how do we get
out of this predicament?," and is less interested than is principled
bargaining in questions of fault or responsibility, or in discussions
of how the present state of affairs came about. 116 If principled bar-
gaining resolves political questions by recourse to status quo con-
114. See FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 73-79.
115. Williams disagrees, seeing principled bargaining as "predominantly problem-
solving" in its approach. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 76.
116. See SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 27-31 (developing consensus about future
conduct rather than finding fault is at the base of problem solving); see also Lerman, supra
note 25, at 86-87 (discussing the need to take blameworthiness into account). Often,
fault is the only thing about which one can be certain. Accurate predictions about future
consequences of present choices are far more difficult to make.
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servative i t norms, problem-solving bargaining forgoes political
discussion altogether. This is not to say that it has no politics-sup-
pressing political inquiry is itself a political agenda-but just that
problem-solving theory does not view explicit discussion of the fair-
ness, justice, and legitimacy of outcomes as a necessary part of the
bargaining conversation. Rather, bargaining is a technical process
concerned with tactics, techniques, and maneuvers, and not with the
direct or explicit discussion of substantive norms, with the possible
exception of the norm of efficiency." 18
117. "Conservative" here is not used in its organized politics sense. See Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 542 n.89 (1988).
118. Occasionally, problem-solving theory acknowledges the justice issue in bargain-
ing and makes suggestions for dealing with it. For example, Menkel-Meadow expresses
the hope that justice will take care of itself in the needs ascertainment dialogue between
lawyer and client. She predicts that doing justice will be one of the client's needs, that
lawyer and client will agree about what justice requires, and that this agreement, in turn,
will match the views of the adversary. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 813-17. If all
of this does not happen, she agrees that "[tihere is nothing in the problem-solving
model which necessarily compels parties to consider the justice of their solutions ...."
Id. at 817. While she believes that the "lawyer and client should hold each other in some
kind of moral check," she does "not supply any answers . . . for what the lawyer and
client ought not to do." Id. at 815 n.239. She also does not discuss the separate prob-
lem created when parties to a negotiation collude against the system and resolve the
bargaining problem in a manner inconsistent with positive law. Cf. Fiss, supra note 25, at
1085-86 ("when... [plarties settle [while leaving justice undone], society gets less than
what appears, and for a price it does not know it is paying"); see also Peter C. Hoffer,
Honor and the Roots of American Litigiousness, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 297-98, 302, 314,
317-19 (1989) ("The litigant sues for us all." Id. at 298.); Schuck, supra note 22, at 337
("We cannot assume that a settlement is legitimate simply because the parties' lawyers
voluntarily subscribe to it.").
Problem solvers, in Menkel-Meadow's view, think that efficient solutions are the
best solutions. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 813. They want to "[put] aside...
philosophical debates about the appropriate measures ofjustness [sic] or fairness," id. at
815, and see it as unfortunate when "one is simply thrown back on moral or political
philosophies ofjustice," id. at 835-36. They are self-described utilitarians, id. at 838-39,
but seemingly with a constricted sense of the limits of utilitarianism as a theory ofjus-
tice. See generally LUBAN, supra note 7, at 34-35 (discussing the utilitarian-based partici-
pant satisfaction rationale of alternative dispute settlement); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER,
CONSEQUENTALISM AND ITS CRITICS (1988) (offering justice as an alternative to utilita-
rian thought); J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
(1973) (critique of utilitarianism); UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams eds., 1982) (discussing criticism of utilitarianism and suggesting possible alter-
natives); Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MIH. L. REV. 1078, 1085-91
(1979) (discussing the need to insert moral values into the utilitarian calculus). There
are refined versions of utilitarian theory, of course, which attempt to meet the objections
leveled at their first generation ancestors, see SCHEFFLER, supra, at 1-13; David Luban,
Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49
MD. L. REV. 424, 440-43 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Freedom and Constraint], but there is
no indication, at least in Menkel-Meadow's discussion, that problem-solving theory
wants to rely on these refinements. With the exception of a quotation from Mill extol-
ling the virtues of noncosmic moral thinking, none of the citations Menkel-Meadow pro-
19921
42 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51:1
While problem solving developed last, and was able to learn
from and build on the cordial and principled theories, it does not
yet make a knock-down argument for the superiority of cooperative
bargaining."t 9 For example, its principal tactical contribution, the
claim that zero-sum bargaining can be made positive-sum (or, to use
vides could plausibly be thought of as referring to utilitarian philosophers. Ironically,
Jilrgen Habermas's decidedly nonutilitarian theory of "discourse ethics," with its re-
quirement of general and reciprocal perspective taking, seems more compatible with the
problem-solving world view than utilitarian equivalents. See Ji.RGEN HABERMAS, MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43-109 (1990).
This is not to single out Menkel-Meadow. Her statement to the contrary notwith-
standing, see Menkel-Meadow, supra, at 815 n.237, there is little philosophically sophisti-
cated discussion of the topic of justice anywhere in the bargaining theory literature.
This should not surprise us, however, for as John Roemer has pointed out, "bargaining
theory ... is informationally too impoverished to capture the important issues in distrib-
utive justice." See Roemer, supra note 67, at 90, 97-102. For examples of equally casual
treatments, see MURNIGHAN, supra note 16, at 180-202; HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 267-69, 288-99 (1982). Even Lax and Sebennius's excellent
book fails in this regard. See LAx & SEBENNIUS, supra note 15, at 150-53. A notable
exception is David Luban. See generally LUBAN, supra note 7; Luban, supra note 25. See also
Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1221-23 n.3 (for some writers "there is just not much to be
said about [negotiation] ethics from [their] perspective," listing Howard Raiffa as one
example). But see Coleman et al., supra note 93, at 669-70 ("Concession or bargaining
theory... makes the division of the gains from contracting... a matter of rationality.").
119. As before, see supra note 78, I will limit discussion of the difficulties with problem-
solving theory to a few illustrative comments. For example, while the theory is charac-
terized as much by its definition of the appropriate ends of bargaining as by its views on
effective means, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 801-16, for the most part I will limit
my comments to its suggestions about means. David Luban has analyzed the communi-
tarian social theory at the root of problem solving's conception of ends. He suggests
that the interest in "transforming the disputants and their mutual relationships so that
they can come to acknowledge each other's point of view and common humanity," see
LUBAN, supra note 7, at 50-55, "seems to place a higher value on social order and conviv-
iality than on fairness," id. at 50, and that this increases the risk "that people can become
reconciled [to] morally outrageous relationships." Id. at 53. (Luban's view may be dif-
ferent now that he has made a rule-consequentialist version of role morality, which
"takes the social self as basic," the "default position." See Luban, Freedom and Constraint,
supra note 118, at 443-52.) See also SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 26-31 (describing
communitarian social vision at the base of the problem-solving world view); Dworkin,
supra note 89, at 479-99 (critique of communitarian social theory). Luban also suspects
that one form of reconciliation urged by problem-solving theory (reconciliation as soli-
darity) runs afoul of Kant and Rawls's publicity principle, and he concludes that the
Kantian notion of respect "provides a better reading of what reconciliation is all about."
See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 54. The image at the base of problem solving seems similar
to Milan Kundera's "great fugue," used (in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting) to de-
scribe the ideal collectivist society, in which each individual is a single note, related to
the other notes and the work as a whole in a perfectly harmonious way. Kronman, supra
note 13, at 30. "In such a society," Professor Kronman points out, "there could, by
definition, be no conflict because each person would see his own interests as identical to
the interests of everyone else, all being merged to a single, indivisible melody ...." Id.
at 30. Professor Kronman calls this vision a "monstrosity," see id. at 31, and there is
much to be said for that characterization. See also SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 105-
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the popular terminology, win-lose made win-win' 2 ° ) by expanding
the size of the bargaining pie, is based on analytical sleight of hand
as much as insight. The strategy of expanding the pie is relatively
straightforward. To soften the harsh and obvious effects of having
to compromise interests in a single item, parties should add another
item (or other items) to the hopper, one that means little to one side
but a lot to the other (an apology is a common example), and then
trade the items evenly. 2' When each side gets something, each will
06 ("Contemporary dispute resolution promises to reconceptualize the juridical subject
to conform to the logic and insight of the human sciences.").
The response that problem-solving methods are preferable because they result in
greater participant satisfaction with bargained-for results, by providing greater flexibility
in and participant control over the bargaining process (see ERLANGER et al., supra note 6,
at 21-27, 34-40; Galanter, supra note 23, at 56-59, for a summary of the various argu-
ments to this effect), does not meet this criticism unless problem-solving theory can
show how feelings of satisfaction and perceptions of flexibility and control are war-
ranted. It is not clear even that informal processes are seen as more satisfying. See
ERLANGER et al., supra note 6, at 11; E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE:
TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLE-
MENT CONFERENCES 61-74 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice, 1989) (There is an "absence of
any substantial connection between perceived justice or satisfaction and perceptions of
participation and informality [and this] is especially noteworthy in light of the promi-
nence given to these factors in critiques of traditional procedures." Id. at 66-67.). Par-
ticipants walk away happy from bad deals as well as good ones, because they do not
know how badly (in the comparative sense) they have done, and the illusion of control
works just as effectively as real control as long as a person's ignorance is complete. See
LUBAN, supra note 7, at 37-40 (discussing "adaptive preference formation"); see also Ga-
lanter, supra note 23, at 59-62 (discussing the difficulties in estimating the accuracy of
arguments that informal processes provide higher quality resolutions); id. at 64-65
("[T]he existence of a general preference for settlement does not mean that the pursuit
of settlement in any particular instance is an informed and uncoerced expression of such
a preference.").
For example, how many of the bargainers in Williams's simulated negotiation, set-
tling for between $15,000 and $25,000, would have been satisfied with their efforts if
they had been told that the average settlement for the problem was $37,500, that more
than half of the bargainers settled for more than $50,000, two for more than $80,000,
and one for $95,000? See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 6-7; see also Hillary Putnam, A Recon-
sideration of Deweyian Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1676 (1990) ("The fact that
someone feels satisfied with a situation means little if the person has no information or
false information concerning either her own capacities or the existence of available alter-
natives to her present way of life."). In real life, of course, it is the absence of such
information that makes even bad settlements stable. Stability is not justice, and igno-
rance is not bliss, however, no matter how many people say so, and being reconciled to a
bad deal is often worse than not being reconciled at all. Federal judicial policy, how-
ever, may be to the contrary. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp.
735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (It is a "familiar axiom that a
bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.").
120. See Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1228 n.22 (describing the concept of "win-win"
bargaining). One is reminded of the Dodo in Alice in Wonderland: "Everybody has won
and a! must have prizes." LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 49 (1960).
121. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 771-72, 800 n.171. It appears that lawyers
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have won, or at least believe it has won. Even if this kind of maneu-
vering would fool anyone, though, which is doubtful, it is a mistake
to think that it will reduce zero-sum bargaining. The party uninter-
ested in the newly added item will still value it as a bargaining chip,
and will want (or at least be entitled to want) something for playing
it. One who agrees to apologize, for example, will want more than
the item previously on the table, to which she had an independent
claim, because the new proposal, apology included, is worth more
than its pre-apology counterpart. The net effect of expanding the
bargaining pie is to introduce new items to be bargained over, and
this can increase zero-sum bargaining as frequently as it can reduce
it.122
Similarly, the claim that bargainers should be rational and effi-
cient resource users by treating agreements as tentative until Pareto
optimal, is attractive in the abstract, but not realistic in practice. No
bargainer wants to waste money or any other resource by leaving it
on the table. But if you and I have just worked out a draft agree-
ment, based in major part on representations about needs and
wants each of us has made to the other, any attempt to improve
upon that agreement risks throwing those representations into
do not use this maneuver often. See KRITZER, supra note 1, at 46-47 ("very few lawyers
reported offers or demands centered on simple acknowledgments of interpersonal
obligations").
122. Menkel-Meadow indirectly responds to this criticism by claiming that it is un-
likely "that the parties [will] have absolutely competitive preferences on all the issues so
that trade-offs will not be possible." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 787 n.123. For a
related discussion of the "Homans principle," see id. at 800 n. 171 ("[Blecause people
have different preferences or values it is possible to increase the number of outcomes in
situations where several differentially valued items are at stake."). But while it may be
true that parties will value bargained-for items in widely varying ways, there is no reason
to believe that they will want to give any of them away-nor should they. If they have
valid claims to items on the table, supported by reasons that have not been rebutted, the
advice that they manufacture new items to trade, rather than argue out their substantive
differences, asks them to engage in an elaborate charade for the purpose of making a
face saving retreat. Unless good reasons and authenticity are to be ruled out of bounds
in bargaining, however, bargainers are surely entitled to refuse to dissemble in this way.
But if that is so, then they will have to bargain over the new items with all of the honesty
and enthusiasm of the old, and the sum total of such bargaining is just as likely to pro-
duce more competition as it is to produce less. It is ironic that problem solving, which
so values authenticity and joint action, should indirectly encourage dissembling. Like
principled bargaining, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, it is not always easy to be
faithful to all parts of the problem-solving program. For an excellent discussion of the
importance of honesty and candor in lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer dealing, see Rob-
ert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1031-33, 1043,
1046 (1981). For a defense stronger than Menkel-Meadow's of the tactic of expanding
the bargaining pie to facilitate trade-offs, though one that ultimately is subject to the
above criticisms as well, see MURNIGHAN, supra note 16, at 167-79.
[VOL. 5 1:1
BARGAINING IN THE DARK
doubt. If I acknowledge that there are other arrangements that
would make me as happy or happier, I may undercut some of the
things I have just said in justifying our agreement. If I go back on
what I have said, however, you will wonder about the rest of my
statements and doubt the wisdom of our agreement, which you
would now realize was based on incomplete and inaccurate informa-
tion about my needs. This doubt would place the draft agreement
in jeopardy and make settlement itself less likely. Only the rare bar-
gainer will take the risk of losing an agreement for the chance of
making it marginally better, particularly if there is no reason to be-
lieve that representations made the second time around will be
more trustworthy than the first. The suggestion that agreements be
made Pareto optimal is based on the psychologically suspect prem-
ise that bargaining conversation can proceed without commitment,
and that bargainers can play with a bargaining problem much as
they would with a problem of mathematics. This premise is out of
place in the nonplayful world of real life bargaining. 2
There is also a trace of nihilism in the problem-solving world
view that raises questions about the method's fit within a system of
law. Problem solving is committed to the discussion of substantive
legal standards to the extent such discussion can proceed agreeably;
but when it does not, problem solvers are free to ignore the issue of
whose substantive arguments are right and whose are wrong. This
is "one of the primary advantages" of problem solving.' 24 Discus-
sion does not proceed agreeably when the parties "have widely di-
vergent views" on the merits. ' 25 But if bargainers are free to ignore
legal standards whenever views differ widely, they will be free to ig-
nore legal standards much of the time. Cases in which both sides
interpret the law in the same way do not usually generate bargaining
problems. It is difficult to know, of course, exactly how determinate
legal argument can ever be.1 2 6 But by eschewing law and legal prin-
123. The suggestion that agreements be made Pareto optimal before being finalized is
most often associated with the economics or mathematics branches of bargaining the-
ory. See, e.g., RAIFFA, supra note 118, at 158-64.
124. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 826.
125. Id.
126. The level of discourse at which the indeterminacy problem arises is considerably
more abstract than that reached in most bargaining conversations, and even then, the
case for indeterminacy is based more on the nature of law than on characteristics or
perceptions of those making legal argument. See Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical
Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 227-35 (1986); Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Formality, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351-54 (1973);Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1, 13-14 (1984). But see MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 258 (1987) (Lawyers often can predict how a judge
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ciple whenever they might introduce friction into the bargaining re-
lationship, problem solvers adopt a view of argument as impolite
rather than indeterminate, and in the process distort both argu-
ment's nature and its purpose. They see conversion and capitula-
tion, rather than learning and doubt, as argument's possible
outcomes, and believe that for argument to succeed, one, but not
both, of the parties must alter all (not part) of her views.' 27
Whatever the outcome of the debate about indeterminacy, rec-
onciling conflicting legal claims-or at least appearing to-will con-
tinue to be indispensable to dispute settlement, principally because
legal disputes, at their core, are about different views of what the law
requires. Maneuvering around or finessing such differences may
suppress disputes for a time, but it will not resolve them. Problem
solving's real gripe is probably with the belligerent and hyperbolic
style used by many lawyers in making legal argument, 12 and not
with argument itself. This is a different problem, however, than the
one it emphasizes, and one that calls for remedies other than
avoidance.
Finally, there is something disconcerting about the evidence
marshalled in support of the problem solving (and, for that matter,
principled) view. Because problem solvers criticize theories of ad-
versarial or positional bargaining for their lack of empirical ground-
ing, 12  one would expect problem solving to have emerged
will decide or what arguments will convince another lawyer; the justification of the legal
order is indeterminate, the regularities of legal practice are not.); Ken Kress, Legal Inde-
terminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 284 (1989) ("[M]oderate indeterminacy, even if true, has
at most modest and not devastating consequences for political legitimacy and kindred
concepts . . . . [Airguments for radical indeterminacy fail."); David B. Wilkins, Legal
Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 478-99 (1990) ("From the practicing lawyer's
perspective, the law is not radically indeterminate[;]" nevertheless, "legal realism sub-
stantially undermines the normative foundation" of the command to represent clients'
interests "within the bounds of law." Id. at 496, 497.). Sometimes even those convinced
by the critique of indeterminacy acknowledge that predicting legal outcome is possible,
though they disagree about the type and nature of the predictors. See Anthony
D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 179-88 (1990).
127. Principled bargaining, perhaps because of its greater affinity for principled disa-
greement, seems to understand these points. See FiSHER & BROWN, supra note 27, at 11-
12. Stuart Hampshire argues that "correctness" is a defining quality of thought, so that
not to be concerned with correctness is to be thoughtless. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNO-
CENCE AND EXPERIENCE 38-39 (1990). Luban's discussion of the "informational pov-
erty" of bargaining also makes a strong case for the need to base bargaining outcome on
principle and not just strategy. See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 19-22; see also Lesnick, supra
note 9, at 442-54 (skeptical and thoughtful discussion of the possibility of argument
being a "transformative experience," and "invitation" to proceed in another way).
128. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 775-78; see also infra notes 248-249 and ac-
companying text.
129. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 766-67.
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ineluctably from the carefully documented nature of the bargaining
process. Yet, aesthetic arguments aside (e.g., problem solvers seem
to think that disagreement is unpleasant, and to provoke it is
tacky' 3 0 ), the case for problem solving is supported by a series of
Jack Sprat hypotheticals, in which the material bargained over is al-
ways divisible by two, each half of which, fortuitously, is attractive to
a different side. Problem solvers live in a world in which half of the
people want cake and the other half frosting, '3 ' half orange and the
other half peel,' 32 or half mountains and the other half ocean
(where there is an ocean resort next to the mountains). 1 33  This is
not always a familiar world. These examples are intended only to
illustrate a point, of course (that because bargainers do not invaria-
bly value things in the same way, items are sometimes naturally di-
visible to both parties' individual satisfaction), and in that regard
their simplistic, catchy, and nonlegal nature may help. But the point
having been made, more realistic examples are called for to show
the practical force of this problem-solving insight. Realistic exam-
ples are in short supply, however, and when they do appear their
complicating features are not discussed.'3 4  Problem solvers, like
proponents of other bargaining theories, cooperative and adver-
130. This is never said directly, of course, but I believe it is a fair interpretation of
Menkel-Meadow's discussion of the "unproductive competition" produced by positional
bargaining. See id. at 775-83.
131. Id. at 771. Cake does heavy duty for cooperative bargaining theory. Menkel-
Meadow uses it to illustrate the role of complementary interests in dividing bargaining
stakes, and principled bargaining uses it to illustrate the role of fair procedures. See
supra note 71. At least Menkel-Meadow does not say to bargainers as a class "let them
eat cake." Some get only frosting. For the economic perspective on cake, see Katz,
supra note 7, at 232-33.
132. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 771 n.70.
133. Id. at 799-800.
134. See, e.g., id. at 772-75. In Menkel-Meadow's extensive discussion of the James
case (perhaps the "Brown" case in her version, though it is not clear because she uses
both names, see id. at 772 n.75), the problem-solving remedy would require Mrs. Brown
to remain in a relationship with an automobile dealer who has been unwilling or unable
(the problem suggests that either explanation is equally plausible) to fix her car for sev-
eral months, costing Mrs. Brown her job, peace of mind, and most of her discretionary
income. The problem of whether Mrs. Brown can trust Snead Motors (or Stead, again
depending on the version of the problem) to start doing things correctly, all of the evi-
dence to the contrary notwithstanding, should seem substantial to anyone familiar with
the case. And the advantages of cutting Mrs. Brown's losses by making a cash settlement
with Snead should seem worthy of serious consideration. But Professor Menkel-
Meadow relegates these issues to a single sentence in a footnote, at the end of a three
page discussion of problem-solving remedies, in which she acknowledges that "it is pos-
sible, of course, that the parties would prefer not to deal with each other .... " Id. at
772-75. Amen! See also KRrrZER, supra note 1, at 43 (In some cases where nonmonetary
remedies are available, lawyers and litigants do not want them "because they do not
want to have an ongoing relationship with someone who has forced them into court.").
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sarial alike, seem committed as much for reasons of taste as for what
the evidence requires.
In the end, problem solving, along with the other cooperative
theories, is based on the belief that avoiding conflict is the key to
effective bargaining.135 Unlike cordial bargaining, it recognizes that
friendliness alone will not do this,'3 6 and unlike principled bargain-
ing, it recognizes that principles often will come up short. But its
alternative, to conceive of the bargaining task as a form ofjoint ven-
ture in which bargainers work together to crack puzzles that trouble
them both, creates new difficulties which, in some ways, make the
argument for cooperative bargaining less persuasive than the case
already in place. This is largely because the theory's over-arching,
explanatory metaphor, that of problem solving, does not always
work. Generic problem solving, the social and work world phenom-
enon from which the theory draws much of its content and evocative
appeal, involves voluntary relationships, undertaken by persons
genuinely united around common goals, working from shared (and
often mutually prepared) information bases, but blocked as to
means. The purpose of problem solving is to invent new paths
through analytical thickets, to propose alternate definitions of oper-
ative problems, to reconfigure fuzzy data, and to achieve common
goals where the issue of commonality and the definition of goals are
not in dispute.
But bargaining, particularly the dispute settlement variety, is
less single-minded and harmonious than this. It is voluntary only in
the sense that it is the best of a bad lot of choices one would not
have chosen if one had been given a true choice, and unified in a
common goal only in the sense that parties may have interests that
overlap or dovetail and then again, they may not. Sometimes the
joint interest of reaching an agreement outweighs individual inter-
ests in reaching different particular agreements, but this is true only
some of the time, and the question of whether it is true in any given
135. Ironically, this is the converse of the mistake made by adversarial bargaining the-
ory. Adversarial bargaining often inflates differences to create conflicts, perhaps so that
bargainers will be motivated at least to discuss the differences. Some need to feel angry
to express pique. See Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report
on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 177, 221 ("rather than being aggressive
because they are angry, lawyers may be angry in order to be aggressive . . ."). On the
other hand, cooperative bargaining minimizes differences to deny conflict, perhaps so
that the disputes will go away and bargaining (accommodation, compromise) will be
unnecessary. Each conception distorts the nature and extent of the disagreement, albeit
in opposite ways, and makes the same mistake of having the parties solve the wrong
problem.
136. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 827.
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instance is always answered from the selfish (in a nonpejorative
sense) perspective of the individual bargainer, not that of the bar-
gaining relationship. The assumptions generic problem solving
takes for granted are too optimistic for dispute bargaining most of
the time. It is not that dispute bargaining does not involve problem
solving, for it almost always does. It is just that the metaphor of
problem solving, standing alone, is too limited to capture the com-
plexity of the dispute bargaining relationship.
While the foregoing arguments for cordial, principled, and
problem-solving bargaining do not always work, this is not a reason
to reject cooperative bargaining approaches generally. The case for
cooperative bargaining is analytically and intuitively appealing. It is
believable, for example, that competition polarizes relationships,
wastes resources, and, as often as not, results in bad settlements or
needless deadlock. There is also something intrinsically sensible
about the claim that bargaining for mutual benefit, based on accu-
rate information and principle, in a friendly and empathic manner,
would be better. Given a choice, who seriously would prefer a sys-
tem based on deception, arbitrariness, belligerence, and greed?
One would like and expect to agree with the case for cooperation,
therefore, but in the legal literature the case is not yet fully convinc-
ing."3 7 The reasons, I believe, are that legal commentators have
adopted too narrow a frame of reference, and have not taken suffi-
cient account of the role of self-interest in discussing the choice of a
bargaining approach. Only when bargaining is examined from the
perspective of an entire career rather than a single negotiation, and
on the basis of an analysis of self-interested trading in addition to
the uses made of cordial, principled, and problem-solving methods,
will it be clear why bargainers are better off cooperating with one
another than competing for zero-sum prizes. Nonlegal scholarship
can be helpful here.
137. Lack of persuasiveness notwithstanding, these arguments are taken seriously in
large domains of legal scholarship, and even more so in legal education. They are cited
frequently in coursebooks as authoritative, see, e.g., GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 32, 48, 50-
51, 55, 59, 69, 92-95, 110, 113, 152-52, 158; STEPHEN S. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPUTrE
RESOLUTrIoN, 19-22, 49-60, 63 (1985); MURRAY et al., supra note 42, at 77-80, 82-89, 96-
101, 111-13; LEONARD L. RISKIN &JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DisPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAW-
YERS, 38-45, 61-63, 112-14, 121-27, 129, 131-34, 138-40, 162-75, 180, 192, 195 (1987),
and form the basis of widely offered courses of instruction, for both law students and
lawyers, see, e.g., Galanter, Deals, supra note 22, at 271, 275; Robert B. Moberly, A
Pedagogy for Negotiation, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 316, 322 (1984); Jacqueline M. Nolan-





The question of whether rational bargainers should choose
competitive or cooperative strategies has been a subject of study in
the game theoretic branch of mathematical science since the 1950s.
Recent work in perhaps the most well-known part of this subject,
that based on the formal problem of the "prisoner's dilemma,"' 138
lends support to the conclusion that, under conditions approxi-
mated in legal dispute settlement, cooperation is the strategy of
choice for bargainers interested in distributing resources efficiently
and maximizing individual return.' 9 This work to a large extent
corroborates the claims of cordial, principled, and problem-solving
bargaining, and when combined with them makes a more powerful
case for the efficacy of the cooperative approach. To appreciate the
full force of the argument for the legal bargainer's practical need to
cooperate, therefore, it is necessary to understand the lessons of this
recent work. 40
The prisoner's dilemma is a game between two players, descrip-
tively named A and B, each of whom is faced with a choice of two
strategies, cooperate or defect. The game board is a four-box ma-
trix (see below) consisting of different payoffs for each of the four
pairs of strategies for playing the game. In the most basic form of
the game, the players are allowed only to choose a strategy and may
not discuss their choices with the other player, either before or after
playing. 14'
138. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97, 100 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (estimating "at least
two thousand studies" of the two-person prisoner's dilemma to date). Many commenta-
tors have described the dilemma from the perspective of real life prisoners. See GIF-
FORD, supra note 1, at 26-29.
139. See AXELROD, supra note 13. But see Coleman et al., supra note 93, at 666 ("the
prisoner's dilemma is best thought of as illustrating the problem of rational defection,
not the problem of rational agreement"); Dawes et al., supra note 138, at 100 ("When
experimenters avoid substantial payments by having a prize for the subject who garners
the most points, they are implicitly instructing subjects to seek not just maximal gain,
but maximal relative gain-a strange task for studying cooperation.").
140. The description of the prisoner's dilemma game that follows is an elaboration on
and paraphrase of the description provided in AXELROD, supra note 13, at 7-10, 206-07.
141. Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood of the RAND Corporation discovered the 2 x 2
matrix, and Albert W. Tucker wrote an unpublished paper on it giving it its name. Re-
portedly, Tucker was asked to give a talk on game theory to the psychology department
at Stanford, and invented a story to go with the matrix. See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER,
The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation, in METAMAGI-
CAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATrERN 715 (1985); RASMUSEN,
supra note 16, at 38. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa wrote the classic work on game
theory. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957). For
other important works, see KEN BINMORE & PARTHA DASGUPTA, THE ECONOMICS OF BAR-
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Player A's payoff is given in the lower left hand corner of each
quadrant, and Player B's in the upper right hand corner. IfA defects
while B cooperates, A successfully double-crosses B. This is the best
A can do and the worst B can do, so A gets a payoff of 5 and B gets 0.
Conversely, if A cooperates and B defects, the northeast quadrant,
then A gets 0 and B gets 5. If both players cooperate, each gets 3, if
both defect, each gets 1. A's preferred ordering of the quadrants is
southwest, northwest, southeast, northeast, and B's preferred order-
ing is northeast, northwest, southeast, southwest.
The numbers are not important in themselves. That is, it does
not matter that the payoff increments are 5, 3, 1, and 0. They could
be any set of T, S, R, and P that satisfy the following conditions:
(1) T> R >P> S
(2) (T + S)/2 < R
That is, T, the temptation to defect (the five payoff), must be
greater than R, the reward for mutual cooperation (the three pay-
off), which in turn must be greater than P, the punishment for mu-
tual defection (the one payoff), which in turn must be greater than S,
the sucker's return for unilateral cooperation (the zero payoff). The
second condition simply says that mutual cooperation is better than
the average of the other two, so that if bargainers are playing several
repetitions of the game they cannot improve on cooperation by tak-
GAINING 6-7, 28, 37, 62, 238 (1987); GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (Alvin E.
Roth ed., 1985); KRITZER, supra note 1, at 80-83; MURNIGHAN, supra note 16; ANATOL
RAPOPORT, Two-PERSON GAME THEORY (1966); ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAM-
MAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965); RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 13-14.
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ing turns suckering each other (which itself is a form of
cooperation).
Game theorists have been intrigued by this paradox: both play-
ers prefer mutual cooperation, the three-three square, to mutual de-
fection, the one-one square, but if both are rational they will find
themselves, to their infinite frustration, trapped in the one-one
square. Why is that? Look at the problem first from A's point of
view. A reasons: "B can either cooperate or defect. If B cooperates,
I should defect because then I get 5 instead of 3. If B defects, I
should also defect, because then I get 1 instead of 0. No matter
what B does I am better off defecting than cooperating."' 42 B of
course reasons in the same way, so both players defect and end up
in the one-one square.
One might argue that A and B, recognizing their dilemma,
should make a leap of faith and trust each other to decide unilater-
ally to cooperate. But just as A (or B) says to herself, "well maybe I
should cooperate and gamble that B will cooperate as well," she re-
alizes two things. First, if B is rational she will defect, and second,
even if B wants to cooperate she will have to count on the fact that A
is rational and will defect. A defects, therefore, and acts out the
logic of the prisoner's dilemma. It is difficult to produce a coopera-
tive outcome when rational behavior points in the opposite
direction.
There is a wealth of literature on playing the game, but rela-
tively little about how to play it well.' 4 ' Nonetheless, certain conclu-
sions emerge. First, there is no optimum universal strategy, that is,
no strategy that is better than all others under all circumstances.
How one plays depends upon with whom one is playing. Second,
there is no way out of the dilemma if there is only one play to the
game because a player is trapped in the southeast corner if she is
going to be rational.' 44 If the game is played many times over,
though, without a fixed ending point (the so-called iterated pris-
oner's dilemma), players can use the future ability to cooperate or
142. David Luban, Presentation at the Meeting of the Section on Alternative Dispute
Resolution of the Association of American Law Schools, January 1988.
143. This is because virtually all of the experimental literature is based on analyzing
choices made by players who are seeing the formal game for the first time. Axelrod
therefore decided to draw on "people who had a rich understanding of the strategic
possibilities inherent in a non-zero sum setting." AXELROD, supra note 13, at 29-30.
144. See id. at 15. This noncooperative or defecting strategy is referred to as "domi-
nant" or "dominating," "because no matter what others choose, the personal rewards
are higher for choosing it than for making a cooperative choice." Dawes et al., supra
note 138, at 97. See RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 28.
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defect as a kind of carrot and stick to coordinate choices and to de-
velop a pattern of mutual cooperation. 4 5 The interesting question,
then, is how one plays the iterated prisoner's dilemma so that such a
pattern develops.
In an interesting and clever experiment,' 46 Robert Axelrod
took up this question. He invited game theory professionals from
all over the world, including people who had published articles on
the prisoner's dilemma, to submit computer programs for playing a
round robin, iterated version of the game, in effect to participate in
145. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 14-16. For a description of four proposals ad-
vanced by game theorists over the years to encourage people to eschew choice of the
dominating strategy in favor of strategies more in the collective interest, see Dawes et
al., supra note 138, at 98-99. Not everyone assumes that the motives of prisoner di-
lemma game players necessarily must be self-interested. See MURNIGHAN, supra note 16,
at 148-49. There are empathy-based explanations of the game, see Jane J. Mansbridge,
On the Relation of Altruism and Self-Interest, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 138, at
133, 134, and Dawes and his colleagues have argued that patterns of play in the iterated
version of the game can be understood as influenced by the development of a group
identity with other game players that induces individual players to cooperate for the
benefit of the group. See Dawes et al., supra note 138, at 98-110; see also MURNIGHAN,
supra note 16, at 146-48 (discussing the effects of establishing a group identity).
146. Notwithstanding the inventiveness of Axelrod's analysis, and its implications for
lawyer bargaining, his book has not been discussed widely or carefully in the legal bar-
gaining literature. There are some perfunctory references, see, e.g., GIFFORD, supra note
1, at 17 n.9; GOLDBERG et al., supra note 137, at 61; MURRAY et al., supra note 42, at 91-
92; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 827 n.285; Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in
Negotiation, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 7, 42-44 (1987), calling the reader's attention to or dis-
cussing the work, but for the most part legal bargaining scholars do not seem to be fully
aware of the force of Axelrod's analysis. Gifford's is a particularly strange omission
since he has an extended discussion of the prisoner's dilemma game, see GIFFORD, supra
note 1, at 26-28, in which he does not refer to Axelrod, even though Axelrod's analysis
supports Gifford's points more substantially than some of the references used. See, e.g.,
id. at 39 n.24.
Roger Fisher and Scott Brown also have discussed Axelrod, arguing that prisoner's
dilemma analysis does not apply to relationship issues. But their arguments are based
on reasons that do not seem to reflect an understanding of the nature of Axelrod's dis-
cussion. See FISHER & BROWN, supra note 27, at 197-202. The basic problem with Fisher
and Brown's analysis is that it does not distinguish between learning and bargaining
(recall that this was also a problem with principled bargaining's directive to invent op-
tions for mutual gain, see supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text), and this omission
causes the authors to misinterpret Axelrod. Learning what another bargainer values or
needs is only part of the process of coordinating bargaining choices with her. Even with
perfect knowledge, if needs are incompatible or based on competing conceptions of the
good, bargainers still must reconcile and accommodate their respective views, and this
will involve more than increasing their respective understandings of what the other
thinks and feels. Axelrod's analysis is about coordinating choices, not just learning
about another's interests, and these are the same only in the fictitious conflict-free uni-
verse of principled bargaining.
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a prisoner's dilemma game tournament. 147 Each program would
147. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 30-31. For a list of participants, see id. at 193
(round one); id. at 195-96 (round two).
It is the iterated version of the prisoner's dilemma game, and the particularly inter-
esting use Axelrod makes of it, and not the prisoner's dilemma itself, that is the impor-
tant part of Axelrod's analysis for purposes of the discussion that follows. Ordinarily,
the prisoner's dilemma would not be thought of as an apt framework for analyzing dis-
pute bargaining. Dispute bargaining is "cooperative" (i.e., participants communicate
directly with one another as part of the process of coordinating choices), and the pris-
oner's dilemma is not (i.e., direct communication between players is not allowed); dis-
pute bargaining is asymmetrical (i.e., participants have different levels of private
information and resources for playing the game), and the prisoner's dilemma is symmet-
rical (i.e., players have the same information base); and dispute bargaining is "exten-
sive" (i.e., participants make multiple offers, sequenced over time, which can be
influenced by prior offers and have a like effect on subsequent ones), and the prisoner's
dilemma is one-shot (i.e., players make only one, simultaneous offer). There are cooper-
ative, asymmetric, and extensive-form games that simulate dispute bargaining more fully
than the prisoner's dilemma, see, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 1, at 90-92; MURNIGHAN, supra
note 16, at 92-101, 127; RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 43-54, though none yet captures its
multidimensional nature, see KRrrZER, supra note 1, at 83-86 ("Although game theory can
be extremely useful as a device to clarify conceptual and theoretical issues, it has many
problems as a paradigm for the empirical study of the bargaining situations that occur in
the litigation context." Id. at 84.); DONALD A. SCHUN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 44
(1983) ("Formal modelling has become increasingly divergent from the real-world
problems of practice."), and typically these other games would be thought better bases
on which to ground a discussion of dispute bargaining. See, e.g., MURNIGHAN, supra note
16, at 92-101 (discussing the Diamond Bidding Game, where the simple additional fea-
ture of known asymmetric outcomes makes alternating between competitive and cooper-
ative strategies (logrolling) a more likely route to cooperative action than consistent
mutual cooperation).
These concerns notwithstanding, Axelrod's discussion is instructive because an iter-
ated prisoner's dilemma game tournament has many of the same properties as a career
in bargaining, even if a single play of the game does not have all of the properties of a
single negotiation. Over a career, a reputation for bargaining cooperatively, established
through behavior rather than words, makes it easier for others to coordinate choices
with a bargainer (and thus to produce maximum distributions for everyone), than do
other bargaining reputations. When rational bargainers believe that their counterparts
will cooperate, and that only by cooperating themselves will they obtain the largest re-
turns, they will take the lead in cooperating and will not wait for the other side to prove
itself trustworthy. See MURNIGHAN, supra note 16, at 145-46. They also will be more
likely to expect cooperation and thus less quick to interpret ambiguous adversary behav-
ior as defecting, less attracted to pre-emptive competitive strikes that attempt to end
bargaining in single power-based moves, and less likely to see other bargainers as ob-
jects to be manipulated rather than persons to be accommodated.
Because it may be possible to develop an overall reputation for cooperating without
bargaining cooperatively in every negotiation, or even all of the time in single negotia-
tions, Axelrod's analysis is not necessarily instructive in determining how best to make
individual tactical choices in particular negotiations. For help in this regard, analysis
based on models that more fully represent the complexity of the single bargaining en-
counter is needed. But Axelrod's work does tell bargainers what overall strategic atti-
tude or frame of reference to take to the bargaining process in general, and what kind of
bargaining reputation to cultivate. In that limited sense, his comments are directly rele-
vant to actual bargaining practice. The popularity of routine processing as a major bar-
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play every other program, a clone of itself, and a random (i.e., coin-
flipping) program, two hundred times. 4 ' Fourteen teams partici-
pated, with programs ranging from the very simple to the moder-
ately complex. When the tournament was over, the simplest
program, called "tit for tat," had won. Tit for tat cooperated on the
first play of the game, and mimicked its opponent on each succes-
sive play, so that if the other player defected, tit for tat punished it on
the next play by also defecting; if the other player cooperated, titfor
tat rewarded that move on the next play by also cooperating. At the
end of two hundred rounds, tit for tat had cleaned up.' 49
Now it is at least peculiar that a program which cannot, by defi-
nition, win any single play of the game, can win the tournament.
Compare tit for tat, for example, with the equally simple "Always De-
fect."' ° Always Defect never loses (i.e., never gets zero, the S payoff)
in head-to-head play. The worst it can do is tie (i.e., get one, or the
P payoff) if the other party also always defects. If the other cooper-
gaining mode, see supra note 22, suggests that many bargainers already understand his
point.
I should add, if it is not clear, that this article is not intended as a discussion, even
descriptive, of the state of the art in game theory scholarship, or its application to legal
bargaining. Much has happened in the field since Axelrod wrote, and even then there
were many who would have found his experiment design overly simplistic as a piece of
pure research, even while acknowledging the virtuosity with which he teased truly mo-
mentous lessons from so modest and limited a data base. A complete discussion of
game theory's contributions to the understanding of legal dispute bargaining is beyond
the scope of this Article.
148. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 30-54, for a description of the tournament.
149. See id. at 30-32. In addition to analyzing its results, Axelrod performed a number
of "subjunctive replays" of the tournament, that is, replays with different sets of entries.
He found, for example, that the strategy called tit for two tats, which tolerates two defec-
tions before retaliating (but which retaliates only once), would have won had it been in
the lineup. Id. at 39. Likewise, two other strategies he discovered, called Revised Down-
ing and Look Ahead, also would have beaten tit for tat had they been in the tournament.
Id. at 38-40. But the ostensible lesson of the tournament was twofold: be "nice" (i.e.,
do not be the first to defect), and be "forgiving" (i.e., punish only once for each defec-
tion). Id. at 33-36.
Tit for tat was submitted by Anatol Rapoport of the University of Toronto, one of the
world's most illustrious game theoreticians, who cautions against overstating the strat-
egy's advantages. He believes that it is too harshly retaliatory on occasion, just as Doug-
las Hofstadter believes that it is sometimes too lenient. See Hofstadter, supra note 141, at
728. Axelrod himself warns "against the facile belief that an eye for an eye is necessarily
the best strategy" for playing the prisoner's dilemma. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 39.
In fact, the very idea of a "best strategy" is incoherent, given the extent to which the
success of any strategy depends on the nature of the other strategies in the game. Id. at
40; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 120 ("Care must be taken in interpreting the
results of the tournament. For a variety of reasons it does not prove that tit for tat is the
best strategy ....").
150. This is presumably the program Thomas Hobbes would have submitted. See Ax-
ELROD, supra note 13, at 4.
1992]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ates on even one move, Always Defect is five points up. Always Defect
never loses and sometimes wins, tit for tat never wins, and yet tit for
tat eventually drives Always Defect out of the bargaining universe.''
How does this happen? The answer, when one thinks about it, is
obvious. Tit for tat collects "threes," the reward for mutual coopera-
tion, in many instances where Always Defect, and defecting strategies
generally, collect "ones," the punishment for mutual defection.
Over the long haul, the difference between three and one, multi-
plied many times, adds up. By eliciting sustained cooperation from
a wider range of strategies, tit for tat makes up in the aggregate what
it loses in some particular plays of the game. Like the professional
golfer who always finishes second, it leads the money list at the end
of the year.
15 2
151. See id. at 51-53, 63-66, 99. Axelrod was able to demonstrate this by means of a
so-called "ecological tournament." See infra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
152. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 35-36; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 120
("Tit for tat is suboptimal for any given environment, but it is robust across environ-
ments, and that is its advantage."). Another explanation for tit for tat's success, Axelrod
concluded, was that most program designers looked only "two levels deep" when they
should have looked three. AXELROD, supra note 13, at 38. Consider the entry called
JOSS. JOSS's strategy was similar to lit for tat's, in that it began by cooperating, it re-
sponded to defection by defecting, and it nearly always responded to cooperation by
cooperating. ButJOSS also used a random number generator to decide when to pull a
"surprise defection," and had a ten percent probability of doing so each time the other
player cooperated. By trying to capitalize on what it hoped would be seen as its gener-
ally good nature, JOSS tried to get the benefits of both cooperation (C) and defection
(D). In playing against tit for tat,JOSS did fine until it tried to sneak in a defection. The
game began with mutual cooperation, or CC. WhenJOSS first defected randomly, tit for
tat retaliated on the next play with a single defection, and JOSS went back to cooperat-
ing. Thus, there was a DC pair, followed, on successive plays, by a switching of the C and
D places, because each program mimicked the previous play of the other. From the
point where JOSS first defected the game went like this: D(]OSS) C(titfor tat), C(JOSS)
D(titfor tat), DC, CD, DC, and so on. Sooner or later, however, JOSS threw in another
random defection, producing a DD pair, and from that point, mimicking each other,
both programs defected until the end of the game. The "echo effect," resulting from
JOSS's first attempt at exploitation and tit for tat's single punitive response, led ultimately
to complete distrust and lack of cooperation. JOSS suffered more from this strategy
because it tried it on partner after partner, and in many cases this led to the same kind of
breakdown in trust, whereas tit for tat, by never defecting first, had fewer such break-
downs. Id. at 36-38. Axelrod summarized the lesson of echo effects in this way:
A sophisticated analysis of choice must go at least three levels deep .... The
first level of analysis is the direct effect of [the] choice. This is easy, since a
defection always earns more than a cooperation. The second considers the in-
direct effects, taking into account that the other side may or may not punish a
defection. This much of the analysis was certainly appreciated by many of the
entrants. But the third level goes deeper and takes into account the fact that in
responding to the defections of the other side, one may be repeating or even
amplifying one's own previous exploitative choice. Thus a single defection may
be successful when analyzed for its direct effects, and perhaps even when its
secondary effects are taken into account. But the real costs may be in the terti-
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After the first tournament, Axelrod invited a larger list of play-
ers to submit programs for a second tournament. In this tourna-
ment, there were sixty-two entries from six countries, people of all
ages and levels of expertise, and from eight different academic disci-
plines.' 5 3 All of the entrants were familiar with the results of the
first round, and yet tit for tat won again.' 54 Tit for tat was still able to
evoke cooperation when other more sophisticated programs were
not, even after these other programs saw tit for tat operate. Axelrod
traced tit for tat's robustness to four qualities that other programs
did not share in the same measure. Tit for tat (and successful strate-
gies generally) succeeded because it was nice, provocable, forgiving,
and transparent.' 5 5 It was nice in that it was never the first to defect;
provocable in that it did not let a defection go unpunished; forgiv-
ing in that it punished each defection only once; and transparent in
that its playing patterns were easy to figure out, so that opponents
did not see it as defecting randomly or behaving obscurely, and thus
they were not suspicious of it. The combination of initial trust in the
opponent (never be the first to defect), a capacity for certain but
restrained retaliation for transgressions (defect once and then for-
give), and clarity of purpose (be transparent), accounted for tit for
tat's success.15 6
ary effects when one's own isolated defections turn into unending mutual re-
criminations. Without their realizing it, many of these rules actually wound up
punishing themselves. With the other player serving as a mechanism to delay
self-punishment by a few moves, this aspect of self-punishment was not picked
up by many of the decision rules.
id. at 38.
In other words, the only way to have a reputation for being a cooperative bargainer
is to cooperate all of the time. One cannot periodically cash in on the reputation, even
quietly and infrequently (at least at the level of strategy), without eventually losing it.
153. AXELROD, supra note 13, at 40-41. See id. at 195-96 (listing the participants). Par-
ticipants included a ten-year old as well as one of the world's leading experts on game
theory and evolution. Id. at 41; HOFSTADTER, supra note 141, at 723. In the second
tournament Axelrod added a probability that the game would end after each round, so
as to avoid the chainstore paradox present whenever an iterated game is played a finite
number of times. See RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 88-89 (discussing the chainstore
paradox).
154. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 42. This time it beat even tit for two tats and Revised
Downing, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 141, at 723, which had won subjunctive replays of
the first tournament. See also supra note 149. This may seem nonintuitive, but recall that
a program's success depends entirely on the context in which it is operating. There is
no single best strategy for playing the game in all environments.
155. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 20, 54.
156. See id. at 43-47. In a similar tournament run at Indiana University, Douglas Hof-
stadter found that several tit for tat-like strategies did better than pure titfor tat, but they
all shared the above "character traits." They simply did a better job of detecting
nonresponsiveness, and when they were convinced that the other player was unrespon-
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Axelrod then ran a series of hypothetical replays of the tourna-
ment in which the environment of each replay was determined by
the results of the previous one.157 A program's score indicated its
fitness, and fitness determined the number of progeny the program
had in the next round. As the tournament progressed through gen-
eration after generation, the environment gradually changed. At
the beginning, poor programs and good programs were equally rep-
resented, but as time passed, the poorer ones dropped out and the
good ones flourished.' The rank order of the good programs
changed, however, because goodness was no longer measured
against the same universe. Programs whose success came from in-
teraction with other good programs continued to succeed. But pro-
grams that won because they were able to exploit dumb programs
found their base of support eroding as dumb programs were gradu-
ally squeezed out, and eventually they suffered the same fate.
159
Tit for tat fared spectacularly well in this "ecological tourna-
ment."' 16 After a thousand generations, its rate of growth was
greater than that of any other program, even though it did not out-
score a single one of its rivals in any of its encounters. Tit for tat
succeeded because it was able to elicit cooperation from the greatest
number of other players. Axelrod concluded that tit for tat was able
to do this because
other rules anticipate [its] presence and are designed to do
well with it. Doing well with [tit for tat] requires cooperat-
ing with it, and this in turn helps [tit for tat]. Even rules...
that were designed to see what they could get away with,
quickly apologize to [tit for tat]. Any rule which tries to take
advantage of [tit for tat] will simply hurt itself. [It] benefits
from its own nonexploitability . 1...61
sive, they switched over to an "always defect" mode. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 141, at
728; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 120 (describing other circumstances in which tit
for tat would not do as well as other strategies).
157. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 48-53.
158. Id. at 49; see also Axelrod & Dion, The Further Evolution of Cooperation, 242 SCIENCE
1385 (1988) ("The population dynamics of the ecological simulation were determined
by setting the change in frequency of each strategy in any given round to be propor-
tional to its relative success in the previous round.").
159. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 50-52.
160. The tournament simulated ecological rather than evolutionary adaptation be-
cause it introduced no new rules of strategic behavior into the game-playing environ-
ment. Id. at 51. It consisted of "the shifting of a fixed set of species' populations
according to their mutually defined and dynamically developing environment, as con-
trasted with evolution via mutation, where new species can come into existence." HOF-
STADTER, supra note 141, at 726.
161. AXELROD, supra note 13, at 53.
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On the basis of the ecological tournament, Axelrod offered pre-
liminary answers to three questions about the evolution of coopera-
tive bargaining norms that had long troubled bargaining
theorists.' 6 2 The first asks how cooperation gets started in an envi-
ronment of unconditional defection. The answer is through the in-
vasion of small clusters of conditionally cooperating bargainers. In
Axelrod's words, "mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of
egoists without central control by starting with a cluster of individu-
als who rely on reciprocity." 163 Small clusters of cooperators can
propagate even in a hostile environment, provided that they defend
themselves in tit for tat-like fashion. Programs that are just nice (i.e.,
complete pacifists), on the other hand, will not survive. The second
question concerns robustness: What strategy does well in a shifting
and unpredictable environment? The answer is that any strategy
with the traits of niceness, provocability, forgiveness, and trans-
parency will do so. Such strategies, once established, tend to flour-
ish in an ecologically evolving world." 4 And the final question is
about stability: Can cooperation protect itself from invasion? The
ecological tournament proves that it can, that once cooperation es-
tablishes itself, it is permanent. As Axelrod puts it, "[t]he gear
wheels of social evolution have a ratchet."'' 6
5
Axelrod's analysis is fascinating in its own right, and has pro-
162. See id. at 95.
163. Id. at 69.
164. Id. at 48, 54.
165. Id. at 21. This description does not do justice to the sophistication and subtlety
of Axelrod's analysis, or game theory generally. See, e.g., KRrrzER, supra note 1, at 86,
86-98 (setting out "recent developments in the application of game theory to litiga-
tion"); RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 21-66 (describing variations in academic games); Ian
Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1298-1314 (1990) (discussing
theoretical refinements in modem game theory research); Katz, supra note 7, at 236-38.
Axelrod's discussion is far more complicated than I have shown, making adjustments for
all kinds of factors including nature of the bargaining relationship, tactical choices avail-
able, payoff structure, access to bargainer histories, probability of the game ending, diffi-
culty of communicating and understanding choices, and the structure and dynamics of
the relevant bargaining population. As the content of each of these factors changes, so
too does the strength of the argument for playing tit for tat. In the end, it is more accu-
rate to describe his discussion as suggesting a kind of attitude or motivation toward
bargaining than as a set of rules governing how to play. See Bernard Williams, Formal
Structures and Social Reality, in TRUST, supra note 14, at 3-5. Axelrod also says as much,
with a collaborator, in an article discussing studies conducted after the publication of his
results. See Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy.
Hypotheses and Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 226, 231 (Kenneth A. Oye ed.,
1986). Bargainers always will need to base the choice of particular moves on what they
know about factors such as the other bargainer, the setting, the chances of bargaining
again, the likelihood that they are being understood, and so on. Often it will be appro-
priate for them to choose not to play tit for tat. But even if supporting only an attitude
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duced the wide range of comment and elaboration one would ex-
pect in the wake of such provocative and insightful work.' 66 But his
analysis also has important implications for legal bargaining theory
to the extent that such bargaining is accurately modelled by the pris-
oner's dilemma, and for a career in bargaining, the model is accu-
rate to a significant extent. To begin with, the payoff structure of
the prisoner's dilemma-T >R>P >S '6 7-- characterizes real life
dispute bargaining as much as it does the prisoner's dilemma game.
Successful defection, where one party exploits the other's unilateral
disclosure, forbearance, or concession, time after time, without fear
of retaliation or loss of cooperation, produces the largest returns in
life as well as in games. Similarly, mutual cooperation results in big-
ger payoffs for both sides than mutual defection because bargaining
stakes are divided between the parties rather than wasted in ego bat-
tles, or left on the table out of exhaustion or polarization. The work
of cordial, principled, and problem-solving theory established this.
Unilateral cooperation, that is, being gratuitously generous, pro-
duces the poorest returns because it is usually exploited. Real-life
bargainers take what they are given, even when it is overly generous,
and rarely think to ask if they should refuse part of it, or give some
back.
More importantly (and more controversially), the decision in-
volved in selecting a bargaining strategy can accurately be character-
ized as a choice between cooperation and defection. Bargaining
consists of three interdependent, overlapping, and intertwined
processes, which I have described elsewhere as assessment, persua-
sion, and exchange.' 68 Collectively these processes make up all bar-
gaining strategies. Bargainers try to determine whether adversaries
will do what they predict and mean what they say; to convince others
to view the issues in dispute favorably to themselves (the original
bargainers); and to make the fewest and smallest concessions neces-
about or predisposition toward bargaining, Axelrod's analysis requires a major rethink-
ing of the adversarial conception of effective bargaining strategy.
166. See, e.g., Axelrod & Dion, supra note 158; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 165, at
226; Gambetta, supra note 14, at 227-28; Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY, supra note 165, at 1,
12-18; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY, supra note 165, at 25, 38-40; Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives
from Game Theory, Narrative Theory and Feminist Theory, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 37, 51(1990);
Williams, supra note 165, at 5-6.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 141-142.
168. See Condlin, supra note 6, at 67-70. For a recent book also adopting this concep-
tualization, see ROBERT M. BASTRESS &JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSEL-
ING, AND NEGOTIATING 405 (1990).
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sary for agreement. Each of the dozens if not hundreds of individ-
ual tactical maneuvers and moves available to bargainers in carrying
out these tasks can occur in both a cooperative and defecting ver-
sion. For example, a decision to disclose privately-held information
relevant to the bargaining problem that the other party has a right
to know is, in effect, a decision to cooperate; a decision to conceal
the information, or make it unnecessarily difficult to obtain, is a de-
cision to defect. Refusing to exploit leverage for more than is justi-
fied by the strength of one's substantive claims is cooperating, while
cleaning out the other side because one is in a position to do so is
defecting. Refusing to follow local "courtesies" (e.g., pretending
that one's schedule is too crowded to meet at times the other sug-
gests as convenient) is defecting, whereas abiding by such courtesies
is cooperating. Strategies for entire negotiations are similarly either
cooperative or defecting, at least "on balance," when one or the
other type of tactical move predominates, or when the most impor-
tant or salient parts of the strategy have either a cooperative or de-
fecting quality.
Categorization of moves and strategies as cooperative or de-
fecting often will be controversial because the content of bargaining
community conventions and norms, upon which such categoriza-
tions depend, will not always be shared. Conventions and norms
are often specific to types of practice, settings, and regions in which
the practice occurs, to strata of the bar that bargainers come from,
and to the culture of bargaining they have learned to understand
and accept, and bargainers from different cultures will not always
agree on the meaning of shared practices. 169 As a consequence,
bargainers must learn to understand different bargaining cultures
and practices, and to think and speak in a manner appropriate to the
occasion. This process has many of the same properties as learning
to do moral reasoning, in the sense that it requires participants to
see the world from the perspective of someone else, to develop a
169. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmICS 712 (1986); Thomas F.
Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 100-01 (1982); Hazard, supra
note 1, at 193; Peters, supra note 146, at 13; James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar:
Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927-3 1. There
are many sources for the content of such conventions and practices. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
(describing three "generally accepted conventions in negotiation..."); Guernsey, supra,
at 103-21 (listing of bargaining conventions); William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal
Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 66-67 (1991) (The negligence doctrine of standard of care
"represents a set of collectively defined but uncodified and partially unwritten general
norms whose application to particular situations is assumed to require the reflective
judgment of a qualified practitioner.").
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capacity for practical (bargaining) wisdom, and to avoid purely so-
phistical or instrumental perspectives on norms by following their
spirit as well as their letter.7 ° With all of these difficulties, however,
like moral reasoning, it still will be possible to say most of the time,
albeit often in a qualified or contingent manner, whether a particu-
lar bargaining practice or strategy is cooperative or defecting within
the governing bargaining norms.' 7 '
If prisoner's dilemma analysis has implications for legal dispute
settlement,172 one still must be clear about the extent of those impli-
170. On seeing the world from the perspective of somebody else, see HANNAH AR-
ENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 49 (1963); on developing a capacity for practical (bar-
gaining) wisdom, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 169-74
(1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE]; Bartlett, supra note 8, at 849-58
(describing feminist practical reasoning); Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical
Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 317, 323-
26 (David Luban ed., 1983); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 68-71 (1980); and on avoiding purely sophistical or instrumental
perspectives, see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra, at 18-19. Even Professor Schneyer
now seems to agree (or "concedes" as he might put it) that "legal rules should be in-
voked only when doing so is consistent with their purposes .... Ted Schneyer, Some
Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 25 (1991). It may be, of course, that
conventions and norms have effects only when bargainers are ethnically homogeneous,
see Gilson, supra note 4, at 312, and that it is hopelessly idealistic to expect bargainers to
see the world from the perspective of somebody else, at least to any significant extent.
171. The requirement of no pre-choice communication is the point of greatest depar-
ture between prisoner dilemma game playing and dispute settlement, because real life
bargainers can talk with one another and make promises about what they will do, and
prisoner's dilemma game players usually cannot. The game can be played either way,
but in Axelrod's tournament, where the players were computer programs, "the players
[could] communicate with each other only through the sequence of their own behavior."
AXELROD, supra note 13, at 12.
If Carol Rose is correct, the opportunity to communicate may be the most impor-
tant variable in the prisoner's dilemma game. As she puts it, "preference orderings
don't just come out of nowhere; they may be constructs of narrative and negotiation,
and may change over time, as we digest the stories of the places that our preferences
have led us . . . " Rose, supra note 166, at 56. Furthermore, "narratives change our
minds... " Id. at 55; see also Daniel Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in
TRUST, supra note 14, at 31, 37 (the greater the communication, all other things being
equal, the greater the likelihood of beneficial outcome); Mansbridge, supra note 145, at
138 ("Blushes, 'an honest face,' and other subtle but involuntary signals in body lan-
guage allow potential cooperators to communicate accurately that they can be trusted
even when they have had no earlier interaction in which to establish a reputation.");
Williams, supra note 165, at 5-8 (attitudes toward cooperation change under impact of
information about reliability of different kinds of assurances). Rose's discussion shows
how narrative and feminist theory can supplement and complement game theory, and
while she does not deal fully with the problem of deception, that is, the situation where
the carefully constructed narrative is a lie, in every other respect she strengthens Axel-
rod's argument. Nevertheless, she does not seem to see it that way. See Rose, supra, at
51 n.49.
172. One can extrapolate too quickly and too far from the results of academic gaming.
See KRITZER, supra note 1, at 82 ("Results based on the Prisoner's Dilemma are difficult
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cations. In a one-time negotiation (with no prospect of the bargain-
ers meeting again), 7 ' Axelrod's conclusions are of limited use. Tit
to apply to bargaining in civil litigation because of several features of the game.");
Good, supra note 171, at 34, 38-43, 45-46 (limits of the extent to which laboratory ex-
periments reflect real life, and the lessons to be drawn from them); Katz, supra note 7, at
243-49. After all, there are perhaps some implausible parts to Axelrod's analysis. See
Williams, supra note 165, at 5-6, 11-13 (arguing that Axelrod's analysis relates only indi-
rectly to human cooperation in society; in real life none of the available motivations to
cooperate is adequate). For example, if tit for tat is destined to take over the bargaining
world, presumably signs of its ascendance would have already appeared. Dispute settle-
ment has been with us long enough, one would think, for lawyers to discover the disutil-
ity of competitive approaches and the corresponding advantage of tit for tat-like
cooperation. Yet, by all accounts, this has not happened, at least not if one accepts the
premise of alternative dispute resolution scholarship, which is that zero-sum competi-
tion is the principle bargaining game in town. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Axelrod might respond that one thousand plays of a prisoner's dilemma game are the
equivalent of much more than a few hundred years of bargaining practice, and that we
are still in the early stages of an evolutionary cycle. There is some appeal in this re-
sponse because each play of the game so compresses bargaining that it would take many
more actual bargaining experiences to communicate all of the same information, with all
of the same clarity, and thus to produce all of the same learning and development. Or,
conversely, Axelrod might argue that in an unacknowledged sort of way tit for tat has
taken over the bargaining world, or at least that part of it made up of institutionalized
bargaining, where bureaucratic processing of cases is the norm. See supra note 22; accord
GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 17, 41-42. This response also has some appeal, but neither
response helps much with a second problem.
A bargaining world in which everyone plays tit for tat is an unlikely picture of a world
run by humans. It seems bland, predictable, mechanical, and thoroughly unexciting, a
world in which there is no outlet for aggressive or competitive energies and no room for
artistry, skill, or individual virtuosity. See infra note 256. It asks humans to act like com-
puter programs, and that will never do. To this Axelrod might reply that choosing a
proper bargaining strategy and bargaining skillfully are two very different things. Bar-
gainers at present arguably agree on strategy, that of "always defect," but that does not
prevent them from being artistic in the manner in which they implement that strategy, or
from bargaining in ways that are exciting and individually distinctive. While tit for tat
may look dull when run by computers, it is as colorful as any bargaining strategy when
used by humans, and would differ from present bargaining approaches mostly in the fact
that aggressive energies would be marshalled in the aid of only sound substantive be-
liefs. Others have described the differences between game playing and bargaining in
insightful detail, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 780-82 n. 111, but they have
not been as successful as Axelrod in pointing out the similarities.
173. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 174. There are reasons to believe that this condi-
tion will not always be met. Much of bargaining is discontinuous, in the sense that a
bargainer does not see a present adversary again for a long time, and when she does, the
memory of prior experience often has been lost. The effect, in prisoner's dilemma lan-
guage, is that neither bargainer has access to the history of the other's pattern of play. It
is true that one does not have to bargain with someone on a daily basis to know her
patterns of play. The other's reputation, based on experiences with a wide range of
members of the bargaining community, and transmitted by word of mouth, can serve the
same function. Reputation is a notoriously unreliable source of data, however, and it
does not always provide information at the level of detail required to make coordinating
bargaining choices possible. See Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST, supra
note 14, at 49, 53-56, 66-71 (discussing the manner in which reputation is acquired);
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for tat is a strategy for repeat bargaining and it can do no better than
a "good" result in any single encounter. Just as the power of tit for
tat is not apparent until one looks at its results over time, so too the
argument for bargaining cooperatively is not convincing until it is
applied to a bargaining career. A lifetime of negotiation is, in a sig-
nificant sense, like a long-playing, iterated prisoner's dilemma game
tournament. Individual negotiations are separate plays of the game,
and negotiator histories, known through direct experience and rep-
utation, are records of the patterns of play. Unlike bargaining in a
single encounter (where an opening or random defection may de-
termine outcome), over the course of a career, bargaining in a coop-
erative manner will pile up hundreds of "threes," the reward for
mutual cooperation, which will cancel out the occasional "zeros"
suffered at the hands of others who always or randomly defect. The
argument that one should cooperate, therefore, applies only to
strategies for bargaining relationships in which there is reason to
believe that the parties will bargain again, in person or through the
proxy of their reputations in the bargaining community. In such re-
lationships, achieving a "tie," or never losing by more than one
move, is like always finishing second. It returns more in the end
than competitive strategies that produce occasional victories, but
that more often produce middling deadlocks and mutual defeats.
The insight that a bargaining approach must be judged at the
strategic as well as at the tactical level, and by its long as well as its
short term effects, may seem obvious in retrospect, but it has not
always been thus.' 7 4 The idea may be implicit in discussions of cor-
Good, supra note 171, at 38 (limits of a party's control over the process of acquiring a
reputation). Some types of institutionalized bargaining (e.g., between public defenders
and prosecutors, insurance adjusters and personal injury lawyers, collection agency law-
yers and legal aid attorneys) are continuous enough to fit the iterated prisoner's di-
lemma model almost perfectly, and other types often will approximate it. See Gilson,
supra note 4, at 309-10 (Axelrod's conditions may be approximated in the Japanese sys-
tem of contracting where parties "develop a substantial stake in [their] reputations for
cooperative behavior" and do not behave opportunistically vis-a-vis each other, and also
in some business settings in the United States.). But there always will be areas of bar-
gaining where the "future does not cast a shadow" and where Axelrod's analysis, by its
own terms, does not apply.
174. The requirement that one take a long range perspective in defining success may
make the argument for cooperative bargaining difficult for some to accept. While it is
intellectually believable that always tying negotiations will produce more in the long run
than winning and losing, in some ways it is just another illustration of "slow and steady
wins the race;" there may be something emotionally unsatisfying about it. To pass up
the opportunity to make a killing by exploiting vulnerability, ignorance, lack of re-
sources, or lack of skill, will seem naive to many lawyers, the advice of someone who has
never entered the fray. Yet, the development of a reputation for cooperating requires
just that, that one cooperate all of the time, at least at the level of strategy, even when it
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dial, principled, and problem-solving bargaining, but Axelrod made
it explicit, developed it, and gave it the emphasis we now know it
warrants. The idea may even be counterintuitive. Lawyers typically
believe that good bargainers get disproportionately large settle-
ments most of the time, that is, that they regularly or at least fre-
quently end up with the larger share of the bargaining pot. The
idea that one could win by losing or tying is not so widely grasped.
In Axelrod's words:
[Tit for tat] won the tournament, not by beating the other
player, but by eliciting behavior from the other player
which allowed both to do well .... [I]n a non-zero-sum
world you do not have to do better than the other player to
do well for yourself. This is especially true when you are
interacting with many different players. Letting each of
them do the same or a little better than you is fine, as long
as you tend to do well yourself. There is no point in being
envious of the success of the other player, since in an iter-
ated prisoner's dilemma of long duration the other's suc-
cess is virtually a prerequisite of your doing well for
yourself. ' 75
What was true of Axelrod's game players could be said of law-
yer bargainers as well:
... there is a lot to be learned about coping in an environ-
ment of mutual power. Even expert strategists from polit-
ical science, sociology, economics, psychology, and
mathematics made the systematic errors of being too com-
petitive for their own good, not being forgiving enough,
and being too pessimistic about the responsiveness of the
other side.176
Successful bargainers, then, live in and contribute to a world of
other successful bargainers. They try only for their fair share of bar-
gained-for resources, and they work hard to insure that others, in-
cluding adversaries, get their deserved shares as well. For them,
doing well is a group phenomenon in which the real returns come
over time.
But so it is clear, bargaining cooperatively does not mean being
is possible to take advantage. One cannot be thought of as cooperative and at the same
time sneak in random defections when it suits one's purposes. That was the problem
with JOSS and the point of the discussion about "echo effects." See supra note 152. A
reputation of randomly defecting may not be as bad as one of always defecting, but it
also is not as good as one of cooperating.
175. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 112.
176. Id. at 40.
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a patsy, 77 splitting the difference, or giving away the store. Coop-
erative bargainers are as aggressive and energetic as their adver-
sarial counterparts in the pursuit of strong claims, even to the point
of demanding most of the bargaining pot when the strength of a
client's case warrants it. The extent to which a strategy is coopera-
tive is determined not by looking at the outcome it produces, but at
the manner in which it proceeds. Cooperative bargainers are those
who do not unilaterally defect on adversaries not known to be com-
petitors, and unless provoked, do not defect at all. That is, they do
not conceal information the other side has a right to know, nor ad-
vance false arguments on the hope that they will be believed. They
do not use leverage or make demands that cannot be justified on
some substantive ground, nor otherwise betray reasonable adver-
sary expectations about cooperative behavior based on the bargain-
ers' past histories (or, when that evidence is too thin, based on
community standards of fair bargaining practice). When these
ground rules are followed, bargaining outcome becomes a function
of the substantive strength of the parties' respective claims and the
bargainers' skill and persuasiveness in arguing for them. Coopera-
tive bargaining sometimes produces even distributions and some-
times rewards one side more than the other; what happens in any
particular case depends on the relative strength of the parties' re-
spective claims. One thing is clear, however: being cooperative is
not just another way of saying divide everything in half.
Its insights notwithstanding, there are sizable practical
problems involved in translating Axelrod's analysis into real life bar-
gaining practice. In life, bargaining strategies do not come in the
sharply dichotomous categories of the prisoner's dilemma, and bar-
gainers often must select from strategies that seem a little more or a
little less cooperative (or competitive). Similarly, because bargain-
ing strategies often are quite complex, and real life information
about their nature fuzzy, it is sometimes difficult or even impossible
to know, immediately and occasionally ever, whether the other side
177. See id. at 184.
[Olne of my biggest surprises in working on this project has been the value of
provocability. I came to the project believing one should be slow to anger.
The results of the ... [t]ournament... demonstrate that it is actually better to
respond quickly to a provocation. It turns out that if one waits to respond to
uncalled for defections, there is the risk of sending the wrong signal. The
longer defections are allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it is that the
other player will draw the conclusion that defection can pay .... The implica-
tion is that it is better to be provocable sooner, rather than later.
Id. at 184-85.
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has cooperated or competed, and therefore equally difficult to know
which message to send back, or even how to send it.' 7 1 Yet, these
are difficulties of execution and not strategy. They are questions
not of how to bargain in a situation of an iterated prisoner's di-
lemma, but of how to put one's bargaining strategy into operation
and carry it out successfully. And like all questions of execution,
they ultimately will yield to the pressure of diligence and insight.
Given the similarities between a career in dispute bargaining
and the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Axelrod's analysis should inter-
est lawyers. It suggests, apparently counter to some lawyers' intui-
tion,' 79 that when faced with a choice of adopting either a
competitive or cooperative approach to bargaining in relationships
or communities in which one will bargain again, lawyers should co-
operate. They should choose strategies that are nice, forgiving,
provocable, and transparent, even when the other side does not.'8 0
As long as the bargaining community contains a "small cluster of
cooperators," lawyers will do better over the long haul by being
cooperative.
Axelrod's argument is not an aesthetic one, and it does not de-
pend on a personal stylistic preference for cordial social relations.
It suggests in a powerful way that when bottom line outcome over
time is the measure, cooperation is the means-indeed, that a coop-
erative strategy may be even the nasty, brutish, and self-inter-
178. See Gregory Bateson, Biological Evolution of Cooperation and Trust, in TRUST, supra
note 14, at 15, 28 ("[I]n cooperative behavior, conditions matter a lot."). Axelrod rec-
ognizes these limitations and cautions against making important life choices without tak-
ing the complicating factors of real life into account. See AXELROD, supra note 13, at 19;
see also Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 165, passim. The lack of a perfect fit between real
life bargaining and a prisoner's dilemma game is no accident. Bargaining games are
valuable research tools precisely because they strip away the fuzziness of life. Id. at 131.
Games identify winners and losers, and provide direct information about the relation-
ship of strategy to outcome. The complicating detail of real life bargaining, by contrast,
often makes it difficult to determine how one did in comparison with another, and in the
process serves the important practical function of promoting agreement. Nevertheless,
it also slows down learning and sometimes causes one to learn the wrong lessons. See
also RASMUSEN, supra note 16, at 14-16 (discussing advantages of "no-fat" modelling in
academic games).
179. When the game theory language is stripped away, Axelrod's norms look a lot like
a version of the golden rule (do unto others as they do unto you), the Talmudic idea of
measure for measure, or the Old Testament norm of an eye for an eye. Although Axel-
rod's norms are framed in the presently popular language of consequentialism, they may
not be so counterintuitive after all.
180. One of the benefits of Axelrod's analysis is that it provides a strategy for use in
the present day world of dispute settlement and deal making, and it does not require
system-wide reform to be effective.
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ested't ' bargainer's best hope (as long as large returns are the
reason she is nasty and brutish"8 2 ). Legal commentators had made
similar claims,' but by focusing on bargaining in the aggregate, by
isolating the trading process, the single best barometer of bargain-
ing success, and by defining guidelines for successful trading, Axel-
rod provided those claims with an important additional base of
support.
III. THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO COMPETE
Bargaining, as we have said, is a moral and political phenome-
non as much as a strategic one, governed by ethical norms as well as
practical ones, and good bargainers must take both normative sys-
tems into account. Bargaining's ethical norms are found in each
state's Rules of Professional Conduct or Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and in its case and statutory law defining the nature and
limits of adversary advocacy. The American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)' 4 will be the
181. Notwithstanding its popularity, see ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE
RIDE 4, 125-27 (1989); GAUTHIER, supra note 93, at 154-55; DEREK PARFrr, REASONS &
PERSONS (1984); DONALD REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 125-42, 207-11
(1980); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 41-44 (1977), there is a
certain irony in basing an argument for being other-regarding on self interest. In an era
of economic man and woman, self interest seems to be taken as natural or fundamental,
but it is no less problematic than altruism or idealism, and needs to be inquired into, not
stipulated. See William H. Simon, Babbit v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal,
37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 582 (1985). For an excellent collection of articles calling this
stipulation into question, including in the area of game theory research, see BEYOND
SELF-INTEREST, supra note 138.
182. An adversarial bargainer is not necessarily interested in the largest bottom line
return. Some disputes are litigated rather than settled, even when it is uneconomic to
do so (i.e., when there is little hope of improving on a settlement offer to the extent
needed to offset litigation and lost opportunity costs), because the bargainer would
rather win an election, advertise her services, pay back a past wrong, teach a lesson, or
the like, than settle favorably. Axelrod's analysis does not apply, at least in the same
way, in these situations.
183. Similarity is an important point. Axelrod's argument is not identical to those of
cordial, principled, and problem-solving bargaining, distinguished only by the extent to
which it is more systematically stated and empirically grounded. His conception of co-
operation is also different in several significant respects. It includes a retributive ele-
ment, recommends reciprocal rather than unilateral cooperation, acknowledges the
limits of setting, relationship, and context, and admits of circumstances in which cooper-
ation is inappropriate. He does not just dress up legal bargaining theories and correct
cosmetic flaws. He has produced a new understanding of cooperation.
184. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 169. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; Penegar, supra note 89, at 309
("[T]he Code may be viewed as ... a mature expression of the profession's most com-
prehensive and widely authoritative effort to define itself."). Among the many texts in-
terpreting and elaborating on the Model Rules, two are excellent, both in their own
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focus here, however, because they provide the most widely used
synthesis. Notwithstanding some excesses, ambiguity, and contra-
diction, the Model Rules articulate a relatively coherent conception
of lawyer bargaining role,'" 5 although attempts to capture it in sin-
glejustificatory metaphors have foundered.' 86 The Model Rules de-
fine the ethical obligations of lawyer bargaining in terms of the
interlocking duties of competence, diligence, deference, loyalty, and
communication. In different ways, and to different extents, depend-
ing on context, lawyers owe these duties to clients, third parties, and
institutions that make up the legal dispute settlement system. Col-
lectively, the duties define a lawyer dispute bargainer's ethical
role.' 87
right and as sources of further authority, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (1989); WOLFRAM, supra note 169. Professor Wolfram is
also the Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Third, The Law
Governing Lawyers, of which four tentative drafts have been published. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991); LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at xxix. My distinction between practical and ethical norms
is similar to and inspired by David Luban's distinction between moral norms and profes-
sional norms. See David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program
for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 460-62 (1981). The present Article is an elaboration
of a point first made in Condlin, supra note 6, at 76-78 n.31.
185. See WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 710-27 (describing lawyer bargaining role and
illustrating some of its ambiguities and contradictions); Penegar, supra note 89, at 310
("the Code reveals a set of coherent ideas which are part of the mindset with which
lawyers conduct their work"); see also infra note 187.
186. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Law-
yer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (characterizing the lawyer
bargainer as a hired gun); see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETH-
ICs 65-86 (1990), where Professor Freedman makes it clear that he is still unrepentant
after all these years, by "saying it again, louder"; Edward A. Dauer & Arthur A. Leff,
Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 581-82 (1977) (lawyer acts as
"amateur" human (see also infra note 217)); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) (diviner of truth); Charles Fried, The Law-
yer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1975)
(friend of sorts); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29 (conscience). While all of these discussions predate
the Model Rules, the conception of lawyer role they consider is essentially the same as
that embodied in the Rules.
187. In the sketch that follows I have tried to adhere to what Gerald Postema, so far as
I can tell, first called the "standard conception" of lawyer role. See Postema, supra note
170, at 73-74. Others laid the groundwork for the description of it as the standard con-
ception, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975);
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669,
672-75 (1978); Simon, supra note 186, at 34-38, and still others have discussed it at
length, see Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
595-626 (1985); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at xx, 7, 393-403. David
Luban has taken a refined version of it, called moral activism, to perhaps its highest
form, see id. at 160-61; Luban, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 118, at 425-52; David
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Ste-
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The duties apply in general to all types of lawyer work, but each
contributes something distinctive and specific to the definition of
dispute bargaining role. Take competence, for instance. For a time
mostly a synonym for legal knowledge, and demonstrated or ac-
quired by knowing or learning relevant law,"' the duty of compe-
tence now requires that lawyer bargainers act skillfully. In the
phen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1007-17 (1990). The Model Rules incorporate
this standard conception. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 159, 393-
403; Gary T. Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, supra, at 600-01, 611. It is also the
"Profession's narrative." See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE
LJ. 1239, 1242-46 (1991). For a description of the Progressive-Functionalist predeces-
sor to the standard conception, vestiges of which linger in the Model Rules, see Simon,
supra note 181, at 565-68. See also ROSENTHAL, supra note 44, at 7-28 (describing stan-
dard conception as "traditional" model of lawyer client relationship, contrasted with
"participatory" model); WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 156 n.69 (arguing that the Model
Rules incorporate the standard conception, called "hired gun" view, along with Progres-
sive-Functionalist conception, called "lawyer-dominant" view). Not everyone agrees
that it is the standard conception, see Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed
Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 120-29 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 170); Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal
Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1568-69 (maintaining that "legal ethics has no paradigm,
only some fragmentary conceptions of the lawyer's role vying inconclusively for domi-
nance"); Schneyer, supra note 170, at 11-22 (arguing that standard conception is "some-
thing of a straw man" constructed by its critics); M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to
Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9 LAw & PHIL. 67, passim (1990) ("Lawyers cannot expect
useful advice from philosophers about the practical moral problems which they encoun-
ter in their daily professional lives." Id. at 90-91.); but see David Luban, Smith Against the
Ethicists, 9 LAw & PHIL. 417 (1990-1991) (rejoinder to Professor Smith); that it repre-
sents the reality of practice for most lawyers, see Rhode, supra, at 590; or that it is differ-
ent from nonlawyer role in any significant sense, see Ellmann, supra, at 129-45; David
Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David Luban on the Morality of Adver-
sary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392 (1990). There are almost as many variations of
the standard conception as there are law professors writing about legal ethics, and I am
not able to incorporate all of the unique features of those variations here. See, e.g., Law-
rence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV.
709, 715-21 (1989); Eric E. Jorstad, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuhrian View of the Adversarial
Legal System, 99 YALE LJ. 1089, 1103-07 (1990); L.R. Patterson, A Preliminary Rationaliza-
tion of the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519 (1979); James Gray Pope, Two Faces,
Two Ethics: Labor Union Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68 OR. L. REv. 1
(1989); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1991). I have
tried only to identify a minimalist view of a legal dispute bargaining's ethical norms, on
which the largest number of commentators and lawyers could agree. I intend this con-
ception to be mainstream and uncontroversial, to whatever extent that is possible. See
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 154-67; Wasserman, supra, at 393; cf.
FREEDMAN, supra note 186, at 65-86 (discussing the pervasiveness of the "ethic of zeal"
in lawyers' professional responsibilities).
188. See MODEL CODE, supra note 184, EC 6-2 (stating that "[a] lawyer is aided in
attaining and maintaining his competence by keeping abreast of current legal literature
and developments"); id. EC 6-3 (stating that a lawyer may "become qualified through
study and investigation"). "This standard [is] lower than the established rule of civil
liability for malpractice, under which an attorney must 'exercise the skill, apply the
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words of the Model Rules, "competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation" of a client.' 89 While lawyers may
not take action that is frivolous (i.e., primarily to harass or mali-
ciously to injure) or prohibited by law,' 90 they must use any legally
available move or procedure helpful to a client's bargaining posi-
tion. 91 Among other things, this means that all forms of leverage
must be exploited, inflated demands made, and private information
obtained and used whenever any of these actions would advance the
client's stated objectives, even if such action would jeopardize a law-
knowledge, and exert the diligence ... [of) a lawyer of ordinary competence and dili-
gence.' " Hazard, supra note 187, at 1258 (footnote omitted).
189. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.1; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184,
at 5-8; WoLFRAM, supra note 169, at 186-89; Robert B. McKay, Competence and the Profes-
sionally Responsible Lawyer, 29 EMORY L.J. 971, 979-86 (1980) (discussing the obligation of
competence); Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75,
85, 119-20 (1985).
190. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 169, Rule 3.1, cmt. 2 (defining action as "frivolous" if it
is "taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the
lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken
or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law"); see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 1-2, 329-36.
191. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 3.1, cmt. 1 ("The advocate has a duty to use
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause ...."); see Richard E. Crouch,
The Matter of Bombers: Unfair Tactics and the Problem of Defining Unethical Behavior in Divorce
Litigation, 20 FAM. L.Q. 413, 414 (1986) (if ethically questionable tactics "work," lawyers
must use them or face the possibility of malpractice liability; also cataloguing suggested
(borderline) tactics for divorce negotiation); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating
and High- Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (1986) (finding the obligation of a
lawyer negotiator to make the " 'best' deal-not the 'fairest' deal"). There is a question
of whether this duty extends to the use of bargaining technique. Such technique is often
context specific rather than generic, and identifying a consensus range of maneuvers
that a competent bargainer should always consider and use is more difficult than, for
example, identifying an equivalent range of trial tactics. For a statement of the standard
of competence for trial, see Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164-71 (1985), and Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-98 (1984). This difficulty, coupled with the use
of the adjective "legal" in the description of competence (as the duty to use "legal pro-
cedure," MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 3.1, cmt. 1), may suggest that competence
requires only the use of litigation tactics made available by formal rules of evidence and
procedure. So restricted, however, the Model Rules would create a double standard, in
which the lesser representational burden would be imposed in the more important case
(in magnitude of client interests affected). Though not inconceivable, it is doubtful that
the Model Rules' drafters had such a double standard in mind, or that they wanted to
relieve lawyers of the burden to act competently when bargaining, but not at trial, and
courts have not interpreted the competence obligation in so narrow a fashion. See Mar-
tin C. Bryce, Jr., Recent Developments, Rizzo v. Haines: An Attorney's Duty to Exercise
Ordinary Skill and Knowledge in the Conduct of Settlement Negotiations, 35 VILL. L. REV. 435,
444-45 (1990). If competence is a requirement of bargaining, therefore, and presuma-
bly it is, and being competent consists of using procedures skillfully for the fullest bene-
fit of the client, as it does, then lawyers are ethically obliged to do all that it takes, within
the realm of law, to see that the client's bargaining objectives are achieved.
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yer's long-term, working relationship with her bargaining
counterpart.
Lawyers also must show enthusiasm for the bargaining task.
Once described as the obligation of zealous representation,19 2 and
now expressed as the duty of diligence,t'9 this duty requires lawyers
to act with "commitment and dedication to the interests of the cli-
ent,""9 and to "carry to a conclusion all matters undertaken" on
the client's behalf. 195 Lawyer bargainers, in other words, must de-
velop and play out client-bargaining hands with energy and believa-
bility, and not undercut those efforts with a tone or attitude which
indicates that their hearts are not in it, or that they do not believe
what they say. Plausibility and sincerity are the most important at-
tributes of effective bargaining maneuvers; the duty of competence
requires the first, and the duty of diligence the second.
The duty of deference is concerned with which objectives are
pursued, not how they are pursued. It makes client judgments
supreme in disagreements with lawyers about which objectives to
seek and, absent criminality or fraud, obligates lawyers to pursue all
goals clients set.'9 6 Deference is the centerpiece of lawyer-client re-
lations and the feature of lawyer role that makes law practice a fidu-
ciary enterprise. In bargaining, the main function of deference is to
require that clients alone decide whether to accept or reject offers of
settlement. 197 Lawyers must present offers and may discuss them,
192. See MODEL CODE, supra note 184, Canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 578-82
(discussing the obligation of zealous partisanship). The nature and extent of this obliga-
tion has always been a matter of debate, but recently the debate has taken on added life.
See Condlin, supra note 6, at 75-76 n.29.
193. See MODEL RULES, sup-a note 169, Rule 1.3; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 191-92;
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 47-52 (discussions of diligence obligation).
194. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
195. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. 3; see also Penegar, supra note 89, at 339 ("[T]he lawyer is not
told to moderate his zeal with respect to opponents encumbered with this or that defi-
ciency, relative weakness, or vulnerability. Apparently nothing is to be held back .... ");
Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1255 (arguing that "lawyers' duty to their clients entails an
affirmative obligation to perform all lawful acts without regard to ethics").
196. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.2 (a). Wolfram describes this conception
of the lawyer-client relationship as the "cooperative" model. See WOLFRAM, supra note
169, at 156; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 1-2, 17-22; Steele, supra note
191, at 1392-93; Perschbacher, supra note 189, at 84-85, 101-04. The client control is-
sues are much more complicated when the client is a group and the goal is political
action. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 324-57.
197. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rules 1.2(a), 1.4 cmt. 1; see also WOLFRAM, supra
note 169, at 165-66, 168-72; Bryce, supra note 191, at 444-46. Under a market view of
lawyer-client relations such an issue would be negotiable. See John Leubsdorf, Three
Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1982).
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arguing for or against on the basis of a broad range of legal and
extra-legal considerations,'"8 but when the dust has settled and it is
time for a decision, the client has the final word. Whether the
choice is to clean out the adversary, split the difference, or make a
gift, if a client's choice is knowingly and freely made, a lawyer must
act on and respect it.
The duty of loyalty arises principally from those parts of the
Model Rules requiring the preservation of client confidential com-
munication199 and prohibiting the representation of conflicting in-
terests. °0 In seeking legal help, clients may (many would say must)
tell lawyers all that they know,20 ' both good and bad, helpful and
harmful, embarrassing and praiseworthy, so that lawyers may be
prepared for any eventuality the representation might present. This
information may be shared in private and, absent consent or tactical
necessity, must not be disclosed.20 2 When the information is about
198. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.4 cmt; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note
184, at 303-308.1 (right to argue nonlegal considerations to a client); WOLFRAM, supra
note 169, at 157-58.
199. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.6. For a general discussion of the loy-
alty obligation, see WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 145-88; for confidentiality, see id. at
242-68, 296-311. The obligation to preserve confidences under the Model Rules is not
the same as the obligation to preserve confidential communication under the attorney-
client privilege. For a discussion of the latter, see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra
note 170, at 185-89; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 250-68.
200. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9; see also WOLFRAM, supra note
169, at 312-37.
201. The classic argument to this effect is FREEDMAN, supra note 187, at 30-32. See also
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 189-97; Paul D. Carrington, The Right to
Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291; Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 3, 3-23 (1951); Stephen Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System and the Changing
Role of the Advocate in that System, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 251 (1981);John B. Mitchell, The
Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney--New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293
(1980); Penegar, supra note 89, at 355-64; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical
Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613; Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647 (1986). This
argument seems to have convinced the authors of one of the leading negotiation texts.
See HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS, AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR 373-89 (1977). Again, things get much more complicated when
the client is a corporation. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 217-34.
202. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.6(a), (b). For a discussion of the disclosure
obligations of the Model Rules generally, see HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 88-
106; LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE, supra note 170, at 177-234; WOLFRAM, supra note 169,
at 296-311; Burt, supra note 122. See also Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice
About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV.
565 (1989) (analyzing with skepticism the role of confidential communication in making
legal advice available and socially desirable); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality,
74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989) (challenging many of the Model Rules' confidentiality provi-
sions and the reasoning supporting them).
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certain kinds of illegality it may have to be revealed, 0 3 but under
no circumstances may lawyers ignore client instructions to conceal
information not having to do with illegality which, if disclosed,
might impair or undercut a client's bargaining advantage, even
though these instructions may prevent lawyers from bargaining co-
operatively.
The loyalty obligation also prohibits the representation of con-
flicting interests. Conflicts can be simultaneous or successive.2°
They are simultaneous when lawyers argue both for and against the
same position in a single dispute, such as representing husband and
wife in a contested divorce, buyer and seller in a lawsuit for breach
of contract, or joint defendants in a criminal prosecution (where the
substance of each defense incriminates the other defendant).20 5
Successive conflicts occur when lawyers switch sides and try to undo
for present clients what they did for other clients in the past 20 6 (and
may occur when they try to undo for present clients what they could
do for other clients in the future20 7). Beyond being bad form, a now
rejected but not always unpersuasive rationale, 208 representing con-
flicting interests is prohibited by the Model Rules because of the
belief that it is not possible for lawyers to proceed competently
against former clients without in some way using information ac-
quired during past relationships to the former clients' detriment.
Such actions would violate the same considerations that underlie the
obligation to preserve client confidences.2 0 9 (A conflict between
present and future client interests will need a different rationale. 21 0)
203. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.6(b)(l) (allowing a lawyer to reveal
confidential information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm"). Rule
1.6 is sometimes superseded by other Model Rules or the substantive law of the various
jurisdictions, but "a presumption should exist against such supersession." Id. cmt. 20;
see also Rhode, supra note 187, at 612-17; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 268-82, 303-11.
204. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.7 with id. Rule 1.9.
205. See id. Rule 1.7(a) cmt; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 128-140.1;
WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 349-58.
206. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.9; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note
184, at 174.1-186.3; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 358-74.
207. See infra notes 234-236 and accompanying text.
208. See MODEL CODE, supra note 184, Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the
Appearance of Professional Impropriety."); MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.9 cmt.
5 (noting that "the term 'appearance of impropriety' is question-begging"); see also
WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 319-23 (discussing the coherence of "appearance of impro-
priety" rationale).
209. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.9 cmt. 5; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 184, at 121-27 (finding that the loyalty obligation underlies conflicts rules); WOLF-
RAM, supra note 169, at 316-17.
210. See infra notes 234-236 and accompanying text.
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In short, lawyers may not compromise the interests of clients, pres-
ent or past, to serve the interests of other clients, or themselves,
either by arguing against clients or betraying their trust.
The duty of communication, or the duty to "explain a matter"
and "keep the client reasonably informed, '" 2 "1 is a corollary of the
client's right to control the representation. In order to decide what
ends to pursue, what costs to incur, and what harms to inflict, clients
must know about relevant evidentiary facts, adverse party interests,
offers of settlement, consequences of choices, alternative courses
available, and institutional and situational factors likely to influence
the outcome of the case.2 2 Lawyers are the clients' only or best
source for much of this information.2 t3 This duty to inform may be
more substantial in bargaining, where proceedings may be and reg-
ularly are suspended to allow for discussion of options, than in
other types of proceedings, such as trials, which, once begun, con-
tinue to a conclusion on a timetable of their own. 214 While lawyers
need not explain bargaining strategy in detail (for they may know it
themselves only in retrospect), they must "fulfill [the client's] rea-
sonable.., expectations for information consistent with the duty to
act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements
as to the character of the representation. 2 1 5 When this is impracti-
cable-when a client is incapacitated, for example-lawyers may act
without prior consultation; however, this is a limited exception, nar-
rowly construed and infrequently used. Clients control legal repre-
sentation, and lawyers must inform them to the extent necessary to
allow them to exercise that control.21 6
When these duties are combined, as they must be, it may ap-
pear that lawyers are ethically obligated to be skillful, energetic, un-
211. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.4.
212. See WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 163-65 (discussing the rationale for the duty of
communication); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 62.1-68; Perschbacher, supra note
189, at 115-18; Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 72-122 (1979).
213. See GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 6-7; ERLANGER et al., supra note 6, at 29.
214. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.4 cmt. 2.
215. Id.
216. See id. Rule 1.4 cmt. 3, Rule 1.14(b); see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at
269-80 (discussions of the Rules regulating incapacitated clients); WOLFRAM, supra note
169, at 159-63, 712. For an extensive discussion of the issues involved in representing
the incapacitated client, see Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Deci-
sionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515. For a discussion
of some of the theoretical and practical difficulties involved in making client control a
reality in the bargaining setting, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement,
16J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).
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critical, and obedient instruments of selfish client ends,21 7 but the
reality of lawyer dispute bargaining role is slightly less harsh. Law-
yers are persons in their own right, with moral and political rights
and obligations of their own, and even though they must take direc-
tion from their clients, they need not do everything asked .21  For
example, the duty of deference distinguishes between questions of
ends and questions of means, and reserves to lawyers the tactical
and technical decisions of how best to advance client objectives. 2 19
217. There certainly are respected commentators who believe that this is true. In
their words,
[L]awyer(s] [are] person[s] who on behalf of some people treat[ ] other people
the way bureaucracies treat all people-as nonpeople .... [They] . . . use ...
bureaucratic skills--delay, threat, wheedling.... negotiation, selective surren-
der, almost-genuine passion--on behalf of someone unable or unwilling to do
all that for himself.
[They] help people who cannot in the particular instance relate success-
fully to each other as whole human beings to relate to each other as counters in
each other's self-protecting and self-maximizing life plans.
Dauer & Leff, supra note 186, at 581. As a consequence, the most that can be said for
them is that they are "no rottener than the generality of people acting, so to speak, as
amateurs." Id. at 582; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 197, at 1046 ("The traditional sys-
tem encourages the lawyer to pursue his client's supposed interests to the limit, perhaps
further than the client would have pursued them, without taking responsibility for the
results."); Penegar, supra note 89, at 338-41 ("the lawyer is not told to moderate his zeal
.. [;] nothing is to be held back"); William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New
Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) (lawyers who represent clients on a thera-
peutic model typically regard the lawyer-client relationship as a community of two, and
the rest of the world as adversaries to be neutralized); Zacharias, supra note 202, at 374
n.106 ("lawyers and laymen alike come to view the profession as amoral 'tools' of the
client, meriting the right to earn a living, but little else," and "this view is consistent with
the general orientation of the professional codes"). The "amoral bureaucrat" view is
not unanimously held, of course, see Fried, supra note 186, but it is refreshingly free of
the civics class hyperbole and self-serving (and self-deceiving) cant, which characterizes
much of the literature on being a lawyer, and this gives it a certain appeal.
218. Model Rule 1.2, allowing a lawyer to limit the scope of a representation, and
Model Rule 1.16, allowing a lawyer to decline or terminate a representation, are the two
most common sources of this power. The process of preventing client misconduct by
withholding cooperation is often described as performing the lawyer "gatekeeper" func-
tion. See generally Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforce-
ment Strategy, 2J. L. & EcoN. ORG. 53 (1986). See also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184,
at 2, 30-45 (representation must be within the bounds of law, and nonfraudulent);
WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 155 (lawyers sometimes must take charge in client relation-
ships); id. at 582-85 (examples of how lawyers do not always have to do what clients
request); Burt, supra note 122, at 1028 ("limits have always been placed on an attorney's
freedom to accept a client's directives without question"); Schuman, supra note 21, at 12
(nothing in the Disciplinary Rules prevents lawyers from offering moral advice to cli-
ents). On the lawyer's duty to self, see generally John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the
Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 429.
219. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.2 cmt. 1; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 184, at 19-22; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 159-60; WOLFRAM,
supra note 169, at 156-57; Spiegel, supra note 212, at 49-65. All of these commentators
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If a client asks a lawyer to use tactics that are repugnant, lawyers
may refuse. Lawyers owe clients only substantive competitiveness;
they may choose their own style. While clients should decide mixed
questions such as how much expense to incur or how much harm to
inflict,22 ° for the most part lawyers and clients divide bargaining de-
cision responsibility along an ends-means line.
Similarly, as officers of the court and citizens of the community,
lawyers have public responsibilities, to third parties22' and to the
law,222 that clients may not trump. Lawyers may not lie for clients
(though they may tell half truths and pufl2 3 ), either to adversaries
or courts, or mislead opponents, either by act or omission, when to
do so would be civilly actionable.224 In limited circumstances, occa-
sionally present in bargaining, lawyers must correct adversary mis-
apprehensions and remedy ignorance.225 They must bargain in
good faith, not seek or agree to unconscionable settlements, and
emphasize the difficulty of making the ends-means distinction. The authority to make
tactical decisions even permits lawyers to act contrary to client instructions under certain
circumstances. See William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Rela-
tionship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys' Procedural
Errors, 1988 DUKE LJ. 733, 740-41.
220. This was clearer under the Model Code, which in Ethical Consideration 7-7, re-
served to the client the right to make all decisions "affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a client," though even under the Model Code the
scope of this power was subject to debate. See Penegar, supra note 89, at 340-41 (Model
Code limits the means an advocate may use rather than substantive outcomes she may
produce); Spiegel, supra note 212, at 65-67.
221. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rules 3.4, 4.4; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 184, at 319-26, 369-86; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 609-15, 649-51, 709-10;John
K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers
and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 791-94 (1987); Perschbacher, supra note 189, at 86-94.
In limited circumstances these responsibilities may produce civil liability. See WOLFRAM,
supra note 169, at 223-35; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 6, at 207-10 (discussing the legal
effects of settlement agreements reduced to consent decrees).
222. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 3.3; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note
184, at 345-368.1; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 638-46, 681-86. But see Wilkins, supra
note 126, at 470-78 ("[T]he claim of indeterminacy directly challenges the ... assertion
that legal boundaries effectively mediate between a lawyer's private duty to clients and
her public commitments to the legal framework." Id. at 470.).
223. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 4.1 cmt. 1, 2; see also HAZARD & HONES,
supra note 184, at 426-33; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 720, 726-27; Lowenthal, supra
note 187, at 417-23; Steele, supra note 191, at 1392-95; Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at
1244-45. For a critique of the distinction between fact and opinion on which the idea of
puffing is based, see Guernsey, supra note 169, at 105-12.
224. Lowenthal, supra note 187, at 415-19; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 529 (1977) (defining incomplete statements as fraudulent misrepresentations); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 727-28 (5th ed. 1984);
WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 719-25; Perschbacher, supra note 189, at 90-93, 126-29.
225. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 428-29; Lowenthal, supra note 187, at
427-30.
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deal fairly with opponents by avoiding the use of force and fraud.226
These are limited obligations, imposed by law as much as by ethical
rules, and while they prohibit few competitive maneuvers-there is
still no obligation to make an adversary's factual case, correct analyt-
ical errors, or refuse any deal a court would enforce 2 27 -they are
supreme in their own realm.
Finally, when lawyers do not act as advocates for individual cli-
ents, the consequences of role, particularly of the duties of defer-
ence and loyalty, are not quite so fierce. For example, when hired as
intermediaries to "establish or adjust a relationship between clients
on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis," lawyers may re-
solve disputes by "developing the parties' mutual interests. ' 2 2 8
They may bargain cooperatively for each side, in other words, as
long as each is consulted on the implications of common represen-
tation, knows the advantages and risks involved, has made an ade-
quately informed consent, and faces little risk of material prejudice
should the joint representation fail. 229 Even when acting as advo-
cates, lawyers may encourage clients to bargain cooperatively,2 3 0
and when clients agree to do so, practical and ethical norms line up.
When lawyers want to be practical and clients zealous, however, law-
yers may be in a bind, depending upon how one interprets the fore-
going duties of bargaining role, and it is to that problem that we
now turn.
IV. THE BARGAINER'S DILEMMA
Practical bargaining is cooperative bargaining. Clients do bet-
ter, at least clients in the aggregate, when represented by lawyers
who bargain cooperatively and are known to do so. Nevertheless, a
particular client, valuing her own immediate return in an individual
case more highly than the interests of clients in the aggregate (which
may include the particular client's own future interests), may seek to
trade on rather than contribute to her lawyer's history of cooperat-
226. See Preamble to MODEL RULES, supra note 169; see also LUBAN, LAWYERS AND Jus-
ICE, supra note 170, at 16-17, 51; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 714-27; Perschbacher,
supra note 189, at 106-07, 123-25, 133-36; Steele, supra note 191, at 1396.
227. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 4.1 cmt; see also Lowenthal, supra note 187, at
413-14; Penegar, supra note 89, at 347 (bargaining is a "no-man's land" in which the
restrictions are "very few indeed"); Rhode, supra note 187, at 601.
228. MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 2.2 cmt. 3; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 184, at 309-18 (discussing the ethical norms for lawyers acting as mediators);
WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 438-43.
229. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 2.2; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at
337-49; HAZARD & HODES, supra note 184, at 142-54.2.
230. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.4 cmt.
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ing. She may instruct the lawyer to defect when the adversary coop-
erates, and may ground this instruction on the lawyer's ethical
obligations to be deferential and competent. This places the lawyer
in a bind. Does she bargain ethically or practically? Does she reject
the instruction and preserve her reputation for cooperating, so that
she can secure better settlements, on average, for all of her clients,
including those in the future? Or does she follow her client's in-
struction, exploit the adversary's reasonable but, as it will turn out,
unwarranted cooperation, and plant the seeds of future
retaliation?2 1'
The dilemma is serious, not necessarily because it is wide-
spread-it may or may not be-but because lawyers seem to assume
that it is the paradigm case. They see the defecting client as every
client, and feel the pressure to bargain competitively across the
board.23 2 Clients do not correct the assumption, some perhaps be-
cause they agree with it, others perhaps because they do not know
that it has been made, and still others perhaps because they see legal
representation as a technical process in which following the lawyer's
lead is the proper (and safest) course.233 Whatever the reasons, the
view that clients invariably want to compete has developed a life of
its own, and is now treated as received wisdom in large parts of the
231. Insurance companies face such a dilemma in settling individual lawsuits when
they must choose between the interests of individual insureds and those of insureds
generally. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1150-53 (1990).
232. Lawyers do not usually say directly that every client is a defecting client, but that
is the premise of the standard conception of lawyer role, see supra note 186, which sees
law as the only check on lawyer strategic behavior. In academic discussions of lawyer
role, the presence of the defecting client is often assumed because it is the hardest case,
but the assumption now may have become self-fulfilling. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devo-
lution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 909 (1990)
(positing that "in a market in which the client seeks a champion not a chaperon, a repu-
tation for aggressiveness may well be worth the costs ... necessary to earn it"); Roland
A. Paul, A New Rolefor Lawyers in Contract Negotiations, 62 A.B.A.J. 93, 95 (1976) (explain-
ing that the lawyer's "duty often has gone beyond simple protection to trying to get for
his client as much as he can"); Reavley, supra note 28, at 642-43 (offering as an explana-
tion for "sharp and nasty practices" by lawyers the perception by lawyers that clients
desire such practices); Zacharias, supra note 202, at 389 (lawyers do not try to dissuade
clients from acting illegally). But see Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public
Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1160 (1990) ("Lawyers in private practice should . . .
abandon their indifference to the ends being pursued by their clients" and counsel "a
client on what the client's position should be."). For a survey of lawyer views about the
nature of their obligations in a wide range of ethical bargaining problems, not always
conforming to the standard conception, see Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching
the Truth in Negotiations, 8 REV. LITIG. 173, 180-97 (1989).
233. See Spiegel, supra note 212, at 79-81. For an excellent discussion of why follow-




profession. Lawyers trapped in this view, as well as those represent-
ing clients who truly want to defect, need a reply to the client's argu-
ment from deference and competence.
One response, which reduces the extent of the problem but
does not solve it, is to argue that the decision to defect is a tactical
decision, for lawyers to make, based on tactical considerations. But
even if this argument is persuasive-and often it is not-it has two
important exceptions that nearly swallow it whole. The first occurs
when clients want a disproportionately large part of the bargaining
pie, and defection is the only strategy which can achieve that result.
When there is only one path to a legitimate (as in legal) client goal,
questions of ends, controlled by the client, and questions of means,
controlled by the lawyer, merge into one, so that it is largely beside
the point to ask who controls the decision. The second exception,
which is related, occurs when the decision to defect is the tactically
superior choice, even though cooperative strategies are also avail-
able to accomplish the same ends. Here, even though the lawyer
controls the decision, the duty of competence compels the choice of
the competitive option. Lawyers must give client ends their best
chance at success.
A lawyer might also argue that defecting unilaterally on an ad-
versary who cooperates puts the lawyer in the impermissible posi-
tion of representing conflicting interests. The argument goes like
this: When a lawyer defects, in the short term she and her present
client do better, reaping the benefits of the unilateral betrayal of
trust. If the defection is carried out skillfully, which the client has a
right to expect, its consequences will probably not be felt until the
next negotiation, when the betrayed adversary or one privy to her
information, now aware that she was betrayed,2 3 4 retaliates in kind,
and harms not the lawyer's present client but a future one.23 5 De-
fecting in the interests of a present client, therefore, compromises
the interests of future (unidentified but real) clients, and in the pro-
cess involves the lawyer in determining which of two incompatible
234. The assumptions here are that a bargainer expecting to trust (because the other
side has a reputation for cooperating) will interpret what she hears and sees in a trusting
light whenever the other's motives or purposes are not clear, particularly if the other is
skillful at concealing those motives and purposes. As a result, in the short term, defect-
ing behavior often will be missed, minimized, or overlooked. Thus, in most cases it will
not be until after the negotiation, if at all, as the bargainer reflects on what happened,
that she will realize she was betrayed, and not until she bargains with the same party
again that she will have the opportunity to reciprocate.
235. As Axelrod has shown, because of the "echo effects" of unilateral defection, this
harm ultimately could extend to many if not all of a lawyer's future clients, if it causes a
lawyer to develop a reputation for always defecting. See supra note 152.
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sets of client interests to serve. This, so the argument goes, is the
representation of conflicting interests. The lawyer avoids such a
conflict not by refusing to represent clients in the future-this ulti-
mately would make legal representation unavailable to all-but by
refusing to defect unilaterally on behalf of clients in the present.
While sensible in the abstract, this argument is not easily
grounded in the language of the conflicts rules. A lawyer who de-
fects unilaterally does not so much represent conflicting interests as
bargain in conflicting styles. She does not switch sides, argue for
and against the same issue, betray the present client who has asked
her to defect, or reveal the confidences of past clients whose secrets
are still intact. She betrays future clients and the present adverse
lawyer (who relied, reasonably, but as it turned out, unjustifiably, on
her past history of cooperation), but the conflicts rules do not men-
tion the interests of such persons. 23 6 Those rules prohibit actual
conflicts that are simultaneous or successive. But unilateral defec-
tion creates only a potential, not an actual, conflict. And the conflict
is successive only in the sense that the lawyer acts inconsistently
with a bargaining pattern she previously has used, not an interest
she has represented. And it is simultaneous only in the sense that
the lawyer betrays someone, not a client, in the present. The duty
of loyalty strictly construed, therefore, at least that part of it
grounded in the prohibition against representing conflicting client
interests, is not directly implicated when a lawyer unilaterally de-
fects on an adversary who expected her to cooperate. In fact, under
the Model Rules, a refusal to defect may be the only disloyal act.
In a variation, a lawyer might also argue that the defecting cli-
ent scenario presents a second type of conflict, one between the law-
yer's interest in cooperating to promote the lawyer's material
interests over time, and the client's interest in defecting to get the
lion's share of a bargaining pot in the present. When a client asks a
lawyer with a reputation for cooperating to defect on an adversary
who also expected to cooperate, the lawyer's reputation for cooper-
ating is likely to be jeopardized. She understandably will be reluc-
236. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9. But see ROBERT E. KEETON,
TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 3 (2d ed. 1973).
The duty of supporting the client's cause is sometimes so forcefully stated as to
support the argument that . .. a trial lawyer [is] obliged to assert every legal
claim or defense available .... [b]ut the aim of the trial system to achieve jus-
tice, the interests of future clients, and your legitimate interest in your own





tant to undercut this reputation because it allows her to coordinate
activities and produce the largest aggregate returns over a bargain-
ing career. This reluctance will make it difficult for the lawyer to
make and carry out the decision to defect. Because lawyers may not
represent clients when the lawyers' interests prevent them from con-
sidering and carrying out courses of action desired by clients 2 3 7 it
may seem, at first glance, that a lawyer must either defect or refuse
representation. Yet, a closer look at the Model Rules will show that
they are more concerned with lawyer "income" and "business inter-
ests" specific to the particular representation than to the undifferen-
tiated interest of doing well generally over time. 23 ' The Rules try to
make sure that lawyers do not exploit the influence provided by
their clients' dependent circumstances to advance their own (the
lawyers') interests by making favorable book deals, buying property
at bargain prices, receiving gifts, unfairly appropriating resources
held by clients, and the like. The Rules are less concerned with
preventing lawyers from representing clients in ways that also maxi-
mize lawyer long range monetary return. In fact, if the latter was
prohibited, representation would be denied to all but the most com-
pliant clients.
Finally, a lawyer could argue to the defecting client:
I'm not selling you out by being cooperative. Being coop-
erative allows me to get good results, and avoid getting
trapped in the mutual defection box. These benefits are
available only because I have a history of cooperating, and
you may not rely on that history and simultaneously deny
it, as it suits your interests. You may not be a free rider on
the efforts of my past clients. 39
On this view, a lawyer's reputation is analogous to a public good,
237. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.7(b) cmt; see also HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 184, at 140.1-42, 156-73; WOLFRAM, supra note 169, at 479-89. On the lawyer's
reluctance to jeopardize her reputation, see Miller, supra note 216, at 210 ("A lawyer
with an established reputation may be loathe to push too hard with one client since the
costs of doing so, in terms of damage to reputation, may well exceed the value that the
lawyer can expropriate in a particular case.").
238. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rule 1.7(b); see also id. Rule 1.8 (regulating
"Prohibited Transactions" between lawyers and clients); Rowe, supra note 25, at 870
("The economic incentives affecting lawyers do not always coincide with what would
serve their clients' interests."); Wolfram, supra note 169, at 479-84.
239. For a discussion of the free rider problem, see DE JASAY, supra note 181, at 137-
40; GAUTHIER, supra note 93, at 113-14; RAIFFA, supra note 118, at 347- 49; RAWLS, supra
note 88, at 9-10, 267-70 (1971). The objection to the free rider is that noncompliance
with a cooperative scheme morally wrongs those who comply to the extent that it ex-
presses disrespect for them. See LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE, supra note 170, at 37-43.
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existing for the benefit of citizens generally, and not something indi-
vidual clients are free to destroy in the service of their own selfish
ends. 24 ° A client might make two replies, however. The first is a
variation of the argument from diligence:
24
'
Counselor, if you really can guarantee the benefits of mu-
tual cooperation, the good result, you can guarantee the
benefits of unilateral defection, the great result. You can
guarantee a good result only because you know the other
side will cooperate, but if the other side will cooperate you
can get a great result by defecting. Since you have an obli-
gation to seek my lawful objectives through reasonably
available means, and defecting does not involve doing
something illegal, you are not being a zealous advocate if
you refuse my request to clean out the opponent when you
know he is going to cooperate.
This is a familiar and strong argument. But in a twist on it, which is
perhaps stronger, the client continues:
Counselor, I do not believe that you can guarantee a good
result, because you cannot guarantee that the other side
will cooperate. And if the other side defects, then by coop-
erating you are helping them to clean me out. You're get-
ting me a terrible result when by defecting you might have
gotten me a mediocre one, and that's malpractice. 42
This argument is more powerful, and when taken together with the
others, leads ineluctably to the conclusion that, because the ethical
norms of bargaining are client centered, case specific, and individu-
alistic, clients may instruct lawyers to squander the capital of their
240. A "lawyer services as public good" view may underlie Judge Sarokin's decision in
the cigarette liability case to deny discovery gag orders so that lawyer discovery material
would be available to citizens generally for future litigation. See Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, 106 F.R.D. 573, 576-77, 586 (D.NJ.), rev'd on other grounds, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d
Cir. 1986). To hold otherwise, said Judge Sarokin, would have been wasteful, ineffi-
cient, and not in the public interest. The same view may underlie the anti-secrecy move-
ment now spreading through the states. See Andrew Blum, Anti-Secrecy Drive Spreads in the
States, 13 NAT'L LJ., Jan. 14, 1991, at 3; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 184, DR 2-108
(prohibiting lawyers from agreeing not to bring future suits on the same issues as part of
settlement on the theory that once a lawyer develops an expertise, parties should not be
able to suppress it in the interests of an individual client; the expertise should be avail-
able to the public generally).
241. The argument that follows is a paraphrase of an argument made by David Luban
in a presentation to the Section on Alternative Dispute Resolution of the Association of
American Law Schools. See Luban, supra note 142.
242. For discussions of the malpractice standard, see HAZARD & HODES, supra note




individual reputations on one-shot cases, and to be individually ra-
tional even when it leads to collectively irrational results.2 43 Law-
yers are charged with representing just one client at one time, and
must represent that client against the whole world.
Seemingly trapped in a no-win situation, 4 4 lawyers have made
an interesting and clever, albeit probably unself-conscious, adapta-
tion. Lawyer bargaining is not just adversarial; it is also stylized. It
is adversarial because it is made up, in the main, of aggressive com-
munication maneuvers such as argument, challenge, and de-
mand.245 It is stylized because this aggressive maneuvering is
carried out in a slightly exaggerated, somewhat predictable, and es-
243. See Penegar, supra note 89, at 310, 322-36, 354-55. Some consequentialist phi-
losophers argue that cooperation is a moral and not just a practical requirement of rela-
tionships, and implicitly, that the contradiction in lawyer bargaining role is between two
different types of moral norms, not moral norms and practical norms. See, e.g.,
GAUTHIER, supra note 93. If they are correct, and not everyone agrees that they are, see
Annette C. Baier, What do Women Want in A Moral Theory?, 19 Nous 53, 54 (1985) (dis-
missing game theoretic moral philosophy as "male locker room"-a "big boys' game,
and a pretty silly one too"); HABERMAS, supra note 118, at 48 (arguing that "empiricist
ethical theories have no enlightening impact because they remain fundamentally cut off
from the intuitions of everyday life"); Roemer, supra note 67, at 91 (seeing it as a mistake
to view bargaining axioms as capturing our moral intuitions directly), bargaining's ethi-
cal norms would require immorality, not just impracticality, and this would produce a
more profound and disabling kind of role contradiction than the one I have identified.
So viewed, the problem would be a variation on the professional morality versus role
morality debate, for which David Luban's work is the most important. See LUBAN, LAW-
YERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 104-74; Luban, Freedom and Constraint, supra note
118.
244. The contradiction imbedded in this clash between ethical and practical norms is
not a variation of the "contradiction" built into all lawyer role by virtue of the fact that
lawyers are simultaneously officers of the court and representatives of clients, and often
must do different things to satisfy their obligations to each, See Preamble to MODEL
RULES, supra note 169. The duties to court and client exist in a sliding scale relationship
to one another, with rules for determining which gives way when there is a conflict.
Both are part of a single system of lawyer role, whose content is sometimes controversial
or unclear, but is rarely incoherent. But see Wilkins, supra note 126, at 479 (A lawyer
always has "two arguably contradictory normative frameworks from which to construct a
'legal' response" to an ethical dilemma resulting from a conflict between the "officer of
the court" and "zealous advocacy" paradigms.). For a recent example of how courts are
able to reconcile these sometimes conflicting obligations, see In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d
790 (Ill. 1988). See also COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N ....
IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PRO-
FESSIONALISM (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM]. The contradiction
between ethical and practical norms is another matter, however. These norms are not
part of a single system, and they do not exist in a clearly defined status hierarchy. They
produce conflicts that cannot be resolved by appeal to predefined meta norms or deci-
sion procedures, and they create a genuine contradiction.
245. This was one of the principal points in cooperative bargaining theory's critique
of positional or adversarial bargaining. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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sentially impersonal fashion. 246 Both dimensions are important to
wriggling out of the dilemma of lawyer bargaining role. The adver-
sarial part allows lawyers to believe that they have fought hard for
their clients, and in the process that they have been deferential to
client wishes and diligent in their pursuit. The stylized part allows
them to preserve bargaining relationships with other lawyers by sig-
naling, through a set of rhetorical conventions, that the aggressive-
ness is not personal, but is just part of the lawyer act.2 4 7 Behavior
that is both adversarial and stylized is a lawyer's way of being (or
believing she has been) both ethical and practical, of protecting her
reputation for cooperating, while at the same time arguing zealously
for the interests of her clients. It is an effort to walk a line between
the important but conflicting normative pulls of bargaining's ethical
and practical sides, complying minimally with each and not openly
violating either.
In a sense, of course, stylized aggressiveness is not a successful
response to the dilemma of bargaining role. It often routinizes cli-
ent interests and thus is not diligent, while at the same time it fre-
quently offends other lawyers and thus is not cooperative. This
objection misses the point, however. There is often no way to be
both diligent and cooperative, to be practically effective and ethi-
cally scrupulous, at least in the hardest of cases.248 Yet lawyers need
to be practical to prosper and want to be ethical to make prosperity
246. For an illustration of law students and lawyers arguing to one another in a highly
stylized manner, in order to convince themselves that they had protected their "client's"
interests, see Condlin, supra note 6, at 96-102 & n.8 1. Popular instructional videotapes of
lawyer bargaining, used in law school courses in negotiation, also contain many of the
same properties, see id., at 126 n.95, as do articles by lawyers in law journals. For a good
recent example of the latter, even in the face of efforts to encourage "dialogue" rather
than "argument," see Sarah E. Burns, Notes From the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 189, 200-02 (1990), providing a response to Ruth Colker's sugges-
tions for litigating abortion cases in a more "feminist" manner.
247. This stylized quality of bargaining behavior may be no more than a carryover
from the habits of trial, where the dramatic dimension of a public proceeding is thought
to require participants to act in ways that are slightly larger than life, and the only error,
if it is one, is seeing bargaining as analogous to trial. Because stylized behavior is a
feature of all types of lawyer bargaining, whether done by litigators or not, and because
stylized behavior also pervades other types of lawyer work, even that with colleagues not
involving adversary relationships, see Condlin, supra note 6, at 126 n.95, something more
fundamental than the transfer of trial habits must be going on.
248. But see GIFFORD, supra note 1, at 41. Gifford seems to understand the contradic-
tion between practical and ethical norms, but thinks that it can be resolved "by packag-
ing competitive negotiation tactics, when justified, in a cooperative style." He seems to
believe, in other words, that it is possible to compete against another without the other
finding out that you are competing. While this might be true in particular circumstances
for limited periods of time, it does not take the "echo effects" problem into account, see
supra note 152, nor is it consistent with Lincoln's popular wisdom.
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palatable. They need to reconcile bargaining's confused normative
universe, or at least appear to do so, and stylized adversarial advo-
cacy is simply the best of a bad lot of present options for allowing
them to believe this has been done.
The understandable, if ultimately mistaken, wish to be true to
all facets of a complex and sometimes contradictory bargaining role
is a less exciting explanation of competitive lawyer bargaining be-
havior than explanations based on the legal profession's deeply
rooted and pathological need to fight, or a failure of technique, but
most reality is more mundane than the most exciting stories that are
told about it.249 Lawyers know how to cooperate (the existence of
private dispute settlement in a system of adversary advocacy is proof
of that), but they are unclear about the extent to which they are per-
mitted to do so consistently with their other important role-related
obligations. The problem of ineffective lawyer bargaining behavior
must be solved at the level of role, therefore, if it is to be solved at
all. Until that is done, other solutions, such as more and better skills
training, the principal prescription of the alternative dispute resolu-
tion literature, will be largely premature or beside the point, no mat-
ter how cleverly conceived or carried out.
V. A WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA
Programmatic responses to the foregoing dilemma of lawyer
bargaining role tend to focus on one part of bargaining's mul-
tidimensional nature and argue that better bargaining will be pro-
duced by more training in the dimension selected. 2 "° The allure of
this reductionist move is easy to see. It is difficult to reconcile con-
249. See, e.g., Schuman, supra note 21, at 3 (The "combative and aggressive nature of
the legal profession" is the root cause of "professional pathology," making law practice
a "Waste Land."). No doubt some lawyer bargainers slug it out with adversaries be-
cause of strongly felt anger or a deeply buried need to fight, or because they know of no
other way to talk about differences, but I assume that most lawyers, like most people, are
uncomfortable with such practices and would let them go in an instant if they thought
they could do so and still do their job well. Cooperative bargaining theorists must think
so as well, or they would not have worked so hard to convince lawyers of the advantages
of the cooperative approach. If lawyer practices were rooted in pathology, rational argu-
ment would not change them.
250. This is the approach of the leading proponents of cordial, principled, and prob-
lem-solving bargaining theories, and similar to the approach taken by Gifford, who rec-
ommends that bargainers learn to do all of the above, as appropriate. GIFFORD, supra
note 1, at 13-18, 22-24. For a recent example of an attempt to write a particular skill
conception of bargaining into the profession's formal definition of role, see ABA TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, STATEMENT OF FUN-
DAMENTAL LAWYERING SKILLS AND PROFESSIONAL VALUES 54-60 (Tent. Draft 1991). See
generally Leubsdorf, supra note 197 (discussing approaches to reform of lawyer role).
[VOL. 51:1
BARGAINING IN THE DARK
tradictory role commands sharing no common denominator, and al-
ways easier to pretend that the world is simpler and that role
obligations are clearer than one knows at better moments to be the
case. The collapse of the distinction between aspiration and duty in
the slowly becoming defunct Code of Professional Responsibility,
for example, shows how comfortably people trained in law embrace
reductionism. 25' The coherence of simplification has its costs, how-
ever. Dispute bargaining is a multifaceted, multidimensional, and
contradictory process, whether one thinks of it as such, or not, and
elements that are ignored will force their way into the picture
whether one's theory makes room for them or not. It would be bet-
ter, then, to develop a conception of bargaining role that accounts
for all of the "blooming buzzing confusion"2 52 of the process, rather
than to ignore that confusion in the hope that form will follow focus.
But to say this is not yet to provide a way out of the dilemma of
bargaining in the dark.
There are essentially four responses to the problem. The first
is to do nothing, that is, to accept the system of unself-conscious,
stylized, adversarial advocacy as the most that is possible, and ask
lawyers to continue to "adapt" as they have in the past. For propo-
nents of this view, existing ethics rules, sufficiently glossed, are flexi-
ble enough to allow lawyers who want to resolve the difficult
problem of the free-riding client to do so, and yet are not so explicit
or confining as to require it of those who are unaware of, uninter-
ested in, or not up to the task. And while the rules could be clearer,
the prospect of actually improving them is not sufficiently great to
251. For a description of the distinction between aspiration and duty in the Model
Code, see LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 3-32 (rev. ed. 1969); Charles Frankel,
Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874, 877 (1976) (book review); John
F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction,
48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 258 (1970). One of the principal problems with the Model Code
was that too many lawyers complied only with the minimum standards of the Discipli-
nary Rules, ignoring the aspirational norms of the Ethical Considerations, thereby col-
lapsing the latter norms into the former. Treating this response as a given, the Model
Rules eliminated the distinction. See MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Scope to the Rules;
see also COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAUSM, supra note 244, at 258 (aspirational standards
of the Model Code did not work because they were "hard to enforce"); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 Record of the Bar of City of New York
77, 85-90 (1981) (discussing tripartite division of the Model Code, into Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, and the way in which only the Disciplinary Rules
were taken seriously).
252. The expression is usually associated with William James, but he attributes it to
"someone." See William James, Percept and Concept-The Import of Concepts, in SOME
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 32 (1979). What I have in mind here is an account of lawyer
role that is as rich and multifaceted as that provided by Mindes and Acock. See Mindes &
Acock, supra note 135, at 218-19.
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justify the risk of perhaps making them worse. This is a "muddling
through ' 25 3 theory of social reform, and to close observers of re-
corded history it may have some appeal.254
While muddling through may have a semirespectable pedigree,
putting one's head in the sand probably will not command wide-
spread support among those who understand the contradiction in
lawyer bargaining role. It is one thing to muddle through, not
knowing that it is being done, accepting the problems that muddling
creates as part of the background noise of everyday life, but it is
quite another to do so willfully in an attempt to avoid a difficult but
perhaps manageable problem. The former is merely ignorance, a
regrettable but understandable condition since one cannot know
everything. But the latter is cowardice, and our faith in the power of
the human animal to "control its destiny" does not allow us to give
in to cowardice, and probably rightfully so. Furthermore, stylized
adversarial advocacy has its costs, for clients, lawyers, and the sys-
tem of dispute settlement alike, and those costs alone make chang-
ing it an attractive course. Doing nothing is probably not an
acceptable choice.
The second option is to make bargaining's practical norms
more ethical (i.e., adversarial) by convincing lawyers that zealous-
ness in the pursuit of individual client ends, and the antagonism and
contentiousness it engenders, should be the natural order of lawyer
bargaining relationships; and that to temper zealousness in order to
make bargaining run more smoothly is to elevate etiquette over
politics, and to miss the point of what legal dispute settlement is all
about. This argument will encounter heavy going with bargainers
who understand the payoff structure of the prisoner's dilemma, and
who are rational. They will want to bargain cooperatively because
over time cooperation is better for them, most of their clients, and
the dispute settlement system in general. Only the unilaterally de-
fecting client will want to exploit rather than contribute to the sys-
tem of mutual trust created by cooperative bargaining, but there is
253. The expression is attributed to John Bright, and was first used during the Ameri-
can Civil War, See 1 JUSTIN MCCARTHY, REMINISCENCES 75 (1900). Charles Lindblom
turned it into a theory of organizational management. See Charles E. Lindblom, The
Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
254. A theory of the "second best" seems the basis for Dauer and Leff's proposed
defense of lawyer role. See supra note 217; see also Lipsey & Lancaster, "The General Theory
of Second Best, " 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1957) (attempting to develop a general eco-
nomic theory of the second best). One has to search no further than the ABA's rewrit-
ing of the Model Code into the Model Rules for evidence that things can always get
worse.
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no right to be a free rider on the efforts of past bargainers,2 55 or to
deprive future bargainers of the rewards of mutual cooperation. Be-
cause almost everyone is better off when dispute settlement is coop-
erative, therefore, the argument that lawyer bargainers ought to
make adversariness the rule is likely to fall, and appears to have
fallen, on deaf ears.
There is a point to this second response, however, that is often
overlooked in the legal literature on cooperative bargaining. If law-
yer bargaining role is to be defined in more cooperative terms, co-
operation must involve more than being friendly, splitting
differences, and avoiding conflict. It must be thought nonremark-
able and even appropriate for cooperative bargainers to disagree,
even stridently and intractably, about differences that are funda-
mental, or to argue contentiously and with feeling about beliefs that
are sometimes incommensurable. It is in the nature of things that
views sometimes conflict, and when this happens contentiousness is
a perfectly natural part of conversation.256 Cooperative dispute set-
tlement must make room for disagreement, and the anger, frustra-
tion, disappointment, and strong feeling that accompany it.
Otherwise, it will not ring true to lawyer bargaining experience, or
be capable of more than relocating conflict. Contentiousness is in-
appropriate only when it becomes personal, when ad hominem attack,
threat, and extra-legal leverage replace substantive argument as a
bargainer's main source of authority. All strong statement is not
personal attack, however, even when thought to be so by the one on
the receiving end. All assertiveness is not belligerence, all straight-
forwardness is not rudeness, all conviction is not arrogance, and all
255. See supra notes 239-240 and accompanying text.
256. One sometimes gets the sense that cooperative bargaining theorists hold no
political or moral beliefs passionately, and think that the effective discussion of differ-
ences consists of massaging bad manners with technique. See SILBEY & SARAT, supra note
23, at 117 (maintaining that needs discourse is "apolitical and distinctly technocratic").
Principled bargaining may be of a different view. See FISHER & BROWN, supra note 27, at
8-9. Owen Fiss sees the problem in a slightly different light. He thinks that proponents
of informalism
begin with a certain satisfaction with the status quo.... [The problem with this
is that] when one sees injustices that cry out for correction . . . the value of
avoidance diminishes and the agony of judgment becomes a necessity. Some-
one has to confront the betrayal of our deepest ideals and be prepared to turn
the world upside down to bring those ideals to fruition.
Fiss, supra note 25, at 1086-87; see also Hoffer, supra note 118, at 306.09 (discussing the
role of "honor" in explaining disputants' motives to litigate); Tanase, supra note 94, at
685 (quoting a former judge of the traffic section at Tokyo District Court who stated that
"lawyers should litigate more and argue more aggressively before the court than now to
get the award which best suits for [sic] the individual case at hand").
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enthusiasm is not insensitivity, even if each is often and easily mis-
taken for the other. Everything that makes one uncomfortable is
not, by definition, out of place in the bargaining conversation, nor is
the one who is uncomfortable always in the best position to deter-
mine whether the comments are warranted.
It is certainly true that bargainers must be able to protect them-
selves from personal attack, and afortiori must be able to recognize
when they are being attacked (put another way, they must be able to
tell when an adversary has defected), but they must not see attack
everywhere, or read their own worst fears into the other's behavior.
Even cooperative bargainers must have a healthy understanding of,
skill at, and tolerance for the robust, excited, and strongly stated
give and take that is an inevitable part of the discussion of differ-
ences. The generality that allows law to apply to broad categories of
cases simultaneously makes uncontroversial interpretations rare,
and the possibility of differential interpretation, with differential ad-
vantages for the respective parties, makes disagreement almost una-
voidable. The party whose view of law, in whole or in part, is
adopted as the basis of settlement does better, all else being equal,
than the party whose view is not. There is no escape from this real-
ity, and no way to make it inconsequential. As long as law is a
source of authoritative principle on which settlement can be
grounded, skill at argument of legal claims will be an inescapable
and influential part of dispute settlement. To believe otherwise is
quixotic.
One would think that bargainers, and lawyer bargainers in par-
ticular, would have an above average tolerance for disagreement.
Disagreement is, after all, widely thought to be a large part of the
nature of dispute settlement and the culture of lawyering. But the
exaggerated and stylized conversational methods lawyers have
adopted to manage and circumscribe bargaining conflict suggest the
opposite. Dealing with differences head-on and matter-of-factly
seems to be thought too risky, too likely to disrupt the bargaining
relationship, to be an integral feature of the bargaining interaction.
Instead, lawyers often seem to prefer the psychological safety of rit-
ual and caricature, where it is easier to deny that comments are sin-
cerely felt or personally directed. If it is true that there is something
in the psyche of the profession that abhors a dispute, the promise of
conflict-free dispute settlement, one interpretation of the presently
popular theories of "win-win" bargaining, is likely to be an attrac-
tive yet dangerous pill. Lawyers do not need to learn to avoid con-
flict, or deny its presence, but to recognize and accept it as
understandable under certain conditions, and be able to analyze and
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discuss it directly, without making more or less of it than bargaining
problems themselves require. As a corollary, they also need a con-
ception of advocacy not tied to theater, which sees disagreement as
an appropriate part of work relationships and ordinary conversation
as the proper vehicle for working it out. Proposals to change the
profession's conception of bargaining to make disagreement go
away are a step in the other direction.2 57
That brings us to the third and most popular response to the
problem of lawyer bargaining role, that of making dispute bargain-
ing's ethical norms more practical, or put another way, of defining
the ethics of lawyer dispute bargaining in more cooperative terms.
This response has three prominent variations. The first seeks to
undo adversary advocacy altogether, usually to replace it with a
more "inquisitorial" approach to fact finding and judgment.25 8 On
this view, the adversary system is fatally flawed, a vulgar scientific
257. But see Lesnick, supra note 9, at 442-47 (discussing the "deceptive" nature of
argument and the limits of rational discourse in resolving disputes and making public
choices). A cooperative conception of lawyer bargaining must also accept and make
room for the opportunity to demonstrate comparative bargaining skill. There are peo-
ple motivated exclusively by the psychic return of doing good work, judged against a
standard of what is absolutely possible (putting aside for the moment the question of
how absolute standards are identified), but they are an exception to the rule. Most also
like to be appreciated for the comparative quality of their work, particularly by others
who know how to judge (which can include adversaries), and do not work as hard if there
is no opportunity for such appreciation. If lawyer bargainers do not work hard, how-
ever, client claims will be overlooked, compromised, and abandoned, and in the process
clients will be denied complete protection of their interests, wants, and needs. In other
words, the opportunity to be judged to have done better work than an adversary is ulti-
mately linked to an in-depth and comprehensive consideration of all of the issues in a
dispute, and to try to prohibit the former is to make the latter less likely. Thus, coopera-
tive bargaining must value comparative cleverness, imagination, persistence, and the
like, at the same time that it tries to avoid the excesses of dirty tricks, and it must provide
a place for judgments about comparative bargaining skill to be made. Hannah Arendt
makes a similar point about political action, observing that because of its extraordinary
competitive and individualistic nature, it must make room for an element of "virtuosity."
See HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 153 (1968); see also Morris, supra note 221, at 791 (making a similar point in
terms of "craft"); Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 703 (1983)
("The will to win-so essential to effective advocacy-cannot be limited to the court-
room; it does and to an extent should permeate the discharge of all the attorney's serv-
ices to the client."); Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1230 (noting that stakes in negotiation
are raised by the high value lawyers place on their reputations for comparative instru-
mental effectiveness). This is not to advocate the "sporting theory of justice." See
Rhode, supra note 187, at 604. Comparative skill is not everything in bargaining, but it is
too important to be overlooked.
258. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
170, at 83, 93-118; Rhode, supra note 187, at 596-600 (criticizing adversary advocacy);
Schuman, supra note 21, at 9 (describing adversary system as a "waste land"). For a
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method under the best of circumstances, but now little more than a
wildly out of control system of orchestrated fights, which ought to
be put out of its misery so that it will no longer cause misery to
those caught in its web. This, like most clean slate reforms, is espe-
cially attractive in times like the present, when rapid change has
made it difficult for legal institutions and conventions to adapt to
new social conditions and events.
Trying to take adversariness out of this society's system for set-
tling disputes, however, is likely to prove fruitless and unwise.
Fruitless, because adversariness simply mirrors the possessive indi-
vidualism159 at the center of the culture itself, and whatever dispute
settlement system is ultimately selected is almost certain to do the
same. 2 60 Unwise, because the legal system of a multicultural society
should not relinquish the values of loyalty and diligence as the cen-
terpiece of its definition of lawyer role. We are not a homogeneous
tribe, linked by kinship, sharing a common race, religion, culture,
discussion of the differences between adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 94-96.
259. See generally CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
260. The question of whether ideology shapes institutions or institutions shape ideol-
ogy is, of course, complicated and difficult. For an intelligent discussion, see William
L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 63
(1974); Richard Danzig & Michael S. Lowy, Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United
States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 675 (1975); William L.F. Felstiner,
Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 695 (1975). I believe,
however, that it is a mistake to think that our system of adversary dispute settlement is
an accident of history, that we could have had any of a number of dispute settlement
systems, adversarial and non-adversarial alike, and that we have an adversarial one be-
cause of contingent historical events. Adversarial dispute settlement fits our culture per-
fectly. It reflects our longstanding suspicion of the state, makes freedom of the single
individual central, and recognizes the importance .of diffusing power by placing it in
many hands. Its procedural emphasis is suited perfectly to a heterogeneous culture not
principally bound together by shared substantive ends, and its slow, redundant pace
provides the room needed for deliberation, the most valued process in a representative
democracy. If it is only coincidental that we have this system, it is a remarkable coinci-
dence indeed that it fits us so well. See SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 101 (arguing
that an attempt to change the adversarial nature of our dispute settlement system would
require a reworking of our entire culture). This is not to say that we are inevitably and
incorrigibly individualistic and adversarial, but just that a dispute settlement system is an
institution of the culture, and not the other way around. It is certainly possible that the
culture could change, that other-regarding could become more important than self-in-
terest, and that this could produce a radical reworking of our dispute settlement system;
but the process does not work in reverse. Dispute settlement is a tail, not a dog. For
discussions of the difficulties involved in adapting a nonadversarial system of dispute
settlement to the American legal culture, using the German system as an example, see
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 98-103; John C. Reitz, Why We Probably




socialization process, and set of moral beliefs. We do not always
agree on the appropriate assignments of power, status, opportunity,
and goods, and are not always able to resolve differences by re-
course to peer pressure, neighborhood councils, and gentle suasion.
Many citizens are outsiders in this society, powerless without formal
legal rules and procedures, and without access to impartial courts,
to prevent unfair deprivations of liberty and property on a regular
basis. Lawyers make these rules, procedures, and courts accessible
and effective, and a citizen should not have to worry during this pro-
cess that the lawyer is not putting the citizen's interests first.
26 1
The adversary system might be modified rather than replaced,
however, without undercutting the loyalty and zealousness ethic or
radically reworking the legal system's conception of lawyer role.
This is the approach taken by the other two variations on the third
response to the problem of lawyer dispute bargaining role. One of
these variations seeks to redefine the ethical duties of diligence and
competence to permit and perhaps require lawyer cooperation in
situations of purely civil dispute settlement.262 Much of the elabora-
tion of those duties, both academic and doctrinal, occurs in the con-
text of criminal cases, imagined and real, where circumstances give
261. Putting client interest first is what clients like about lawyers. See Post, supra note
6, at 380.
The lawyer is the public and unavoidable embodiment of the tension we all
experience between the desire for an embracing and common community and
the urge toward individual independence and self-assertion; between the need
for a stable, coherent, and sincerely presented self and the fragmented and dis-
associated roles we are forced to play in the theater of modem life.
Id. at 389; see also Hoffer, supra note 118, at 302-03 (discussing the transformation of
American dispute settlement from informal and communal processes to uniform and
predictable, i.e., rule bound, ones); Rowe, supra note 25, at 827 ("[Iln America [proce-
dure's] role is relatively prominent perhaps because of our society's heterogeneity and
comparative shortage of shared substantive values."); Schneyer, supra note 170, at 23
("[H]ired gun norms, however unattractive in the abstract, become appropriate insofar
as they serve as a measured response to real temptations and pressures in law practice
.... "). But see Steele, supra note 191, at 1397, 1402-04 (fairness, not loyalty to the client,
should be the lawyer's highest value). For defenses of the adversary ethic, see generally
FREEDMAN, supra note 186; Landsman, supra note 201; Pepper, supra note 201; Saltzburg,
supra note 201; Schneyer, supra note 170. For a different, though not incompatible, per-
spective on this topic, see Galanter, supra note 2, at 17-27 (discussing how law operates
in the shadow of indigenous ordering, or in Galanter's words, "[i]f we have lost the
experience of an all-encompassing inclusive community, it is not to a world of arms-
length dealings with strangers, but in large measure to a world of loosely joined and
partly overlapping partial or fragmentary communities," id. at 22).
262. The most well-known statement of this view is Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the
Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 170, at 158. For another sophisticated
and sympathetic discussion, see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 59-66,
202-05.
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the duties a necessarily competitive caste.263  For reasons rooted
deep in our legal and political history, the rules of criminal adjudica-
tion provide citizens with special advantages when the state moves
to deprive them of their liberty. Built into criminal adjudication at
its most basic levels is a panoply of procedural and substantive rules
designed to make prosecution difficult to undertake and complete.
Grounded in an all-out commitment to liberty, these rules have as
one of their principal effects the equation of criminal representation
with "no holds barred" advocacy, requiring, among other things,
that lawyers (plea) bargain with the use of what in other contexts
might border on, or be thought of, as dirty tricks. 2" In criminal
defense, anything that works, short of illegal or criminal conduct
itself, is permitted and therefore required.
Civil representation does not come with all of the same histori-
cal or political baggage, however, and so the argument goes, need
not be adorned with all of the same trappings.2 65 The character of
the civil dispute is not defined by the constitution, at least not to the
same extent as the criminal case, and its form does not derive histor-
ically from the fear of the unbridled use of state power against the
263. See Luban, supra note 258, at 91-93; Penegar, supra note 89, at 367 ("[A] good bit
of the broad debate has been colored by the imagery of the criminal case."); see also
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-70 (1932) (discussing counsel's role in a criminal
prosecution). For academic and doctrinal discussion of the lawyer's ethical duties in the
context of criminal cases, see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 32 (1980); FREED-
MAN, supra note 186; Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175
(1983); Carrington, supra note 201; Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1951); Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (H.
Berman ed., 1961); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1011 (1986) (discussing David Luban's The Good Lawyer, supra note 170, and STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984)); Gary Good-
paster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
118 (1987); Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?, 95 YALE LJ. 1523 (1986)
(reviewing KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1985)); John Kaplan, De-
fending Guilty People, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 223 (1986); Landsman, supra note 201;
Mitchell, supra note 201; Pepper, supra note 201; A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the
Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921; Saltzburg, supra note 201; Harry I. Subin, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer's "Different Mission: " Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case,
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
264. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188 (1973); WOLFRAM,
supra note 169, at 588-90; Burt, supra note 122, at 1035-45; Luban, supra note 258, at 92;
Rhode, supra note 187, at 605-06; Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and
the False Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135, 1140-47 (1988). On society's commitment to the
pre-eminence of individual liberty, see BERNARD BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION: PER-
SONALITIES & THEMES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (1990); BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
265. See Rhode, supra note 187, at 606; Schwartz, supra note 264, at 1149-53;
Schwartz, supra note 262, at 155-69; see also Zacharias, supra note 202, at 356-57 (the
constitution makes criminal representation a special case).
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individual. It is about money and property, not liberty, and it has
few if any of the stigmatizing or ripple effects of criminal prosecu-
tion. Civil dispute settlement is about commerce more than politics,
it is to criminal defense what commercial speech is to political
speech, 266 and it could be held to a correspondingly different stan-
dard. It is not necessary, therefore, the argument concludes, that
civil bargainers subscribe to a "no holds barred" conception of bar-
gaining role, and because it is also not desirable, such a conception
should not be adopted. The practical effects of acting on such an
argument would be numerous, but they might not be momentous.
In fact, they may do little more than bring the formal norms of civil
bargaining into line with a large part of existing bargaining practice,
in particular that segment conducted by repeat institutional players
such as insurance companies, banks, administrative agencies, and
the like, in the routine processing of citizen and customer claims.2 6 7
The other variation on modifying rather than replacing adver-
sary advocacy distinguishes not between civil and criminal represen-
tation, but between different types of lawyer tasks. 68 It seeks to
reformulate the ethical duties of competence and diligence so as to
cut down on, and in some instances prohibit entirely, the use of
whole categories of dirty tricks, while still leaving room for the oper-
ation of adversarial interaction and the determinative effect of dif-
266. For a discussion of the distinction between commercial and political speech, see
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340-48 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-59 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).
267. See supra note 22 (discussing routine processing).
268. The leading exponent of differentiating among various types of lawyer tasks is
John Langbein. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHi.
L. REV. 823 (1985) [hereinafter Langbein, The German Advantage]. There are critics of his
claim for a "German Advantage" in civil dispute settlement, see, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et
al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in
Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 705 (1988); Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advan-
tage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
587 (1988), and Langbein has taken issue with these critics, seeJohn H. Langbein, Trash-
ing the German Advantage, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 763 (1988). Nevertheless, his basic sugges-
tion that a dispute settlement system should distinguish between adversarial and
nonadversarial processes remains intact. See also Rhode, supra note 187, at 640 ("Euro-
pean civil law procedures, which employ neutral as well as partisan modes of investiga-
tion .... might be adapted for some purposes in American tribunals."). For a variation
on this theme, see Schwartz, supra note 187, suggesting a division of the lawyering role
universe into advocate and nonadvocate categories. The Model Rules adopt the dichot-
omy between advocate and nonadvocate to a limited extent, in making a distinction be-
tween lawyer as counselor, see MODEL RULES, supra note 169, Rules 2.1-2.3, and lawyer as
advocate, see id. Rules 3.1-3.9.
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ferential lawyer skill. For example, proponents of this view
commonly distinguish between assembling the universe of evidence,
information, and rules (the record, so to speak) on which settlement
is based on the one hand, and interpreting and arguing from that
universe of information on the other.269 In creating the bargaining
record, lawyers should be free, or even obligated, to share relevant
evidence, not to coach or hide witnesses, to answer the other side's
factual questions, to disclose applicable law, and the like. But when
the issue is what this welter of information and rules means, they
also should be entitled to argue for the most favorable interpreta-
tions they can defend, even when not the most plausible, or when
not believed by the lawyers themselves. In this view, adversarial ad-
vocacy entails analyzing and arguing self-interestedly from a com-
mon record, rather than constructing a one-sided factual picture of
what the dispute is about in the first instance. 270 These changes
would not make competition go away, but they would limit it to that
competition built unavoidably into the structure of the bargaining
problem: the indeterminacy of law and facts, the parties' contrasting
world views, and differences in the parties' respective substantive
beliefs.
These last two approaches may be an attempt to strike a com-
promise between substantiality and acceptability, that is, to propose
changes in the system of adversary advocacy that will improve law-
yer bargaining behavior in significant ways, but at the same time not
weaken the loyalty and diligence promises made by the profession
to the criminal defendant. 27' Such proposals should be easier to
enact, one would think, than more comprehensive reworkings of ad-
versary advocacy, because their ripple effects are smaller, and their
opponents presumably less numerous. These are the kinds of re-
269. See Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 268, at 830-48; Reitz, supra note
260, at 989-92 (summarizing and elaborating on Langbein's argument, making the
above distinction).
270. The spirit of this full disclosure approach is embodied in the Judicial Conference
Working Group's most recent proposals for rewriting the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Federal Rules: Major Changes Sought By Judicial Con-
ference Working Group, 60 U.S.L.W. 2158-59 (1991). For an illustration of the manner in
which lawyers selectively reconstruct a factual record for purposes of making an argu-
ment, see Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext,
and Context, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29 (1991).
271. Schwartz and Langbein did not concern themselves principally with bargaining
or bargaining role, or the practicalities of rules reform, see Schwartz, supra note 262;
supra text accompanying note 262; supra notes 268-269 and accompanying text, but their
discussions are easily extended to these topics consistently with their original purposes,
and the motive of wanting to propose something workable is a plausible explanation of
the lines they draw.
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forms one would expect the organized bar to be quick to support.
Nevertheless, the politics of rules reform turns out to be not so sim-
ple, as the drafting of the bargaining section of the Model Rules
once again made clear.2 7 2 If the politics could be managed, how-
ever, it is still not clear that the kinds of distinctions these last two
proposals seek to make lend themselves to the format of ethical
rules. At the simplest level, lawyer tasks and types of work interlock
and overlap in ways that make isolating and regulating pieces of
them difficult.27 3 The record is always being completed, for exam-
ple, even as one argues about what it means, and the conceptual
separation of fact investigation from argument is just not always
true to bargaining reality. While slightly easier to make operational,
the civil-criminal distinction has equivalent problems. Apart from
the fact that some representation is difficult to categorize, 27 4 civil
disputes often involve greater resource disparities, have more se-
vere penalties, and produce more traumatic and lasting effects on
272. See Lowenthal, supra note 187, at 442-47; see also Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as
Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
677 (1989) (political account of the development of the ABA's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct).
273. For example, in rehearsing questions and answers with a witness prior to a depo-
sition, hearing, or trial, is a lawyer preparing the factual record, or constructing and
manipulating it? Witnesses have a legitimate need to prepare for questioning, so that
they can communicate understandably and accurately what they have witnessed, and be-
cause they know little about how formal evidentiary hearings operate, they should be
allowed to ask for help in this process. But, it is also not possible to prepare questions
and answers without shaping them to some extent, so what standards of role does a
lawyer follow when engaged in such a task? Presumably, Langbein would solve the
problem by having "some combination ofjudges, magistrates, and masters" take charge
of the witness examination process, see Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 268,
at 855, as he views the division of witness examination functions between judge and
attorney as a "grand discriminant" among legal systems. See id. at 863. But,
[u]nless there is a change in our fundamental cultural definitions, adoption of
judicial questioning of witnesses is likely to result in simply engrafting judicial
questioning onto our present system of adversarial questioning with relatively
unrestricted prehearing witness contact by attorneys and vigorous attempts at
cross-examination following judicial questioning. Such a mongrelized system
would neither secure the supposed economies of the German system nor avoid
the opportunities our system offers for witness influencing.
Reitz, supra note 260, at 994.
274. For example, deportation proceedings are civil in theory, but their effects and
the manner in which they are conducted often remind one of criminal prosecution. See
GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION 263 (1981).
The same might be said for civil contempt. See ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE
TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974) (citing the superiority of civil contempt over
criminal in inhibiting civil rights demonstrations). Deborah Rhode suggests that a dis-
tinction might be made along commercial and political lines rather than civil and crimi-
nal lines, see Rhode, supra note 187, at 606-07, but she does not develop the point, and it
seems fraught with many of the same difficulties.
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individual lives than do criminal prosecutions. Citizens often need
the protection of "anything that works" advocacy in the former as
much as the latter.275
Perhaps even harder than forcing orderly distinctions on an un-
ruly reality is the task of expressing the idea of cooperative bargain-
ing through the medium of rule-based incentives and constraints.276
Cooperation is not a formula or technique so much as it is an atti-
tude or state of mind for approaching a bargaining setting.277 The
cooperative move in one context, with one set of parties, is often
different from the equivalent cooperative move in another, and the
determination of how to cooperate depends more on faculties of
judgment than on the ability to decode and apply rules. The idea of
legislating cooperation has some of the same oxymoronic properties
as ordering freedom or compelling moral action. Genuine coopera-
tion, of the kind envisioned by the legal bargaining theorists, may be
too subtle, nuanced, and context specific to be announced. It may
be that it can only be learned. 278 And it may need a rule framework
that is more suggestive and malleable than didactic.
The fourth and most interesting response to the bargainer's di-
lemma, though not written as such, is Bill Simon's argument for
"ethical discretion in lawyering. "279 Simon divides conventional ap-
proaches to the definition of lawyer ethical role into two camps, the
275. See Rhode, supra note 187, at 606. There are famous cases in which civil proceed-
ings have been less fair and more punitive than criminal; one of the most outrageous is
the Atomic Energy Commission's security clearance hearing in the case of Robert Op-
penheimer. See PHILIP M. STERN & HAROLD P. GREEN, THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SECUR-
ITY ON TRIAL 402-23, 428-29, 450-59 (1969); see also Walters v. National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333 (1985) (finding no need for lawyers, even to
present complex medical and scientific evidence, in a nonadversarial proceeding before
"a decisionmaker whose duty is to aid the claimant"); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973) (finding no right to appointed counsel in parole revocation hearings); Wil-
liam D. Popkin, The Effect of Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study of Three Disa-
bility Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1977) (studying the effect of representation in
nonadversary programs). More routine examples occur in small claims court each day.
276. This is the position of the personal responsibility view of professional role. See
Leubsdorf, supra note 197, at 1047; see also Rhode, supra note 187, at 647 ("No such
code, however well-drafted, can definitively respond to the complexities of professional
practice."). For a thoughtful consideration of what such a rule structure might look like,
see Wilkins, supra note 126, at 516 (discussing the possibility of developing a set of
" 'middle-level principles' that both isolate and respond to relevant differences in social
and institutional context while providing a structural foundation for widespread compli-
ance in the areas where they apply").
277. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 165, at 231.
278. This learning may occur in much the same fashion that Aristotle envisioned
moral norms should be learned. See Condlin, supra note 170, at 323-24.
279. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083
(1988); see also Rhode, supra note 187, at 643 ("The rationale for professional action
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libertarian, which "emphasizes the lawyer's role as advocate and...
duty.., to the client, ' 280 and the regulatory, which "emphasizes the
lawyer's role as officer of the court and . . . duty . . . to the pub-
lic,"'28 ' and rejects both as based on a common style of reasoning
that he calls "categorical. '28 2 Categorical reasoning "restrictively
specifies the factors that a decision-maker may consider before she
confronts a particular problem," "privilege[s] some elements over
others," and "restrict[s] judgment in'ways that often preclude law-
yers from taking the actions that seem most legally appropriate in
particular circumstances. 283 In categorical reasoning "[t]he deci-
sion-maker has no discretion to consider factors she encounters that
are not specified, or to evaluate specified factors in any way other
than that given in the rule."28 4 These limitations oversimplify real-
ity, prevent lawyers from assessing the relative merits of their cli-
ents' ends, and in so doing, alienate lawyers from legality and
justice. Categorical reasoning, in Simon's view, suffers from the
same failings as formalism generally, and it is no more appropriate
in defining lawyer role obligations than in justifying a judicial deci-
sion or grounding a jurisprudential theory. 28 5
Elaborating on his earlier idea of "non-professional advo-
cacy,"' 28 6 Simon argues instead for a "discretionary approach''287 to
cannot depend on a reflexive retreat to role, which denies the need for reflection at the
very point when reflection becomes most essential.").
280. Simon, supra note 279, at 1084.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1086.
283. Id. at 1086-87.
284. Id. at 1086.
285. See id. at 1091.
286. See Simon, supra note 186, at 130-44; see also William H. Simon, Legality, Bureau-
cracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE LJ. 1198, 1200 (1983) (suggesting a vision of
legality in welfare administration that involves relative informality); William H. Simon,
Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) (critique of professional
notions of client and system). For a thoughtful analysis and critique of Simon's view, see
Bryant G. Garth, Independent Professional Power and the Search for a Legal Ideology with a Pro-
gressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183, 192-204 (1987).
287. See Simon, supra note 279, at 1090-91. For the work of another important propo-
nent of the discretionary approach, see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers,
68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988). Presently, discretionary models are attractive in legal scholar-
ship. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141 (1988) (advocating greater use of discretion and judgment by judges in reasoning
"between the poles" of Federalist and Nationalist models of federal courts law); William
E. Nelson, Moral Ethics, Adversary Justice, and Political Theory: Three Foundations for the Law of
Professional Responsibility, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (1989) (suggesting that lawyers be
thought of as quasi-bureaucrats, committed to pluralist political ideals rather than indi-
vidual client ends). The appeal of discretionary models probably owes a great deal to
the success of the critique of indeterminacy. See supra note 126. The inability of formal
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the definition of lawyer role, in which the lawyer's "basic maxim"
would be to "take those actions that, considering the relevant cir-
cumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to promote jus-
tice."'288 The "seek justice" maxim has two components: First, that
a lawyer assess the merits of the client's goals and claims in relation
to the goals and claims of others whom the lawyer might serve (rela-
tive merit), and second, that she "attempt to reconcile the conflict-
ing legal values implicated directly in the client's claim or goal"
(internal merit).289 In making the determination of relative merit
the lawyer should consider "the extent to which the [client's] claims
and goals are grounded in the law, the importance of the interests
involved, and the extent to which the representation would contrib-
ute to the equalization of access to the legal system. 29 ° In making
the determination of internal merit, the lawyer should understand
and respect "the role of judicial and administrative officials in law
enforcement," but treat "the premises of that understanding as re-
buttable presumptions that do not warrant reliance where they do
not apply." 291 In the event of "some unusual incapacity on the part
of official institutions" the lawyer "should make her own judgment
about the proper substantive resolution and take reasonable actions
to bring it about. 21 9 2 Where institutions are not incapacitated, the
lawyer should facilitate official decision. 93
Simon's is a powerful (one could say power-filled)294 concep-
tion of lawyer role not fit for the tentative or faint-hearted. As with
all of his work on the topic, he writes from a deep and abiding faith
in the moral insight and strength of character of the single deciding
individual. He assumes that the lawyer unilaterally can know and
understand all things clearly, and can avoid the doubt or ignorance
that often impedes action. The lawyer is the ultimate moral and
and determinate rules to deal in a nonmythical way with the complexity of real life situa-
tions has been laid bare for all to see. The natural response when rules fail is to look to
individuals for solutions, and to argue for rules flexible and open-ended enough to pro-
vide such individuals with the discretionary authority to make judgments about what
needs to be done. The pendulum will no doubt swing back to determinate rules, and in
some places, for example, criminal sentencing, perhaps already has.
288. Simon, supra note 279, at 1090.
289. Id. at 1093, 1096.
290. Id. at 1093.
291. Id. at 1097.
292. Id. at 1098.
293. Id. at 1100.
294. For a discussion of Simon's propensity to give individual lawyers extensive uni-
lateral power, see RobertJ. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic and
Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 55 n.31 (1986). Luban's "moral activism" is a
similarly robust view. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 160-61.
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political authority in a discretionary world. And while she must take
many factors into account, including the understandings and capaci-
ties of the other individuals and institutions with which she inter-
acts, she need not defer to anyone or anything if such deference, in
her view, would be unethical under the circumstances-even to the
point of being allowed to nullify law when she finds it in conflict
with her own sense of what is morally required. If Dworkin gives us
Hercules,295 then surely Simon gives us Ptolemy.
296
Ptolemy notwithstanding, Simon's approach is a healthier,
more interesting conception of lawyering and lawyer role than the
instrumental conceptions it competes with and seeks to replace. It
sees the lawyer as a moral and political agent with direct,
nonmechanical responsibilities for the justice of legal proceedings.
The lawyer must take responsibility for outcome as well as proce-
dure, must correct market failure when it appears that institutions
will deny justice, and must consider all of the dimensions of a prob-
lem, even the nonlegal, when relevant to a determination of right
outcome. She must make individually tailored, fully considered,
context-specific judgments about where to spend her resources and
how to act each time a new tactical or strategic question presents
itself, and she must never fall back on the formulaic dictates of pro-
fessional role. This is a more fully human and moral way to think
about being a lawyer than those methods embodied in ideas like the
division of labor, or based on metaphors like "cog in a machine.
297
295. See DWORKIN, supra note 94, at 105.
296. SeeJorstad, supra note 187, at 1099 (Simon's error is that of having " 'a too con-
sistent optimism in regard to man's ability and inclination to grant justice to his fellows
.... (quoting REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF
DARKNESS 118 (2d ed. 1972))) . Whether Simon is too optimistic or not, and this seems
difficult to say, it is to his credit that he is willing to trust individuals to make morally and
politically wise choices. He does not seem to feel so strongly about particular ends that
he builds them into his conception of role in the form of categorical rules, decision
procedures, and status hierarchies, so that they will be realized whether lawyers recog-
nize their importance or not. He seems willing to live with whatever people produce,
provided they have thought about and argued it out carefully and fully, and this is a
refreshingly democratic stance to take. Ellmann thinks that this quality makes Simon's
view "preferable to the more exclusively political" conception of lawyer role that Luban
presents, but doubts "that... individualized discretion can properly guide lawyers' ex-
ercise of the broad power to modulate the vigor of their advocacy." See Ellmann, supra
note 187, at 158 n.96. For another view of Luban, see Wasserman, supra note 187.
297. See Simon, supra note 169, at 66 ("[Tlhe effort to apply [general legal norms] to
specific circumstances can be experienced as direct participation in the normative life of
the community. [It] is the distinctive ethical component of the ideal of professional-
ism."). For machine-metaphorical or division of labor approaches, see Lee Modjeska,
On Teaching Morality to Law Students, 41J. LEGAL EDUC. 71 (1991) (lawyers are "pilots on
the river of law," for whom the client's cause is their cause, and the client's safe journey
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Simon's lawyer is a fully functioning moral agent, not just a func-
tionary, with noble, even heroic notions of how life is to be lived.
And his conception of lawyer role is one that respects and responds
to the complexity and multidimensional nature of the lawyer dispute
bargaining relationship.
If Simon's view has a fault, it is that it may require someone as
knowledgeable, thoughtful, and intrepid as Simon himself (and with
the work schedule of a law professor) to solve the complicated polit-
ical, moral, and technical questions that would be the discretionary
lawyer's often frustrating daily fare. Most rule systems are not writ-
ten with such a person in mind, aiming instead at a lowest common
denominator, and requiring only that those regulated rise to a mini-
mum threshold of acceptable conduct, understandable to and within
the grasp of almost all to whom the rules apply.2 98 Whether the fact
that large numbers of lawyers would misunderstand or not have
time to work through the problems that discretionary advocacy
would present makes the conception a bad idea, is a more difficult
question than whether discretionary advocacy is good or bad in the
abstract. Simon discusses several objections to his view, but this is
not one of them.299 In the end, however, this objection, rather than
problems of coherence or attractiveness, may prove discretionary
advocacy's undoing.
If discretionary advocacy were to be accepted, however, and
one surely hopes that it would, it would need considerable work
their passion); Penegar, supra note 89, at 376 (discussing Geoffrey Hazard's conception
of lawyer role as "mere employee, one of a legion of mere technicians of the corporate
enterprise, lacking in moral cachet and unable to direct the client's affairs"); Pepper,
supra note 201, at 623-24 (a lawyer is a technician or mechanic who helps the client
confront the very large and complicated machine that is the legal system, for the pur-
pose of getting it to work); Rhode, supra note 187, at 602-05, 643-47. See also Lon L.
Fuller &John D. Randal, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160
(1958) ("If it is true that a man in his time must play many parts, it is scarcely given to
him to play them all at once.").
298. This was the stated objective for including Disciplinary Rules in the ABA's Code
of Professional Responsibility. See Frankel, supra note 251, at 878.
299. See Simon, supra note 279, at 1119-44; see also Wilkins, supra note 126, at 510-15
("[Tihe likely consequence[ ] of adopting a system of professional regulation that in-
structs each lawyer to take only those actions that she believes will help to produce the
legally correct outcome in every case," id. at 510, is to "shortchange important systemic
values in a manner that can neither be controlled ex ante nor effectively reviewed ex
post," id. at 514.). David Luban discusses a similar "too much to ask" objection to his
"Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning" conception of lawyer role, phrasing the objec-
tion as "[requiring] a veritable night in Gethsemane every time a lawyer wants to take
what might be described in some circles as 'a lousy four-bill landlord-tenant case.' " See
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 139-44.
[VOL. 5 1:1
BARGAINING IN THE DARK
before it could be a workable guide for acting in lawyer bargaining
role. For example, it is not clear what implications, if any, the the-
ory has for rewriting the ethics rules of bargaining. Simon's discus-
sion is not about rules, and it is unclear what inferences are justified.
Presumably, he would reject the "do nothing" option, since part of
the problem with present conceptions of lawyer role, in his view, is
that they are too imbedded in categorical rules. A system of discre-
tionary advocacy would need more room to operate. How one
writes rules conferring ethical discretion is not obvious, however, if
in fact rules are needed at all.-" If rules are appropriate, presuma-
bly they would leave intact the tension between the competitive and
cooperative dimensions of lawyer bargaining role. It is not possible
to say, ahead of time and for all situations, which of these different
dimensions should give way or be subordinated, and an attempt to
do so would reintroduce categorical thinking. This and a myriad of
other problems would have to be addressed before discretionary ad-
vocacy could be made sufficiently specific to satisfy the predictable
demand of lawyers to know exactly what they are expected to do.
This seems a potentially more interesting and fruitful undertaking,
however, than the equivalent work required under each of the other
responses to the contradiction in lawyer bargaining role, and one
which, even if it did not ultimately prove satisfactory, would improve
our collective understanding of the system of informal justice and
the lawyer's role in making it operate.
300. For discussions of the trade-offs between precision and flexibility in rules, see
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976);
Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Non-
legal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 215-20 (1990);John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). See also Wilkins, supra note 126, at 514-15
(creating a system of professional regulation that effectively incorporates the lessons of
legal realism requires the "abandon[mentl of the traditional model's commitment to
general, universally applicable ethical rules [and the adoption of] an approach ... that
responds to the manner in which lawyers actually interpret and apply legal rules."). But
see Schneyer, supra note 170, at 25 ("[lit remains a fact of life that at some point the urge
to enumerate different rules for different practice contexts thwarts policy making by
favoring a grid of rules and roles that is too complex to be of practical use."). The
politically less powerful have many concerns with loose or imprecise standards. See Del-
gado et al., supra note 25; Martha L. Fineman, The Politics of Custody and the Transformation
of American Custody Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 829 (1989); see also Lerman,
supra note 22, at 746 ("In regulating behavior it is better to make a specific rule than to




These are exciting times for legal dispute bargaining. A full-
fledged subject of law school study for only a little more than a dec-
ade, it now finds itself simultaneously popular beyond its wildest
dreams, and in the middle of a theoretical dilemma calling into
question the coherence of its intellectual core. Its moment of great-
est success is also a moment of great precariousness. This is not
because of the lively debate between competitive and cooperative
theories of instrumental bargaining effectiveness, and the mutually
exclusive manner in which those views are sometimes discussed.
Such disputes are energizing for an academic discipline, adding pat-
ina (albeit sometimes in the form of scar tissue), not tarnish, to a
discipline's aura. Because the sharp dichotomies in this debate are
more academically constructed than real, however, they are likely to
go away on their own, or at least settle into predictable and stable
relationships, once the early rush of enthusiastic articles and books
is written, seminars and conferences held, and training programs
locked into their respective market niches.30 ' The conflict between
bargaining's practical and ethical norms is another matter, however,
and here it is harder to be sanguine about the prospects for long
term resolution. Diligence in the pursuit of a client's interest is
often a virtue, just as competing with an adverse bargainer is often a
vice, and yet it may not be possible to do one and avoid the other
much of the time. A bargainer may have to choose. This is a less
roseate view of lawyer bargaining role than many of those now pop-
ular, but it may be a more accurate one. If a conflict cannot be dis-
solved, however, it is still important that it be made clear.
301. See SILBEY & SARAT, supra note 23, at 38 (characterizing the alternative dispute
resolution movement as a product of a struggle by academics to find a place for them-
selves in the production of legal scholarship).
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